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SUMMARY
This doctoral thesis started in 2006 with an initial proposal to study corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) in the extractive industry in the context of contested operations on 
indigenous people's territory. The early focus on corporate codes of conduct and the 
academic debates around the concept of 'Free Prior Informed Consent' for indigenous 
people quickly seemed insufficient when a first review of the management literature 
showed a lack of grassroots empirical work on the topic. Despite corporate claims to CSR 
in the extractive industry and a whole lot of academic literature on the ethical 
responsibilities of corporations and the identification of corporate stakeholders, there still 
seemed to be a big blind spot on the grassroots reality of contested extractive industry 
operations. From there, it was only a short way to planning a qualitative study of managers' 
and local community stakeholders' perspectives. This idea was further refined and 
narrowed down when facing the messy reality of the field (see chapter two).  
This development process also speaks from the three papers that make up the core of 
this dissertation. The first co-authored paper (chapter three) reviews and adds to the 
international business literature on internationalization and local responsiveness. It 
systematizes and introduces the practitioner concept of the license to operate (LtO) and 
argues that local responsiveness is essential for extractive industry firms to obtain such a 
license which changes the perspective on an industry that traditionally is perceived as 
global and highly integrated with little local responsiveness.  
Despite the alleged importance of the LtO to managers, the often fervent local 
opposition against extractive industry operations challenges corporate claims to 
community engagement and CSR. The remainder of this dissertation therefore revolves 
around an ethnographic case study of the resistance against Vedanta's proposed mine in 
Niyamgiri and the corporate response.  
In the second paper (chapter four), my co-authors and I contribute to the growing body 
of literature in management and organization studies that draws on a social movement 
perspective to examine mobilization in and around organizations. Tensions within the 
transnational resistance network against Vedanta emerged as a key topic from the empirical 
material gathered during the first field trip. Grounded in the empirical material and 
drawing on the existing literature on anti-corporate mobilization, we develop the concept 
of national advocacy networks to speak to the translocal nature of such resistance 
(Banerjee, 2011). Our longitudinal ethnographic study also points to the processual nature 
of organizing and counter-organizing around the contested mining project in Niyamgiri. 
The topic of counter-organizing is taken up again in the third paper (chapter five) in 
light of the continued conflict and the increasing repression of anti-mining protest in 
Niyamgiri in the period between 2010-2013. Drawing on the framing literature, chapter 
five explores how frames employed by pro-mining actors might contribute to such 
repression and adds to our understanding of counter-organizing and adversarial framing.  
Overall, this dissertation provides a much needed grassroots ethnographic perspective 
to contribute to the management and organization studies literature regarding conflicts 
between corporations and their local communities.  
SAMENVATTING
Dit proefschrift vond haar oorsprong in 2006 als onderzoeksvoorstel, met als doel het 
maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen in the winningsindustrie, in een context van 
omstreden activiteiten in inheemse gebieden, te bestuderen. De initiële focus op collectieve 
gedragscodes en de academische debatten over 'Free Prior Informed Consent' bleken snel 
ontoereikend toen de initiële management literatuur studie naar het thema een compleet 
gebrek aan lokaal onderzochte data aantoonde. Ondanks de claims die bedrijven in de 
winningsindustrie veelal leggen op hun maatschappelijk verantwoord beleid, en de 
overvloed aan beschikbare literatuur over ethische verantwoordelijkheden van 
ondernemingen en het identificeren van hun belanghebbenden, blijkt dat de locale realiteit 
in de betreffende winningsindustrie vaak een andere is waar weinig oog voor is.  
Met dat uitgangspunt was het een kleine stap een kwalitatieve studie naar de 
perspectieven van lokale corporate managers en belanghebbenden in de lokale 
gemeenschap op te zetten. Gezien de chaotische lokale omstandigheden bleek een 
beperking in deze bestudeerde perspectieven noodzakelijk, waarover in hoofdstuk 2 meer. 
Deze ontwikkeling komt ook voort uit de drie studies die de empirische basis vormen van 
dit proefschrift. De eerste paper, waarvan mede-auteur, geeft in hoofdstuk drie een analyse 
en verdieping in de bestaande internationale bedrijfskunde literatuur. Het systematiseert en 
introduceert het in de praktijk gebruikte ‘License to Operate' concept, en beargumenteerd 
een meer lokale responsiviteit van de winningsindustriele ondernemingen die traditioneel 
gezien worden als globaal geïntegreerd. Ondanks zakelijke focus op de LtO, bestaat er een 
gapend gat tussen de corporate claims en de schijnbaar fervente lokale oppositie. Het 
vervolg van dit proefschrift draait om een etnografische gevalstudie naar het verzet tegen 
Vendanta’s voorgenomen mijn in Niyamgiri en de grootzakelijke tegenreactie.   
Hoofdstuk vier draagt bij aan het groeiende management- en organisatie literatuur dat 
het sociale beweging perspectief gebruikt, om de mobilisatie in en rond ondernemingen te 
bestuderen. De spanningen binnen de transnationale weerstandsnetwerken die tegen 
Vedanta ontstonden, bleken een centraal onderwerp in het empirische materiaal dat ik 
gedurende de eerste field trip verzamelde. Gebaseerd op die empirische data, en aan de 
hand van bestaande literatuur over anti-kapitalistische bewegingen, ontwikkelen we een 
national advocacy network concept, dat aansluit op het translokale oppositie idee 
(Banerjee, 2011). Onze longitudinale ethnografische studie markeert ook processuele 
karakter van het organiseren en tegen-organiseren van het aangevochten mijnbouw project 
in Niyamgiri. 
Vanwege het continuerende conflict tussen de Vedanta en Niyamgiri gemeenschappen, 
en de groeiende relevantie van het onderwerp, dient het 'counter-organizing' thema zich in 
het derde artikel (hoofdstuk vijf) weer aan. Tussen 2010 en 2013 werd er groeiende 
onderdrukking van anti-mijnbouw protesten in Niyamgiri waargenomen. Hoofdstuk vijf 
borduurt voort op de framing literatuur en onderzoekt daarbij hoe de pro-mining 
belanghebbenden tot deze onderdrukking bijdragen, waardoor het bijdraagt aan de 
adversarial framing en counter-organizing literatuur. In het geheel draagt dit proefschrift 
bij aan de management en organisatie literatuur over conflicten tussen corporaties en de 
locale gemeenschappen, en voegt daaraan het lokaal geworteld ethnografisch perspectief 
toe.  
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The rise of Niyamgiri
In late 2007, the search term 'Niyamgiri' delivered only a couple of hundred hits in an 
online search. In spring 2015, the remote mountain range, located in the East Indian state 
of Orissa, returns over 130,000 search results and comes with an extensive Wikipedia 
entry.  
In between these two searches lie a couple of years in which thousands of national and 
international news articles, videos, and reports were produced about the fight of the  about 
10,000 people strong Dongria Kondh tribe against multinational mining company Vedanta 
Resources. In a consortium with the Orissa Mining Corporation, Vedanta planned to mine 
one of Niyamgiri's mountain tops for bauxite to feed its already constructed aluminium 
refinery, at the foot of the mountain range. Located in middle of their traditional territory, a 
mine was no option for the Dongria Kondh who fiercely opposed Vedanta's plan. The song 
of Dambu Praska, a Dongria Kondh bard, tells the story of Niyam Raja, the tribe's deity or 
'King of Law' that the Dongria believe to reside on Niyamgiri's summits (Padel & Das, 
2010). Because they hold the mountain tops sacred, the locals keep them free of 
agriculture, logging, homesteads and — more recently — mining. 
“He created fruit in the hills, grains in the plains,  
He is the first of the Dongaria Kondh. 
After making pineapple, mango, jackfruit and grains, 
Niyam Raja said to us ‘Live on what I have given you’. 
Niyam Raja is crying today; the hills will turn into mud, 
The rocks will crumble and everyone will die. 
Will there be any rivers left if there are no streams? 
Will there be any streams left if there are no hills? 
What will we do without the fruits, grains and buffaloes? 
What will we do without Niyam Raja? 
What will the animals do without the big forests? 
What will we do without the plants that save lives?” 
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1.2 About this dissertation
This doctoral thesis started in 2006 with an initial proposal to study corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) in the extractive industry in the context of contested operations on 
indigenous territory. The early focus on corporate codes of conduct and the academic 
debates around Free Prior Informed Consent for indigenous peoples quickly seemed 
insufficient when a first review of the management literature showed a lack of grassroots 
empirical work on the topic. Despite corporate claims to CSR in the extractive industry and 
a whole lot of academic literature on the ethical responsibilities of corporations and the 
identification of corporate stakeholders, there still seemed to be a big blind spot on the 
grassroots reality of contested extractive industry operations. From there, it was only a 
short way to planning a qualitative study of managers' and local community stakeholders' 
perspectives that was then further narrowed down when facing the messy reality of the 
field (see chapter 2).  
This development process also speaks from the three papers, that make up the core of 
this dissertation. The first co-authored paper, chapter three, builds on a review of and adds 
to the international business literature. It systematizes and introduces the practitioner 
concept of the license to operate (LtO) and argues for more local responsiveness among 
extractive industry firms that are traditionally perceived as global and highly integrated. 
Still dissatisfied with the corporate-centric nature of concepts like the LtO and the gaping 
difference between managerial claims about a social license and the reality of fervent local 
opposition, the remainder of my research and conceptual work and also the following 
chapters of this dissertation evolve around an ethnographic case study of the resistance 
against Vedanta's proposed mine in Niyamgiri and corporate reactions to it.  
In chapter four, my co-authors and I contribute to the growing body of literature in 
management and organization studies that draws on a social movement perspective to 
examine mobilization in and around organizations. Tensions within the transnational 
resistance network that formed against Vedanta emerged as a key topic from the empirical 
material gathered during the first field trip. Grounded in the empirical material and 
drawing on the existing literature on anti-corporate mobilization, we develop the concept 
of national advocacy networks to speak to the translocal nature of such resistance 
(Banerjee, 2011). Our longitudinal ethnographic study also points to the processual nature 
of organizing and counter-organizing around the contested mining project.  
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The topic of counter-organizing is taken up again in the third paper, chapter five, as it 
became more important as the conflict between Vedanta and the Niyamgiri communities 
continued. In the light of the rising repression of anti-mining protest in Niyamgiri around 
2010-2013, this chapter draws on the framing literature and explores how the frames 
employed by pro-mining actors might contribute to such repression and thereby adds to the 
literature on counter-organizing and adversarial framing. Overall, this dissertation provides 
a much needed grassroots ethnographic perspective on conflicts between corporations and 
the local communities in which they operate to the management and organization studies 
literature.    
The remainder of this introduction is structured as follows: I will provide a brief 
overview of the context of community protest and CSR in the extractive industry and will 
illustrate this with information about the protest against the Niyamgiri mine. I will then 
discuss the conceptual and applied contributions of this dissertation in more detail and give 
an overview of the dissertation.   
1.3 Community protest and CSR in the extractive industry
"Something is profoundly wrong with the way we live today. For thirty years we have 
made a virtue out of the pursuit of material self-interest: indeed, this very pursuit now 
constitutes whatever remains of our sense of collective purpose. We know what things 
cost but have no idea what they are worth. We no longer ask of a judicial ruling or a 
legislative act: is it good? Is it fair? Is it just? Is it right? Will it help bring about a better 
society or a better world? Those used to be the political questions, even if they invited 
no easy answers. We must learn once again to pose them."  
(Judt, 2010) 
In his last book, the philosopher Tony Judt raises an important point when he criticizes 
how today's society turns its attention on cost alone while forgetting to think about the 
actual value of things. This discrepancy is at the core of most conflicts between local 
communities and extractive industry corporations and touches the core of debates about 
CSR and stakeholder management, as I will briefly outline.  
1.3.1 Reasons for community protest  
Communities not only mobilize against the often detrimental socio-cultural, 
environmental and economic impacts of industrial scale natural resource extraction (e.g. 
Banerjee, 2007; Evans, Goodman & Lansbury, 2002; Frynas, 2005; Gamu, Le Billon & 
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Spiegel 2015; O'Fairchellaigh & Ali, 2008; Whiteman, 2004; Whiteman & Mamen, 2002) 
but also because the globalized business forces that drive this extraction ignore their strong 
attachment to 'place' (Escobar, 2008) and fundamentally disrupt people's lifeworld, their 
domains of everyday meaningful practice (Habermas, 1981/1995; Bebbington et al., 2008).  
Especially indigenous communities like the Dongria Kondh, with a strong cultural 
attachment to and subsistence dependency on their ancestral lands are disproportionately 
affected by extractive industry operations (Banerjee, 2011; O'Faircheallaigh & Ali, 2008; 
Whiteman, 2004; Whiteman & Mamen, 2002). When they loose control over their land, 
indigenous communities are often among the most fervent opponents extractive industry 
companies face (Martinez-Allier, 2002; O'Faircheallaigh & Ali, 2008; Whiteman 2009). 
Often the most marginalized segments of their societies (Eversole, McNeish & 
Cimadamore, 2005; Mander & Tauli-Corpuz, 2006; Mikkelsen, 2014), indigenous peoples 
and other disadvantaged communities around the world mobilize for the right to influence 
decision-making about their land and resources and to put their interests on the political 
agenda (Coumans, 2008). Anti-corporate movements are therefore often more than just 
against an individual corporation, they are symptoms for the fight for citizen rights and 
self-determination (Thompson & Tapscott, 2010).  
Activists and campaigning organizations put forward five core arguments against the 
mine at Niyamgiri that are emblematic for the criticism against extractive industry projects 
around the world:  
(1) That Vedanta's mine would heavily impact a unique ecosystem inhabited by rare 
plant and animal species and the base of the Dongria Kondh's subsistence lifestyle. 
(2) That it would affect the streams and water table and threaten fresh water supply to 
the Dongria Kondh and tens of thousands of farmers downstream. 
(3) That this mine would be followed by others and create a precedent for mining and 
logging of the entire range of mountains. 
(4) That minerals-based industrial development would result in tremendous negative 
economic and socio-cultural effects for the Dongria Kondh whose more or less 
sustainable subsistence lifestyle and unique culture would be threatened by 
resettlement, the influx of outside workers, rising crime and other social issues 
prevalent in mining regions, and the overall influence by mainstream capitalist 
culture.  
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(5) And, finally, that the expected economic benefits of the mine would accrue not to 
the tribal people who were most negatively affected and that it would be impossible 
to financially compensate for the actual environmental and social externalities 
created.  
1.3.2 Resistance movements from local to translocal 
Periphery country governments compete over their reputation as good destinations for 
foreign direct investment from core countries, often by lowering their social and 
environmental standards (Banerjee, 2008; Van Tulder & Van der Zwart, 2006). Driven by 
the need for foreign direct investment and expectations of resource rents, these 
governments give extractive industry multinationals the legal license to operate. Locally, 
however, affected communities heavily challenge this license, independently of whether 
legal permits were granted by the government (O'Faircheallaigh, 2008).  
In democracies like India or Nigeria, and even more so in other states, communities 
threatened by mineral or oil extraction lack representation and protection of their rights due 
to widespread corruption and little effective local administration (Banerjee, 2008; Padel & 
Das, 2010; Thompson & Tapscott, 2010). As a result, they find extra-institutional channels 
to express their discontent with governmental development policies and demand 
recognition of their citizen rights (Mohanty, 2010). Even in the remotest locations, activists 
today are more resourceful than ever and able to connect to international supporters and 
construct networks of resistance (Escobar, 2008). Transnational advocacy networks 
connect community members to international activists and advocacy organizations who 
transfer knowledge, create solidarity between movements, and lobby governments and 
corporations (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Therefore, anti-mining activists today can tap into a 
constantly growing body of knowledge from around the world about the extractive 
industry's impact and successful mobilization strategies (Banerjee, 2011; Coumanns, 
2008).  
Increasingly, transnational social movements and their supporters target individual 
multinational corporations rather than governments to effect changes in their 
environmental and social performance (den Hond & de Bakker, 2012; McAteer & Pulver, 
2009). Social movement pressure therefore is one of the main drivers for corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). However, movements against individual corporations are usually 
rooted in and connected to broader movements that challenge the economic development 
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discourse of governments and business elites after the often devastating experience of 
decades of structural adjustment and industrialization for the rural poor in India and other 
countries of the global South. By suggesting alternative definitions of the meaning of 
'development' (Banerjee, 2008; Escobar, 1992; Padel & Das, 2010; Bebbington, 2007), 
these social movements are asking the political questions that Judt (2010) in the above 
quote reminds all of us to ask and therefore "can be a fundamentally important vehicle for 
realizing rights from the state, holding it to account, and struggling for more equitable and 
sustainable forms of development" (Gaventa 2010: xii).  
However, the operations of multinational corporations clearly point to the challenges of 
unidimensional perspectives on governance. Nation states are only but one player among a 
host of private actors from multinational corporations to NGOs and community groups in a 
system of multilevel governance grounded in competing values. Therefore, Banerjee 
(2011) draws on the 'translocal' as a qualifier for cross-border resistance that addresses the 
question "who gets to decide what is right or wrong and how do current policy making 
mechanisms in society allow local participation in developmental decision-making?" (p. 
335). Translocality adds a local situatedness to traditional 'transnational' perspectives 
(Brickell & Datta, 2011) that is especially relevant in the context of this dissertation. The 
idea of translocal resistance against mining multinationals goes beyond transnational 
advocacy approaches as it emphasizes the relevance of the particular local context in which 
such resistance is rooted.  
 In the case of Niyamgiri, Indian and international activists and NGOs amplified the 
local protest against the mine and forged a nation-wide and later a transnational campaign 
that gained considerable momentum from 2006 onwards. The many search engine hits of 
the term 'Niyamgiri' cited above bear witness to the size and reach of this campaign. 
Among these hits are hundreds of videos and images that show the pristine Niyamgiri 
mountain range and captivating portraits of Dongria Kondh men and women in their 
traditional adornment (see figure 1). 
Today, the fight of the Dongria Kondh communities against the Vedanta corporation 
has become a powerful "legend" of "David vs. Goliath" (Kothari, 2015). Even more so as 
the company's defeat seems unquestionable at this point. In summer 2013, resulting from a 
several years long legal battle, local and transnational protest, the affected Dongria Kondh 
villages were asked to cast their vote about the contested mining project. In an unanimous 
collective decision, all affected villages rejected mining -- a sweeping victory for the anti-
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mining movement and massive disappointment for Vedanta and its supporters. At the time
of writing, the Niyamgiri case is being mentioned alongside other successful movements
against mining such as the ones in Tambogrande, Peru (copper and gold mining) or against
the Esquel gold mine in Argentina. 
Figure 1: Dongria Kondh girls and Niyamgiri mountains on a campaign website
1.3.3 CSR and the license to operate  
As argued above, local communities, often with international support, challenge the
operations of large multinational oil and mineral corporations. Their economic power, the
high visibility of their brands, and profound social and environmental impacts make
especially large well-known corporations from the developing world salient targets for 
protest (Davis & Zald, 2005; Hendry, 2006). Reputation disasters such as the Deepwater 
Horizon, Brent Spar or Exxon Valdez accidents have shaped societal expectations for more
responsible practices in the extractive industry that have pushed, oil and mining 
corporations to the forefront of the CSR movement.  
On the other hand, it is clear that these firms are not only passively reacting to external
drivers for CSR like societal expectations but rather actively promote and shape the CSR 
agenda themselves (Utting, 2005). Joint industry efforts like the Global Mining Initiative
or the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative are examples for how the industry 
attempts to influence the public discourse and its own public image. Additionally, 
individual corporations produce extensive CSR and sustainability reports and voluntary 
codes of conduct in which they emphasize their commitment and responsibility towards
environmental protection, safe working conditions and the communities in which they 
operate. The notion of business having to obtain a 'social license to operate' is especially 
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prominent in the extractive industry practitioner discourse and has considerably shaped the 
theoretical debate in the past couple of years (Owen & Kemp, 2013; Parsons, Lacey & 
Moffat, 2014). 
Via the 'license to operate' corporate managers highlight the importance of local 
community acceptance for the feasibility of their local operations. Going beyond official 
legal permissions, so the argument, firms need to earn the 'goodwill' or at least silent 
commitment of the directly affected communities in order to be able to operate without 
protest and sabotage. The social license concept is thus rooted in a self-interested 
instrumental or "business case" perception of CSR where corporations strive to maximize 
long term profits through strategic short term investments into community benefits 
(O'Faircheallaigh, 2008). 
Industry initiatives, sustainability reports by large multinationals and the license to 
operate discourse might create the perception that CSR is a pervasive and successful 
practice in the extractive industry, able to contribute to community development and 
poverty alleviation. However, there is a vast difference between the few massive 
multinational players that are usually targeted by transnational campaigns and the many 
more extractive industry companies that are still able to operate 'below the radar' of 
international NGOs. Examples include state-owned firms, those originating from 
developing countries or autocratic regimes.  
CSR strategies are also often developed centrally at MNE headquarter level while their 
implementation clashes with local expectations and realities (Yakovleva & Vasquez-Brust, 
2011) and lacks culturally sensitivity to deal with indigenous perceptions of justice and 
their different cosmology (Anguelovski, 2008; Banerjee, 2007; Whitmore, 2006; 
Whiteman, 2009). Several authors in the field argue that extractive industry companies still 
lack a positive track record when it comes to successful CSR that created sustainable 
benefits for local communities (Hilson, 2012; Hilson & Yakovleva, 2007; Prieto-Carrón et 
al., 2006; Slack, 2012). It is also questionable whether another output is possible as CSR is 
unable to address or mitigate "the key political and economic mechanisms through which 
multinational corporations undermine the development prospects of poor 
countries" (Hilson, 2012: 132) such as tax evasion or corporate lobbying (see also Utting, 
2005; Banerjee, 2007).  
Corporate-centric definitions of who is a stakeholder and who belongs to the local 
community often fail to resonate with local self-definitions and exclude affected groups 
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that then need to find other ways of expressing their grievances (Filer, Burton & Banks, 
2008; Jenkins, 2004; Whiteman, 2009). It seems that impacted communities do not self 
identify as 'just another stakeholder' because they bear the direct social and environmental 
costs of natural resource extraction. Unimpressed by practitioners' license to operate 
discourse, affected communities also mostly see CSR measures as insufficient 
compensation for negative impacts (Hinojosa, 2013) and it seems that CSR strategies are 
unable to account for the true value of resources, land, justice and place to these 
communities (Whiteman, 2009). Judt's (2010) differentiation above deeply resonates at this 
point: While the question for corporations will always be 'How much?', how much 
compensation, mitigation or CSR measures are needed to heed their imperative for 
resource extraction, for community members it will mostly be the question of 'Whether or 
not?' and if they have the option to say 'no' when resource extraction touches places and 
values that cannot be compensated for. However, usually "the right to say no to 
development on their land does not arise" for local communities in traditional corporate 
CSR strategies (Banerjee, 2007: p. 35). For all these reasons and despite claims to CSR, 
communities around the world resist mining and oil projects on their land. 
While Vedanta's website speaks extensively of community development, the 
establishment of child care centers and women self-help groups and other economic 
development projects, activists and NGOs challenge the effectiveness of such measures 
and communities that were resettled for the establishment of the refinery report that they 
were forced to part with their land (Amnesty International 2010, 2013; Saxena, 
Parasuraman, Kant & Baviskar, 2010; Padel & Das, 2010).   
1.3.4 Establishment of industry by force 
Faced with fervent community resistance, corporations and governments frequently 
resort to repression and violence in order to implement extractive projects and India is one 
of many countries with a long history of mining related struggles and implementation of 
industry projects by force (Padel & Das, 2010). In some mineral-rich regions, communities 
are in a state of permanent mobilization over several decades to protect their land from 
mining. For example in the Gandhamardan mountains in Western Orissa a resistance 
movement developed that functions as a template for similar movements across the state. 
Bharat Aluminum Company (BALCO)1 was the first to attempt mining these mountains in 
1981. After years of struggle, the company had to abandon the project in 1987. Continental 
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Resources of Canada (1990) and National Aluminum Company (2007) followed in futile 
attempts to mine the mountain despite local resistance. In 2008, Sterlite Resources, a 
subsidiary of Vedanta Resources, applied for the mining lease, again stirring up the 
decades-old resistance movement.  
Violent confrontations with the police and military and clashes between local pro- and 
anti-corporate forces are a frequent occurrence around the world and not only in the Indian 
context studied here. In India, protesters have been threatened and beaten up, false cases 
were charged against crucial movement figures, some of whom got tortured and maimed in 
prison while other protesters were shot by the police (Goodland, 2007; Padel & Das, 
2010). In Orissa alone, dozens of people were killed in the last two decades by police fire 
while protesting the loss of their land to industry. In the face of such examples of the 
establishment of industry by force and violence that even condones death, Banerjee's 
concept of 'necrocapitalism' — the "practices of organizational accumulation that involve 
violence, dispossession and death" (2008: 1543) sounds less bewildering than it should, 
especially given the prominence of corporate claims to responsible practices and 
community development.  
In Niyamgiri, several violent confrontations between local community members and 
the police, military or local pro-Vedanta groups have been documented (Amnesty 
International, 2010, 2013; Padel & Das, 2010; Saxena, Parasuraman, Kant & Baviskar, 
2010) especially since the beginning of the anti-Maoist operations in the region that some 
have linked to the wish of the government to create a safe operating environment for the 
corporation (Roy, 2009; Padel & Das, 2010).  
1.4 Conceptual and applied contribution
The highly contested nature of extractive industry operations offers an extreme case for 
the study of  corporate-stakeholder interactions and anti-corporate mobilization. As argued 
above, oil and mining corporations are at the forefront of the CSR movement while at the 
same time, their reputations are constantly at risk due to oil and chemical spills, dangerous 
working conditions, high greenhouse gas emissions, engagement with oppressive regimes 
and corrupt governments, negative impacts on indigenous peoples, and the industry's 
association with civil wars and increased poverty or economic inequality (e.g. Banerjee, 
2007; Bebbington et al. 2008; Evans, Goodman & Lansbury, 2002; Whiteman 2004).  
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There is no other industry where negative public opinion and especially local
community protest can have such a profound impact on business performance. Community 
resistance results in productivity delays with the associated financial losses quickly rising 
to several millions of dollars per week (Franks, 2014). Also Vedanta incurred severe
financial losses due to its failed investment related to the planned Niyamgiri mine. 
Presumably in an attempt to create a fait accompli that would convince the authorities and 
guarantee mining permission, the company had already constructed a bauxite refinery in 
Lanjigarh at the foot of the mountain before opening the Niyamgiri mine (Padel & Das, 
2010). Until today, this refinery creates financial losses as it operates on truckloads of 
bauxite brought there from other mines across India, instead of being fed directly into the
refinery from the mountain on a giant conveyor belt the company was never allowed to 
finish (image 2). 
Figure 2: Lanjigarh refinery and unfinished conveyor belt through Niyamgiri
The Niyamgiri case is but one example for the numerous instances of community 
protest against the extractive industry (see e.g. Banerjee 2011; Bebbington et al., 2008). 
Reflecting this situation, a recent Ernst & Young (2014) study ranks the 'social license to 
operate' among the top three greatest risks facing the mining industry and points to the
"growing influence of communities to stop or slow projects". Also international financiers
react to the losses incurred through community protest and are more and more reluctant to 
fund extractive industry ventures that lack a strategy for preventing and mitigating 
community resistance (Ernst & Young, 2014; O'Faircheallaigh, 2008).  
In the face of the high practical relevance of corporate community conflict and the
many cases of extensive translocal resistance, it is surprising that the management and 
organization studies pay comparatively little attention to the extractive industry (but see
e.g. Banerjee, 2000; Bruijn & Whiteman, 2010). There is especially a scarcity of 
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ethnographic research that gives us a better idea of the grassroots dynamics between 
corporations and communities and the roots and local organizing tactics of translocal anti-
corporate movements (Banerjee, 2011). The importance of understanding such dynamics is 
especially relevant at a time when, with the advent of new techniques like fracking to 
exploit so far unusable reserves, mobilization directed at the industry has surged around the 
world (Mazur, 2014). Anti-fracking protests anywhere from Algeria to the US and UK and 
a host of other countries show that corporate-community conflict and the formation of 
broader movements targeting the industry is a lasting and growing challenge that finds 
little reflection in the scientific literature so far.  
Moreover, there is a strange tendency in the management and organization literature 
that examines the tensions between corporations and their stakeholders to confound anti-
corporate campaigns forged by international NGOs with grassroots protest and to focus 
solely on the 'boomerang politics' of international NGOs (e.g. Joutsenvirta, 2011; Doh & 
Teegen, 2003; den Hond & de Bakker, 2012). This brushes over the complicated grassroots 
interactions that occur during the process of 'localizing' the demands and tactics of 
international NGOs to build up the transnational campaigns. Den Hond & de Bakker 
(2012) point to this shortcoming and call for further investigation that acknowledges the 
variety of actors involved. If we truly want to understand anti-corporate mobilization 
across borders, we need to add a sensitivity for the dynamics and grassroots interactions 
between the private actors involved in translocal movements: local, national and 
international NGOs, community organizations, pro-corporate local groups,  and activists.  
Finally, we also need a much better understanding of the role corporations play in these 
contested localities and should go beyond studying codes of conduct and general claims to 
CSR published on corporate websites. Such studies draw on easily accessible sources of 
data and reinforce the managerial discourse of CSR without paying sufficient attention to 
managerial discourse on the ground that might be much different. They also do not give 
insights in how managers frame and deal with resistance against their operations if it 
actually happens despite CSR. Given the above mentioned examples of the establishment 
of industry by force, it is time that management and organization studies pay more 
attention to managerial discourse as it shapes and emerges within this context rather than 
within the sanitized and firm-centric 'CSR universe'.    
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1.5 Overview 
The dissertation project as presented here, developed from the initial idea to study 
corporate social responsibility in the extractive industry. Following a critical engagement 
with the existing management literature on CSR, especially standards and codes, as well as 
the international business literature on the internationalization of the industry (Kraemer & 
van Tulder, 2009), the focus on resistance against extractive corporations and claims to a 
license to operate emerged. 
This dissertation is structured as follows: In chapter two, I present the method. I start 
off with a more detailed description of the process of focusing the research project on a 
single case study rather than carrying out the initial idea of conducting several case studies 
of resistance against one corporation in different locations. This is followed by an 
overview over the research process and kinds of empirical material collected, a description 
of how I gained access to studying the resistance movement in Niyamgiri and negotiated 
consent with study participants. I close with a detailed discussion of how the empirical 
material was collected and analyzed and how I tried to validate my findings with study 
participants.  
Chapter three is a theoretical paper (Kraemer & van Tulder, 2012) that aims to 
synthesize the international business and stakeholder literature. It also theoretically 
develops the practitioner concept of the license to operate (LtO) further and emphasizes its 
different levels from local to global in order to clearly distinguish between industry 
legitimacy and reputation, legal licenses and government support, and local community 
acceptance of extractive industry operations that are often confounded in practitioner 
discussions about the LtO. It takes the idea behind the local LtO - that firms need to be 
embedded in and accepted by their local communities - to contribute to the international 
business strategy literature. The traditional argument in this literature is that upstream 
extractive industry companies face high pressures for integration and negligible pressures 
for local responsiveness. Based on the example of the extractive industry as an extreme 
case, we expand the discussion on drivers for local responsiveness to include the pressure 
these corporations face from local community stakeholders and argue that this 
considerably changes the nature of the traditional integration-responsiveness grid.  
Chapters four and five draw on longitudinal data on the resistance movement against 
the Niyamgiri mine in Orissa gathered from ethnographic fieldwork and desk research. 
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Chapter four (Kraemer, Whiteman & Banerjee, 2013), zooms in on the process of social 
movement organizing and emphasizes the variety of actors from local to national and 
international that played a role in the establishment of the transnational advocacy network 
against Vedanta. Based on a narrative about the rise and fall of a young community leader, 
the paper contributes to the management and organization studies literature on anti-
corporate organizing as it points to the complicated interactions within a system of 
transnational mobilization and unveils conflicts among actors that are rooted in the neglect 
of national level mobilization structures. It also highlights the counter-organizing tactics of 
corporations and their local supporters that pose a considerable threat for community 
activists. 
Taking the idea about counter-organizing one step further, the emphasis of chapter five 
lies with the discourse of managers and other supporters of the Niyamgiri mining project. 
It contributes to the literature on adversarial framing by identifying two master frames in 
the empirical material that also seem to find widespread application across a range of 
movements in different locations: the outsider and criminal master frame. Next to arguing 
that these two frames provide a vocabulary to future studies on the framing of resistance, 
the chapter discusses how both frames were employed in Niyamgiri to delegitimize and 
weaken the anti-mining resistance.  
Finally, in chapter six I draw together and jointly discuss the findings of the three 
papers in this dissertation. I discuss the limitations of this work, link it to the most recent 
literature in the field and suggest areas for future research.  
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2. METHOD
"I still haven't realized how I ended up here! Last week I landed in Delhi and now I’m 
already in Bhubaneswar with a couple of ‘activist friends’. We're going to the 'mass 
rally' against POSCO’s steel plant tomorrow. No clue what to expect from the rally. Is it 
gonna be violent? We’re going to leave early I heard, because we need to take back 
roads to avoid police attention… No more information yet.  
All six of us, who have come from Delhi, are gonna share this room. A couple of beds 
and mosquito nets, Indian style toilets on the hallway. It’s even hotter here than in 
Delhi and everybody looks super tired after the one and a half days in the train. I was 
totally confused when we arrived in the courtyard. So many new faces and names! 
Can't remember one of them! Some of the older men everybody seemed to know and 
revere – who are they? Politicians? Activists? Got smiled at because I was trying to 
shake hands instead of making the ‘Namaskar’ to greet people. Who was this Lohia 
after which this place is named? Nitin  said something about a socialist leader of the 1
Independence Movement - felt like I should have known… In the train he was so 
interested in me coming from East Germany and it was embarrassing that I know so 
little. But how to answer a question like "What's the situation of the labor class in 
Germany today?" that felt like he had fallen out of time, or me fallen into another one...  
I envy the two young NGO guys who came with us, they are also new to this ‘going to 
the field’ stuff but at least they know the Indian context and have read and written about 
the several people's movements against various companies here in Orissa. [...] They just 
don’t stick out like I do and aren’t deaf and dumb…  
Now we’re all sitting here with our laptops and digital cameras and electronic 
equipment. I can relax a bit, talking about memory space and chatting but in a couple of 
minutes we’re expected downstairs to attend a vigil for some dead communist I’ve 
never heard about." 
(Field notes, Dec. 3rd, 2008) 
2.1 (The dream of) a multi-site ethnography
Early ideas about this dissertation evolved around a multi-sited qualitative study of 
local protest against multinational corporations from the extractive industry and their 
ability (or not) to gain a local license to operate and the role of CSR in this process. Multi-
site ethnography has become more common in the last decades as researchers have 
formulated translocal topics and studied translocal phenomena (Hannerz, 2003). The idea 
is one of "placing the ethnographer in the translocal network of relationships" (Hannerz, 
  All names are randomly chosen first names that preserve the national identity (India/UK) of the informant (see 1
section 2.4.6).
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2003: 209) instead of focusing on complete immersion in and in-depth study of an entire 
culture or society (Hannerz, 2003; Marcus, 1995).   
My foreshadowed problems (Malinowski 1922 in Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007) 
evolved around the perspectives of managers on anti-corporate protest and the 
transnational expansion of local resistance movements. The company I had selected was 
Vedanta Resources Plc., a mining and metals multinational traded on the UK stock 
exchange with mines (then) in India, Zambia, South Africa and Tasmania. There were a 
couple of reasons for that choice. First, Vedanta had operations in several countries where 
research could be conducted in English, a not unimportant practical consideration. Second, 
in all locations Vedanta had faced or still was facing some form of campaign or resistance 
against their operations from what I could gauge from my early scan of different extractive 
industry companies. Third, there was very little research in the management and 
organization literature on resistance against mining corporations (as opposed to oil or 
forestry multinationals) and in settings other than the Americas. Finally, yet most 
importantly, the campaign against Vedanta in Niyamgiri had considerably picked up speed 
between late 2007 when I first looked at it and a couple of months later when I made my 
decision to go to Orissa. The initial idea had been to travel to three of these locations for 
about two to three months to conduct qualitative interviews with corporate managers and 
immerse myself in the groups of activists and NGOs that were running the respective 
protests. The opening quote, written only a couple of days after I first set foot on the Indian 
sub continent to conduct what I then thought to be the first part of my study, illustrates why 
this plan quickly changed.   
I had come to the field with the intention of studying the campaign against Vedanta's 
mining project in Niyamgiri to then move on to Zambia or South Africa to examine the 
resistance the same company faced elsewhere. I had come with images of transnational 
advocacy (Keck & Sikkink, 1997) in mind and assumed that international NGOs like 
ActionAid, Survival International and Amnesty International were the main players in the 
campaign. I had thought I could collect my data in India in three months. I was wrong.  
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2.2 Zooming out and zooming in: Early surprises and progressive 
focusing   
Surprises or 'aha' moments can be an important guiding force for qualitative studies that 
offer great opportunities for insight (Christianson, 2011). The first two weeks in India 
challenged my assumptions and expectations as I went through several moments of 
surprise that considerably influenced the course of the study.  
Right after my arrival in Delhi, I was able to do a first interview with an activist couple 
who later became key informants (see section 2.4.2 below). From them I learned that much 
more was happening below the waterline of the internationally visible tip of the 'campaign 
iceberg' that I had been able to examine from my PhD student's office in Rotterdam. 
Throughout this conversation, I caught glimpses of the network of local and national 
organizations and individual activists that were supporting the local communities in 
Niyamgiri to resist the mine. I learned that international NGOs had in fact only recently 
joined an ongoing struggle, the main force behind which was a complex melange of Indian 
political, non-political, more or less organized, collective and individual social movement 
actors that were active below the iceberg's 'waterline'.  
Later, the quickly growing relationships to key informants opened up an ‘opportunity to 
learn’ (Stake, 2005). I was surprised to hear that the translocal interactions (Banerjee, 
2011; Hannerz, 2003) between Indian organizations and activists and their international 
counterparts were much more conflictual and complicated than I had anticipated. 
Motivated by the lack of coverage of such difficulties in earlier studies of transnational 
campaigns this resulted in the decision to further explore this complicated network of 
local, national and international social movement actors. As my research opportunities and 
interests developed further, the research covered a number of virtual and physical spaces 
(Hannerz, 2003; Marcus, 1995) though in a different way than initially anticipated: instead 
of multiple cases of resistance against the same company in different locations, I covered 
the activities of a variety of actors involved in the same movement across space and time.  
Moments of surprise, emergent research opportunities and personal inclinations - my 
"sympathy for the underdogs" as one member of the department critically commented - 
therefore resulted in a move away from the initial corporation-centered conception of the 
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study, a decision that is backed by calls for more non-corporate focused research in 
management and organization studies (Bamberger & Pratt, 2010).  
Progressive focusing (Silverman, 2010) helped to identify situations within my 
extended case (Stake, 2005) that were exemplary for the issues I wanted to cover. One 
example is the focus on Jika, the young tribal leader who emerged as a crucial figure in the 
transnational resistance movement and turned into a Vedanta supporter over the course of a 
couple of years (see chapter 4). Although co-optation of central movement actors was a 
recurrent theme in interviews and conversations with activists, it was not foreseeable that it 
would actually happen right before my eyes. My developmental research design allowed 
me to zoom in on this aspect when realizing its importance and presenting it as an example 
for the social movement process. 
Based on the online available information about the case that had been published by 
international NGOs, I had come to the field with a boundaried notion of the campaign 
against Vedanta's mine in Niyamgiri. The opening quote from my field notes highlights the 
sudden realization that there was so much more to studying one movement than just this 
one movement. The first conversations with activists and Indian NGO staff were replete 
with references to other past and current anti-mining and anti-industrialization movements 
in Orissa and other states. Most of the people I met were and had been involved in several 
of these struggles. Before my arrival, I had not even heard about the strong local protest 
against the POSCO plant at Orissa's coast and a week later I joined some activists to attend 
a "mass rally" of which I did not know what to expect.  
I needed to get a grasp of the rich history of past and present struggles in Orissa and 
India that formed a whole body of social movement activism, or social movement industry 
(Zald & McCarthy, 1977). Not only did this industry influence the tactics and perceptions 
of Indian activists who were involved in the Niyamgiri case, this context was also relevant 
for the framing activities of proponents of the mine (see chapter XX). I needed to 'zoom 
out' before I could 'zoom in' on one specific case and did so in a number of ways. 
First, I had the opportunity to accompany one activist on a ten day tour through Orissa 
that he had planned to record material for a documentary on the various social movements 
in the state. Not only was this a chance to spend an extended period of time with a key 
informant on the Niyamgiri struggle, it also provided a broad overview over the various 
more or less prominent resistance movements across the state, their history and the 
networks of involved actors.  
18
Second, I expanded my recruitment of interviewees to include actors from both sides of 
the conflict about the construction of the POSCO steel plant. This struggle was widely 
perceived by activists to be among the most emblematic struggles in Orissa at the time next 
to the Niyamgiri conflict. Though not intended as a comparative case, zooming out on this 
additional struggle allowed me to ascertain that I was not studying the idiosyncrasies of 
one company and its management. Along these lines, third, I also expanded from the initial 
idea to only interview Vedanta managers of the Niyamgiri project and covered the 
perspectives of others from multiple locations. This allowed an embedding of the case 
studied in its broader context and assured the relevance of findings beyond one specific 
site while still keeping the field research period practically manageable (Marcus, 1995). 
Having realized the importance of the social movement industry, I realized that I would not 
be able to cover Vedanta's operations in other countries at the same level of detail with the 
time and resources available. This resulted in the decision to conduct a second field trip to 
Orissa instead of going multi-country. 
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2.3 Overview of the research process
Figure 3: Overview of the research period and types of empirical material
The empirical material ultimately gathered for this study is a product of two factors:
iterations between emerging theoretical ideas grounded in early coding of first empirical
material and the literature (Burawoy, 1991; Charmaz, 2000; Corbin & Strauss, 2008) that
resulted in a progressive focusing of the research questions (Silverman, 2010) and, second, 
opportunities to access certain sites or people which then again shaped the emerging 
research object (Marcus, 1995; Stake, 2005). The output is a piece of “patchwork 
ethnographic fieldwork” that combines classic ethnography with traditional qualitative
interviews and other more focused ways of gathering empirical material (Tsing, 2005). 
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Figure 3 (above) provides an overview of the research and analysis process. It outlines 
the variety of empirical material collected across time and space with the goal to contribute 
to management and organization theory through grounded theorizing (see section 2.4.2). 
The research period stretches across five and a half years from the decision about 
conducting a case study in Orissa in June 2008 to the end of the Niyamgiri struggle in 
January 2014 when the Ministry of Environment and Forest gave its final 'no' to the project 
on the grounds of public voting in Niyamgiri. 
The next section deals in more detail with the process of gaining access, building field 
relations and negotiating consent with informants. 
2.4 Access, field relations and informed consent
2.4.1 A web of relations, assigned roles, and negotiated borders 
One of the main tensions emerging from multi-sited research lies in the increased 
complexity of one’s relationship to research partners when placing oneself within the 
network of various sites and relationships (Hannerz, 2003; Marcus, 1995). I was studying 
‘up’ and ‘down’ (Nader, 1972) and got assigned multiple and changing roles by different 
actors. Some I took on, others I rejected. Remaining legitimate as a researcher while 
gaining access as a friend, trying not to become tangled up in moral conflicts and power 
struggles between conflicting actors, harsh critique of my outputs by one informant and 
demands for support or resources were some of the challenges that resulted from the 
fieldwork.  
Below, I discuss in more detail how I gained access to study participants and 
established informed consent and also touch upon the “shifting affinities for, affiliations 
with, as well as alienations from” those with whom I interacted across time and different 
locations (Marcus, 1995: 113).  
2.4.2 Access to social movement actors 
Multi-sited ethnography often means “close affiliations with cultural producers (e.g. 
artists, filmmakers, organizers), who themselves move across various sites of 
activity” (Marcus, 1995: 114). This description fits the study participants that later turned 
into key informants (see table 1 below) who often performed several of the following 
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roles: filmmaker, researcher, part-time NGO employee/affiliate, freelancer, academic, and 
activist. Many were traveling extensively within India and some internationally in these 
various functions and were relying on several sources of earned income and/or grants.  
Table 1: Key informants 
Name Description
Medha Refers to herself as a "human rights activist and independent researcher" 
on one of her papers. Has worked for national and international NGOs 
and, although critical of the sector, mainly relies on selected NGOs for 
project and research work to generate an income. Co-organizes protest 
events and travels extensively to research, document, and support anti-
mining and anti-industrialization struggles. Repeatedly part of fact 
finding missions after violent incidents and critical of the role of NGOs 
for grassroots social movements. Strongly involved in national level 
activism with ties to local activists, connecting different movements.
Sanjay Independent film maker and activist with a "past in the NGO world" but 
now critical of their "development religion" and impact on grassroots 
movements. Has produced several films and written about social 
movements and other relevant issues in Indian society (e.g. dalit people, 
climate change). Similarly to Medha, relies on project work and grants 
to finance these activities. Has traveled extensively to several struggle 
areas for documentation and research. Strongly involved in national 
level activism with ties to local activists.
Sunil Independent film maker and activist with a strong focus on 
documentation of corporate and social movement activities. Heavily 
involved in (online) distribution of information, specifically about the 
Niyamgiri struggle but also other movements. Less involved in on-the-
spot grassroots mobilization but involved in developing a system of 
grassroots reporting. Nearly in daily contact with local community 
members and activists during times of high activity. Equally critical of 
NGOs' role in grassroots movements. Connecting local, national and 
transnational levels through information sharing.
Charles Academic who is strongly supporting anti-mining and anti-
industrialization struggles in India mostly through academic work but 
less through grassroots mobilization. Attends international protest 
events if possible. Well connected to similar academics and activists 
across India and the UK. Emphasizes the potential of international 
NGOs to create awareness in corporate home countries but equally 
critical of their impact on grassroots movements.
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The key point of access to this network of people was a members-only online email list 
server on mining conflicts in Orissa. The online group, founded in late 2004, brings 
together activists from India, the UK and other countries who work with one or several of 
the anti-mining or environmental struggles in Orissa. Prior to the first field trip, contacted 
several individuals and organizations that had been mentioned in news articles about the 
Niyamgiri conflict. One of them, another academic, vouched for me to enter the list server 
in summer 2008 after I had explained my research to him. With close to 100 members at 
the time and the anti-Vedanta movement in full swing, the group was quite active and 
hardly a day passed without at least one message. Members use the list server to share 
information and updates (e.g. protest letters sent to the authorities, relevant newspaper 
articles, reports about clashes between villagers and the police), coordinate and plan 
activities (e.g. share invites to attend protest events, collect signatories of protest letters), 
and sometimes to discuss more general ideological questions (e.g. the pro and contra of the 
government's war against Maoist rebels). I was introduced to the list as a PhD researcher 
who wanted to study the anti-mining resistance in Niyamgiri and once admitted, I was not 
only able to read the current daily posts but could also access all past messages online.  
The online group made getting in touch with Indian activists easy and allowed me to 
make good contact with social movement actors before my arrival in India. I contacted 
individuals who from their posts seemed to be involved in the Niyamgiri case and made 
use of their social networks through a snowball sampling tactic (Atkinson & Flint, 2001) 
based on which I could gather a list of 13 prospective interviewees to kick off the first field 
trip. The snowballing technique proved very effective and allowed access to actors who 
were less prominent in the online world and on the sites of international NGOs but 
nevertheless important for the local movement.   
Arrived in Delhi, I had a first interview with Medha and Sanjay who turned into key 
informants in the course of the study. They enquired about the interests and purpose of my 
study and seemed satisfied to find that I was willing to critically examine Vedanta's 
activities and had come to see with my own eyes rather than study their claims to CSR 
from afar. They offered to join them and a couple of other activists on their trip to Orissa 
where they were to attend a mass protest against the POSCO steel plant in Dhinkia and 
also wanted to trek through the Niyamgiri mountains to meet people in the villages, 
departing from Bissam Cuttack (see figure 4 below). Grasping this unique opportunity 
during my first week in India and abandoning my initial plan to do more interviews in 
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Delhi had far reaching implications for my study as it allowed me to quickly meet other 
actors of the national advocacy network. 
Figure 4: Research locations in India, especially Orissa (Odisha)
Activists and NGO staff in the UK were contacted via email and interviewed in London 
or on the phone. One UK activist rejected to be interviewed when I told him that I was
interested in the conflicts and organizing processes within the movement because, as he
said, he did not want to contribute to such problems by talking about them. 
Snowballing has the potential to lead to selection bias and access regulation by 
gatekeepers (Atkinson & Flint, 2001) which was addressed in two ways. First, I did not
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rely on the contacts made through early informants alone and deliberately sought out 
potential interviewees that were outside of the circle of social movement actors personally 
known to my early informants. In each interview I asked for other people who could tell 
me more about the Niyamgiri case or comparable social movements in Orissa.  
Second, some key informants had done or were doing academic research themselves 
and were aware of academic requirements for unbiased information and triangulation of 
information when I brought up these issues. As a result and next to their obvious contacts, 
they also recommend interview partners who they did not know personally or whose 
activities they did not approve of but who they thought could provide different 
perspectives for my research. “You should speak to this person but don’t tell them that we 
gave you their name.” was something I repeatedly heard when looking for alternative 
sources of information. Often, these informants were staff of Indian and international 
NGOs whose activities key informants observed critically (see chapter 4). This, together 
with 'cold emails' sent out to organizations that were mentioned in one of the many online 
articles about the Niyamgiri conflict and calls for support that were published on many 
NGO websites, assured access to a diversity of viewpoints on the civil society side of this 
study across different locations (see Appendix 1).  
Overall, 42 interviews were conducted with 47 social movement actors and their 
supporters amounting to nearly 180 hours of conversation. The table in the appendix lists 
these instances of formal interviews that were either accompanied by direct note-taking or, 
mostly, recorded and transcribed. Multiple interviews with the same person are also 
indicated with location and date of the interviews. Additionally, countless informal 
individual and group conversations and discussions were conducted and recorded in field 
notes throughout the weeks that were spent traveling and living with key informants. 
Several (translated) conversations with groups of villagers and opposition groups during 
the trek through the Niyamgiri mountains and when traveling to other struggle areas in 
other parts of Orissa should also be mentioned as they provided important context 
information that was recorded in field notes.  
2.4.3 Building trust 
About two months into my first field trip one key informant told me how he and other 
Indian activists had updated each other about my conversations with them, discussed 
whether Sanjay should take me on that trip with him and evaluated my trustworthiness. I 
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was struck by the realization that the ease with which I had gained access to social 
movement actors had not been all that self-evident. From the beginning, I had been open 
about my appreciation and sympathy for activists' work and their motivation to support the 
local anti-Vedanta movement (Mohrmann, 2010). However, after that conversation, I 
realized that these words had not been enough and that people had been waiting for me to 
prove myself.  
An important step towards building trust with activists had been the confrontation with 
a Korean film team during our trek through the Niyamgiri mountains. The team had come 
to film the tribal people with the ‘permission’ of an international NGO and were oblivious 
about the situation on the mountain where the local resistance organization had basically 
announced a 'ban' on foreign visitors to Niyamgiri unless they had asked for their 
permission. When meeting the film team in a tribal village at night (see chapter 4), our 
group including myself tried to enforce the ban and sent the team away. This confrontation 
created a bond in our group and a shared story to tell and retell multiple times throughout 
the trip and allowed me to show that I was more than a passive value-free observer.  
However, in my introductions and when describing my research project, I made clear 
that I would also examine the perspectives and opinions of corporate managers and their 
supporters. Much to my surprise, many activists were not put off by this but rather 
encouraged me to get in touch with the companies because they hoped to learn more about 
their motivations and views. Some tried to assign the role of their ‘spy in the corporate 
sector’ to me and asked me to share information from corporate interviews. Due to our 
close contact and me relying on them for travel information and other support, key 
informants usually knew where I was traveling and who I was meeting for interviews. 
Questions like “How was it?” or “What did he say?” were commonly asked when I 
returned from a trip to a Vedanta or other corporate office. Navigating this ethically 
difficult terrain, I would then share a broad summary of the conversations I had had - 
s t r i c t l y a n d t e c h n i c a l l y a b r e a c h o f c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y. T h i s “ e t h i c a l 
situationism” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007: 219, italics in orig.) seems justifiable in 
light of managers' power to protect their interests. Moreover, I was sure that none of the 
managers interviewed trusted me enough to share potentially harmful information as I told 
all of them that I was also speaking to activists when introducing my research. On the other 
hand, and again grounded in a value-based assessment of the different power relationships, 
I took a different stance when it came to the identity of and information provided by 
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informants from within the social movement (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). In no 
instance did I reply to questions by managers about whom exactly I had spoken to or gave 
away information about the movement or its actors. 
2.4.4 Access to corporate managers and pro-corporate actors 
“To penetrate the shields of the powerful the social scientist has to be lucky and/or 
devious […]”  
(Burawoy, 1998: 22) 
Access to corporate managers was also obtained through a snowballing tactic similar to 
the one used with activists. Individuals who had agreed to support the research project with 
their interview were asked to suggest other relevant interviewees and, ideally, to make an 
introduction. The first contact inside Vedanta was one of these lucky coincidences 
mentioned above. I had told an Indian friend about the plan to study the resistance against 
Vedanta in Niyamgiri and found out that he had a childhood friend who, according to a 
recent Facebook update, had started working for Vedanta's CSR department in Keonjhar in 
Orissa’s steel belt (see figure 4, above), where the company wanted to establish a steel 
plant. We exchanged some emails and he agreed to an interview on the challenges the 
company was facing in terms of community resistance and how the company was dealing 
with them.  
Next to luck, a certain level of deception was needed when interacting with corporate 
managers (see also Douglas 1976 in Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). I used the same 
standard formulation to introduce the research as with social movement actors, saying that 
I wanted to "study the Niyamgiri conflict and the perceptions of all actors involved: local 
communities, activists and NGOs, and corporate managers". However, I did not fully 
disclose the depth of interaction with activists and my participation in protest events. 
Moreover, while I downplayed the management background of my study when speaking to 
activists where I emphasized my interest in social movements against corporations, 
towards corporate managers I highlighted that the Rotterdam School of Management was 
amongst the leading European Business Schools. This helped in establishing my role as a 
researcher interested to learn more about how corporations perceived and were dealing 
with community protest.  
Through this first contact in Vedanta's CSR, interviews with other Vedanta managers in 
two locations and also with pro-corporate members of the local community in Keonjhar 
could be arranged. His recommendation to the local CSR manager also facilitated entry to 
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a resettlement colony at Vedanta's aluminum smelter and power plant in Jharsuguda. 
Having visited two different Vedanta operations in Orissa, it was much easier to contact 
their office in Bhubaneswar, reference my contacts in the company, the research I had 
already done and ask for an interview with someone who could speak about their 
Niyamgiri project. I was told to visit the office and, after two fruitless attempts where I was 
informed after a couple of hours that the person I was supposed to meet would be unable to 
receive me on this day, the corporate communications manager was ready for an interview. 
From there, I got connected to the CEO of the Lanjigarh operation who was also the Vice 
President of Mines at Vedanta and then moved on to the local Head of CSR & PR and the 
Assistant Manager of PR at the Lanjigarh refinery located at the foothills of Niyamgiri.  
Lacking a contact to a POSCO insider, I walked into their Bhubaneswar office, 
introduced myself at the reception and asked who I could interview regarding the 
company's problems in acquiring land for the port and steel plant. This resulted in two 
meetings with the India PR Manager who connected me to his successor for another 
interview when I returned on my second field trip. Repeated attempts to gain access to staff 
at POSCO's field office at the proposed steel plant were rejected.  
Overall, 12 interviews with 10 managers, ranging from top (six) to middle (two) and 
lower management (two) were conducted in four locations, three of these were operated by 
Vedanta and one by POSCO (see appendix 2). In addition, interviews were conducted with 
academics and consultants working for Vedanta and other mining companies and 
conversations included several government officials in the areas of tribal welfare and 
mining. This covered a range of perspectives on the corporate side, ranging from 
interviewees who directly interacted with local communities at contested sites, to managers 
responsible for these operations and corporate communications personnel intent at creating 
a positive public image of these operations. Additional interviews with pro-company 
villagers, the spokesperson of an industry association, and a manager of another smaller 
Indian mining company further ensured a diversity of perspectives not shaped by 
individual experiences in a single location. Additionally, Vedanta's 2009 Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) in London was audio recorded. Together with a number of other activists 
and NGO staff, I was able to enter this meeting on a ‘proxy share’ organized by UK 
activists. Not only did this meeting deliver insight into the semi-publicly expressed points 
of view of the Vedanta management board, it was also the only instance where a direct 
interaction between activists and the board of directors could be observed.  
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2.4.5 Informed consent   
“Signed consent forms do not constitute informed consent, they merely provide 
evidence (perhaps of questionable value) that consent has been given [...] Informed 
consent is at heart an interpersonal process between researcher and participant, where 
the prospective participant comes to an understanding of what the research project is 
about and what participation would involve and makes his or her free decision about 
whether, and on what terms to participate.”  
(Guillemin & Gillam, 2004: 272). 
Evolving qualitative research projects, where informing everyone at all times about the 
exact purpose and content of the research is “neither possible nor desirable” (Hammersley 
& Atkinson, 2007: 57), require processual forms of consent rather than the signing of 
consent forms by study participants (De Laine, 2000; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007; 
Miller & Bell, 2012; Murphy & Dingwall, 2007). Especially when researching sensitive 
issues, target groups are unlikely to consent fully to the research without getting to know 
the researcher and building trust which results in progressive access to the field and its 
continuous negotiation (De Laine, 2000; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007).  
I openly introduced myself as a researcher to all study participants and it was obvious 
to everyone involved at all times that I attended events, had conversations with people, and 
asked for new contacts in my function as a researcher. Permission to observe, take notes or 
voice record conversations was negotiated informally with individuals or groups of people. 
For example, when conducting a focus group with the members of different NGOs who 
had or were working on issues of social justice in Orissa, I asked for permission to record 
the conversation. This resulted in a short discussion among the participants because some 
were reluctant. Only when I explained that I would contact them individually before using 
any of their verbatim quotes, did all participants agree to the voice recording.  
Especially when spending longer periods of time with activists, some of which became 
close friends over the weeks and months I had known them, it became harder and harder to 
audio record conversations because it felt inappropriate and intrusive. I mainly relied on 
open note taking during these periods and only used the recorder during very relevant 
discussions and when several people were present. Consent in such situations was obtained 
with a raised eyebrow or short question on my behalf and a silent nod or smile by those 
involved. This was enough as people knew I was doing my research and had gotten used to 
me scribbling away in my notebook and recording things from time to time. In addition, I 
conducted repeated and more formal recorded interviews with several key informants, 
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mainly when I had not seen them for a while or felt that I had gathered a number of 
important questions that I wanted to discuss in more detail.  
Some participants denied being recorded (see appendix 1&2) which meant that 
extensive notes were taken during these interviews. Especially some corporate executives 
and some NGO staff did not allow for recording. Managers cited reasons such as not 
wanting to be wrongly quoted and that their statements were the opinion of the corporation 
and not theirs as reasons for refusing recording. With NGO staff the main reason was fear 
of "being shut down" by the state if they were found to be too critical and directly quoted. 
Especially the staff of state-level NGOs expressed this fear.  
2.4.6 Anonymity 
Study participants were anonymized and are identified only with general categories 
such as "state-level activist" or staff of an "international NGO". Randomly selected first 
names that preserved the national identity were assigned to interviewees who were quoted 
more often, mainly with the goal to increase readability of narratives. Gender was not 
considered an analytically relevant category and informants might be identified with the 
opposite gender to further protect their identity.   
2.5 Challenges and conflicts 
2.5.1 Financial transactions and reciprocal relationships  
"When I called Sanjay for his interview, he told me that a group of activists from Delhi 
were planning to go to Orissa to attend a mass rally against a steel plant and do a tour 
through the Niyamgiri hills to speak to the communities and assess the situation. 
During the call he also mentioned his lack of money to go with them. Later, in the 
interview, he again told me how much he would like to go with them to get footage for 
one of his documentary films. When we talked about whether I could accompany the 
group to Orissa, he suggested that I pay for his travel costs in exchange for his help 
with my research, that he would connect me to people, translate for me and help me 
find my way in Bhubaneswar. I was totally surprised by the offer, confused and excited 
at the same time and asked him for some time to think this over. Should I do this?" 
(Field journal, November 2008) 
On the third day in Delhi and after a couple of phone conversations with family and 
friends, I decided to abandon my initial plan of staying in the capital for about a month. I 
called Sanjay to confirm our deal which would catapult me right into the middle of the 
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conflict I wanted to study and give me access to activists and even another social 
movement I had hardly heard about before. Although delighted to leave Delhi and gain 
access to Niyamgiri so quickly, I was also concerned about the financial transaction 
involved and asked myself whether I should pay for my access to the field and whether my 
research would have been that interesting for activists had I been a penniless researcher 
from India.  
Dealing with the hopes and expectations of study participants is a key challenge of 
fieldwork (De Laine, 2000; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007) and made this early request 
for financial support from a gatekeeper so difficult. On the one hand, I was in a weak 
position and needed to get access. From what I could gauge, based on the frequency and 
nature of their activity on the list server and what they told me during that first interview, 
Sanjay and his wife were among the key actors in Delhi who supported the Niyamgiri 
movement. It was therefore important to establish a strong relationship and accompany 
them on the trip. On the other hand, I had not known them long enough to fully trust them 
and did not know exactly what I could expect from the trip. I was also hesitant to build 
relationships based on financial transactions only and afraid that I was about to create 
growing expectations in the future. 
In our next conversation I made clear that, although I had been given me the funds to 
fly to India and back for my research, I was not equipped with unlimited funding and had 
to be careful not to spend too much of my research budget. I asked Sanjay for his best 
estimation of the overall costs of the trip and we agreed that any additional cost would be 
discussed and potentially split amongst us. Later, during the journey, however, I was 
relieved to find that my initial worries had be unfounded and that the people I accompanied 
painstakingly assured that everyone of the group contributed their fair share to meals, 
supplies we bought for the trek and our transportation. The rule was “Everybody pays what 
they can. If they work for an organization and can claim the money back, they pay 
more.” (Medha, fieldnotes). The only thing that I fully paid was what I had agreed on: the 
trip after the Niyamgiri trek where Sanjay took me to other parts of Orissa, collected video 
material, and brought me in touch with and explained to me much of the background and 
history of social movements in the state.     
In the end, the situation turned out to be quite the opposite and I was hosted regularly 
by activists without them wanting to take any money for this. Trying to keep my 
independence and making the relationships at least somewhat reciprocal I paid people for 
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concrete support such as written translations, tried to pay my rent with those I spent 
extensive periods of time at and brought back a second audio recorder as a present when I 
returned for my second field trip. I also tried to build more reciprocal relationships based 
on my own expertise (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). For example, I offered to look into 
ways to invite one informant to the Netherlands for a research seminar and provided a 
transcript of Vedanta's 2009 Annual General Meeting that I shared through the list server.   
2.5.2 Discussions with managers 
Corporate managers mostly engaged in 'PR talk' during interviews that did not yield 
much more than information about the size and expected positive impact of the contested 
project and the company's CSR achievements. In order to elicit somewhat more substantial 
replies to my questions, I used the background information and arguments shared by 
activists as a resource during the interview (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995), to engage 
managers in discussions. Against recommendations to create an empathic interview 
environment (Fontana & Frey, 2005), this controversial interview style seemed to better 
serve the purpose of studying ‘up’ (Nader, 19s72) and helped elicit answers that went 
beyond what could be found on corporate websites.  
This interview practice also helped deal with the emotional effects of being treated as 
the “unthreatening” female which is often helpful in gaining access (Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 2007: 74) but proved quite straining when asking substantial questions. The 
following quote from an interview with a senior POSCO manager illustrates the 
patronizing way in which some managers attempted to dominate the interview situation 
(emphasis in italics):  
PS14: Now, now, now. Romy, Romy Kraemer, you are the head of POSCO, 
right? You want to set up a steel industry, right? You have land in India. Who 
do you speak with? YOU tell me, you tell me. 
Interviewer: Well… [laughs uncomfortably] First I speak to the government of 
course. 
PS14: Then? 
Interviewer: Then I would speak to the local people. 
PS14: Then? 
Interviewer: See if they want it there or not and …  
PS14:[interrupts] So why, why do you speak first to the government? 
[…] 
PS14: Then? 
Interviewer: You might have to talk to village meetings instead of talking to 
village heads. 
PS14: Hmm, wonderful! I LOVE the answers, I love that. 
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Interviewer: [laughs] 
PS14: So you have spoken to a democratically elected government, then you 
go and try and speak to a democratically elected body of the village folks. 
There are 15 villages out there representing 20.000 people. Each of them has a 
gram panchayat which is the local body out there so you will keep speaking to 
all of them right?  
Interviewer: hm 
PS14: Romy Kraemer! You will never be able to set up your steel industry! 
[laughs contentedly] 
Following this and similar situations, the practice of challenging managers with 
alternative interpretations of corporate activities and criticizing their activities helped to 
create a more equal level playing field in which interviewees tended to articulate 
themselves more openly.  
2.5.3 Negative feedback from study participants  
Disputes with informants about publication of the research are a common occurrence in 
qualitative studies (De Laine, 2000). About one year after its publication, in April 2014, the 
paper on the processual aspects of social movements (chapter 4) got challenged by an 
informant from within the social movement. Associated with a university himself and 
knowledgeable about the publication process, he had directly written to the Journal editor 
criticizing the factual correctness of the representation of the social movement in the paper 
and accusing the authors of a breach of his privacy.  
All accusations could be answered to the satisfaction of the editor and the official 
response was forwarded to the claimant explaining that his accusation had been 
satisfactorily answered and a withdrawal was rejected. Undeterred, the claimant repeated 
the same accusations and demanded another time that the article be withdrawn from 
publication which, again, was refused because he did not substantially add to his argument. 
As a result, all measures were taken to cut any reference to this study participant from the 
remainder of the dissertation to avoid future complaints. The section on respondent 
validation below further highlights how I tried to assure in the best possible way the 
validity of the empirical material and interpretations.   
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2.6 Collection of empirical material
Contemporary multi-sited ethnographies are less focused on participant observation 
alone but rely on new forms of communication to maintain contact with and gather 
information from informants across space and time (Hannerz, 2003). Interviews and 
participant observation were complemented with material gathered from online forums, 
emails and website content, corporate and NGO reports, legal and various other 
documents, and even documentary films and a corporate advertising video. The diverse 
material reflects the various ‘truths’ and reality constructions of the actors and their 
organizations and helped tremendously in contextualizing interview and observational 
materials (Silverman, 2010; Stake, 2005) and address the challenges of impression 
management and retrospective sensemaking that come with interview data (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007).  
I am hesitant to refer to the research process behind this dissertation as a process of 
collecting and working with ‘data’. The etymological meaning of the term (from Latin dare 
"to give") implies a givenness and objectivity which I do not see fit with the subjectivist 
approach of this study (Cunliffe, 2011). The term ‘material’ seems to be much more 
appropriate because it puts the emphasis on the created and creative nature of qualitative 
research where research participants are agentic subjects (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007) 
who actively participate in creating empirical material. Interview accounts are co-
constructed between interviewee and interviewer (Hermanns, 2009; Rapley, 2001), 
participants point out potential interviewees and sources of information and hand over 
some documents but not others, they might even try to influence or use the researcher for 
their benefit (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007) thereby influencing the course of the 
research. Further, notions of science in practice as a craft (Burawoy, 1998; Cunliffe, 2011; 
Prasad, 2005; Rosen, 1991) support the idea of working with different materials rather than 
data. 
Craftsmanship in that sense means that one is “[…] constantly engaged in adjusting and 
reconfiguring scientific protocols to meet the vagaries of each unique empirical 
situation.” (Prasad, 2005: 7). The ease of handling one’s tools and techniques as a 
crafts(wo)man, creatively combining and applying methods and drawing on certain 
research traditions, can only develop with long and regular practice. Reflecting upon the 
research and writing process of this dissertation, I note that I moved from an apprentice to 
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a practitioner over time. Below, I will outline the ways in which empirical material was 
obtained and collected.  
2.6.1 Qualitative interviews 
Initially, interviews were guided by foreshadowed problems and evolving research 
questions without imposing a-priori categories (Fontana & Frey, 2005). As certain themes 
emerged from the analysis of the already collected material, the interviews focused more 
and more on these topics and sampling of interviewees became more purposeful. In 
addition, during periods of participant observation, informal conversations and 
ethnographic interviews helped me to understand the situation, peoples’ activities, 
practices, and subjective experiences (Spradley, 1979). Interviews were audio recorded and 
transcribed verbatim if interviewees allowed it. Where this was not the case, field notes 
were taken during the conversation and elaborated upon directly afterwards.  
Overall, 64 interviews were conducted with 58 informants (see appendix 1&2 for a 
detailed overview) which adds up to nearly 200 hours of formal interview time, the 
majority of which was audio recorded and transcribed. Interviews lasted between 26 
minutes and nearly three hours with an average length of about one and a half hour. 
Group interviews were conducted in addition to these one-to-one interviews, the most 
important one being a joint interview with six state-level activists in Bhubaneswar. 
Additional group situations that were recorded and later transcribed (and translated when 
needed) were meetings between activists and villagers during the trek through the 
Niyamgiri mountains and discussions between activists that I participated in. Another 
group interview was conducted with three consultants to the Indian government’s Ministry 
of Mines on the new mining law.  
2.6.2 Participant observation 
Participant observation was key whenever longer periods of time could be spent with 
informants. Unlike traditional ethnographies in cultural anthropology, multi-sited studies 
and studies from other fields often do not strive to reach the same depth and level of 
immersion and forego the focus on an entire ‘culture’ for attention to a number of 
phenomena or objects of interest (Nadai & Maeder, 2005). The time spent in particular 
settings was therefore often very short, anything between a couple of hours to several 
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weeks, compared to ethnographies with the goal to deep-dive into the lifeworld of a single 
group.  
The majority of my fieldwork time was spent traveling or staying with Indian social 
movement actors which allowed me to share their daily lives and learn about their 
activities and perspectives via ethnographic interviews and participant observation. I 
travelled together with a larger group of two activists/key informants and three Indian 
NGO staff for a two-week period at the beginning of my first field trip. Together, we went 
out on a weeklong trek through the Niyamgiri mountains, the proposed site for Vedanta’s 
mine and close to the Lanjigarh refinery (see figure 4, above). We also visited an anti-
POSCO mass protest in Dhinkia, went to a jail to visit the arrested leader of the anti-
POSCO movement whom I later interviewed after his release during the second field trip, 
and a number of other activities. Living in the state capital with a key informant, I got to 
attend a number of official functions and events organized by the network of social 
movement groups and activists. Those included a memorial function for a Marxist 
politician who had recently died, an event organized in memory of a deceased activist who 
had been crucial in the early days of the anti-Vedanta struggle, and a number of street 
theatre performances intended to educate the general public about the anti-Christian riots 
that had started to sweep over large parts of East India in summer 2008. I accompanied an 
Indian member of an international NGO for a full day to the anti-POSCO protest area and 
another nearby village where her organization was active. I travelled with some key 
informants and two Indian NGO staff for two weeks to various villages in mining affected 
areas in Orissa. There, activists interacted with villagers and local resistance leaders in 
order to find out about their activities and those of the corporations/pro-corporate groups 
and I also had the opportunity to interview villagers or (former) resistance leaders. During 
those trips we rarely stayed in hotels because my key informants had (activist) 
acquaintances in many places who welcomed us into their houses. When not traveling, I 
mostly either lived together with key informants in Bhubaneswar and Delhi.  
The 2009 Vedanta AGM in London offered a unique opportunity to observe 
interactions between Indian activists and their European counterparts (see chapter 4) as 
well as between social movement and corporate actors. Additionally, on two occasions, I 
was able to interact with corporate actors for periods that were longer than a simple 
interview. I stayed for two days in a Vedanta guest house where I mainly interacted with 
the CSR manager who did not leave my side and accompanied me to meetings with local 
36
proponents and opponents of the project. Later I was able to visit a Vedanta ‘resettlement 
colony’ in another location together with the local CSR staff who also gave me a tour of 
the plant that was still under construction. Given the difficulty of gaining access to mining 
corporations especially in locations where their projects are highly contested, those short 
periods of time were extremely valuable in gaining a better understanding of the corporate 
perspective on anti-mining resistance. Some of the most revealing and interesting 
conversations took place when traveling with corporate informants in the car or during 
shared meals.  
Observations were recorded on the spot in the form of handwritten field notes. When 
there was no time for writing, I voice recorded short ‘notes to self’ that were later added 
when going through the field notes at the end of each day. Like when traveling with 
activists, I also recorded some group settings, especially interactions between local 
villagers and CSR staff. I later had them translated to verify the information that had been 
translated back to me on the spot and learn more about the interactions between managers 
and locals.  
2.6.3 Online sites 
The above mentioned online list server, that often was the venue for debates and used 
extensively for communication among activists, represents another – virtual – site of this 
study that provided relevant empirical material. It was a great source of factual information 
on events and organizing activities but also revealed much about activists' self-
presentations and movement-internal debates. Moreover, via this online connection, it was 
possible to stay connected and continue gather information about the movement outside of 
fieldwork periods.  
The list server is moderated by a UK based anti-mining activist and the majority of the 
over 90 members personally know each other from protest events and also across country 
divides. Group members receive a daily summary email with all messages posted to the 
group since the last summary. The type of information posted ranges from links to 
newspaper articles in Indian and European media that are related to anti-mining and 
industrialization struggles to calls for action or participation in events, updates on 
campaigning activities and recent local developments such as the arrest of an activist and 
plans for protesting it. Members also use the group to share their own relevant articles or 
multimedia productions. Less frequently, the list is used as a collaboration tool and 
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members share drafts and ask for input from other members (e.g. on letters to the 
ministry). Finally, the online group regularly was the venue for ideological debates and 
internal criticism among movement members.  
Overall, since its foundation in December 2004 until autumn 2010, there had been over 
6000 messages posted to the group. The number of messages posted per day has generally 
increased over time from just a couple of postings per week to currently about two to six 
posts per day. It also fluctuates strongly and can further increase to about 15 messages in 
times of high activity. Very rarely there is no daily update due to a lack of postings. There 
are about seven to ten core members who actively contribute a large part of the information 
with others mainly consuming it.   
In addition to that, a closed Facebook group specifically on the Niyamgiri struggle was 
set up by an Indian activist and key informant of this study in 2009. Though there were 
many overlaps in terms of membership with the list server, this group had over 500 
members at the time of the study who were less involved in the movement but rather 
sympathetic bystanders interested to spread the word about it. Although some of the 
information shared in the group overlapped with the list server posts, often more detailed 
information on the Niyamgiri struggle was provided there.  
2.6.4 Other material 
Official documents such as laws and censuses, annual reports, CSR reports and 
brochures, research documents and press releases published by companies, governments 
and NGOs were collected whenever possible to cross-check and contextualise information 
obtained through other means. Similarly, I followed the news on the Niyamgiri and 
POSCO struggle in the English speaking Indian and UK press. Overall, more than 1500 
pages of documents and news articles were collected between 2008 and 2014.  
Video coverage of protest events, campaign clips and documentary videos produced by 
NGOs and activists also provided important background information about the case and 
related struggles in Orissa. One crucial video is the official exit of Jika (see chapter 4) from 
the Niyamgiri movement that was published on youtube in summer 2009. A Vedanta PR 
DVD on one of their new plants provided important insights into the corporate perception 
of the positive economic and social impact of the project and the ability of the company to 
'uplift' entire regions.   
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2.7 Analysis and presentation of findings
Combining and theorising from historical data, retrospective interviews and 
longitudinal data gathered from different sources, I use extensive quotes, narrative 
(Czarniawska, 1999) and grounded theory to make sense of and present the empirical 
material. In line with the grounded theory building processes (Charmaz, 2000; Bryant & 
Charmaz, 2007), the material was coded, categorized and sorted to develop a theory 
grounded in the empirical findings. Early coding with open and preliminary codes and 
frequent iterations between theory and the material informed the theoretical sampling of 
participants, settings and situations until saturation was reached (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). 
All digital texts, interview transcripts, documents, websites and online newspaper articles, 
were analysed with NVivo. Handwritten field notes, field journal entries, and printed texts 
(e.g. reports, corporate PR materials) were coded manually. In extensive handwritten 
memos the material was analytically interpreted and the evolving thoughts about the 
material documented (Noerager Stern, 2007; Bex Lempert, 2007).  
Grounded theory approaches share an affinity to study processes (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008; Langley, 1999) and center on activities as main categories of analysis. Activity-type 
categories were further defined by specific properties. For example, the category 'local 
community mobilizing' was developed to describe the observed and re-told activity of 
national level activists that traveled to remote communities in the Niyamgiri mountains. 
This category was further defined by the properties of 'mobilizing by sharing learnings 
from past and current struggles', 'mobilizing by explaining socio-economic impacts and 
scientific facts' and 'mobilizing through stories of injustice'). These properties had emerged 
from the material as a result of the process of coding and constant comparison of empirical 
material, codes and the emerging categories (Kelle, 2007). Categories were clustered and 
expanded as analysis and material collection proceeded. After saturation was reached, 
categories were again clustered and collapsed upon one another and then hand-sorted to 
put them into relation and make sense of the material (Noerager Stern, 2007). Memos 
guided this process, new ones were produced and formed the basis to discuss the emerging 
theory with co-authors and supervisors.   
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2.7.1 Respondent validation 
Respondent validation increases the validity and quality of the outputs produced. 
Gathering feedback from those studied is considered essential for ethical qualitative 
research, as a tool to increase the agency of study participants (Locke & Velamuri, 2009) 
and also to counter-check content based on a responsibility to protect study participants 
from harm (De Laine, 2000). Two types of respondent validation were employed: 
informally sharing emerging ideas with key informants and explicitly sending written 
documentation for fact-checking. 
Feedback on the evolving research focus and the outputs to be produced was obtained 
from key informants via informal conversations and email. Albeit subtle, this was an 
important step to assure that the political implications of the research project were counter-
checked with activists. The topics of the two empirical papers, within-movement dynamics 
and defection as well as movement repression and perception by managers were 
considered relevant and interesting by those who provided feedback. Reacting to the first 
topic, some activists expressed hopes that the findings would reach NGOs and other 
international actors to have them reflect on their interactions with local movement actors.  
In addition to this ongoing updating and exchange about my evolving research focus, 
written drafts of the empirical papers were shared with key informants with the request to 
provide feedback. However, only two informants with ties to academia made use of this 
opportunity and provided extensive written comments, suggesting additional readings and 
pointing out smaller flaws in the flow of the text and facts provided. These were taken into 
account during the revision process.   
2.8 Declaration of contribution
In this section, I declare my and others’ contribution to this dissertation.  All field and 
literature research that forms the base of this dissertation was conducted solely by the 
author. Several parts of the present work were presented at conferences and in research 
seminars where feedback was obtained from participants that informed revisions and 
improved the final output. The process of respondent validation that also contributed to the 
empirical chapters was outlined in section 2.7.1 above. Chapters 3-5 were also 
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considerably improved based on the feedback of anonymous reviewers. Below I will 
further detail the most important contributions to each individual chapter. 
Chapters 1, 2, 5 and 6 were ideated and independently written by the author and later 
improved with the feedback obtained from Prof. Rob van Tulder (promotor) and Prof. Gail 
Whiteman, (co-promotor).  
Chapter 3 was conceptualized together with the promotor, independently written and 
jointly finalised for publication in A stakeholder approach to corporate social 
responsibility (2012) by A. Lindgreen, P. Kotler, J. Vandamme & F. Maon (Eds.) with the 
author of this dissertation as the first and the promotor as second author of the book 
chapter.   
The idea for chapter 4 was developed by the author based on her empirical findings as 
well as the repeated discussions with the promotor, co-promotor, and Prof. Bobby Banerjee 
(Cass Business School, City University London). Feedback on several versions of the 
paper was obtained from Prof. Whiteman and Prof. Banerjee who are also the second and 
third authors of the final paper. This paper was published in  2013 in Organization Studies, 
34(5-6), pp. 823-852.  
Finally, the idea for chapter 5 was independently developed and written by the author 
and finalised with the feedback of the promotor and co-promotors.  It was then submitted 
to Organization Studies where it received feedback and an R&R that could not be 41
finished due to time constraints and other commitments.  
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3. A LICENSE TO OPERATE FOR THE EXTRACTIVE 
INDUSTRIES?
Operationalizing Stakeholder Thinking in International Business  2
3.1 Abstract
The concept of the ‘License to Operate’ (LtO) has emerged as practitioners’ 
operationalization of corporate responsibilities towards multiple stakeholders, especially in 
the oil and mining industry that faces a unique and complex set of stakeholder pressures. 
The LtO is a poorly and often  strategically employed concept-in-use. This chapter seeks to 
(re)conceptualize the LtO for multinational enterprises and draws implications for 
international business theory. Examples from the extractive industry are examined through 
a multilevel LtO-lens. The chapter then re-assesses and rephrases traditional thinking about 
the trade-offs between global integration and local responsiveness/embeddedness for 
multinational firms, building on international business and stakeholder theory. We 
highlight the need for international business to go beyond a strictly task-related focus when 
assessing factors that influence the activities and location choice of multinational firms. A 
shift from a ‘responsiveness’ to a ‘responsibility’ approach is suggested to improve the 
managerial sophistication of the LtO concept. 
3.2 Introduction
In May 2002, Occidental Petroleum pulled out of its legally granted concession to 
explore and extract oil in U’wa territory, Colombia. The U’wa believe that the crude oil 
is the blood of their “mother earth”: they did not consent to the extraction and were 
supported by international NGOs whose campaign led investors to sell their Occidental 
shares and ultimately resulted in the company’s withdrawal. 
 This chapter is co-authored with Prof. Rob van Tulder and published in A. Lindgreen, P. Kotler, J. Vandamme & 2
F. Maon (2012) A stakeholder approach to corporate social responsibility. Farnham: Gower.
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In 2003, following immense public and shareholder pressure, Canada’s largest oil 
company, Talisman Energy, pulled out of its Sudanese investments because it had been 
accused by civil society groups of fueling the rampant civil war through generating 
income for the Sudanese government. 
In April 2008, Shell reported an output loss of 169,000 barrels of crude per day due to 
sabotage of its main pipelines in southern Nigeria. Overall, violence in the southern 
Delta region has reduced Nigeria’s total crude oil production by a quarter since January, 
2006. 
In September 2010, after years of campaigning by a coalition of national and 
international NGOs and activists in support of the Dongria Kondh tribe, the Indian 
government denied UK mining company and major aluminum producer Vedanta 
Resources, environmental clearance for a bauxite mine on the ancestral land of the 
tribe. 
Following the massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico caused by the explosion of BP’s 
Deepwater Horizon, the US government — after strong pressure by, among others, 
local fishery communities — put a hold on all offshore drilling licensing until the 
safety requirements for this practice had been reviewed. 
These examples illustrate the complex set of stakeholder pressures and their influence 
on the operations and location choice of corporations from the extractive industry (mineral 
and oil and gas). Growing awareness for the impact of business operations in other parts of 
the world in the home countries of large well-known European and North American 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) from contested industries has turned them into prime 
targets for attacks by alliances of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and locally 
affected stakeholders. The influence of NGOs and local communities on MNEs operations 
is an interesting perspective on international business (Doh & Teegen, 2003; Teegen, Doh 
& Vachani, 2004). It adds to the traditional emphasis on the quality and availability of 
natural resources, liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995), the bargaining power of the host 
country government (Fagre & Wells, 1982; Grosse, 1996; Ramamurti, 2001; Vernon, 1971) 
and the need for global integration (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989b) as relevant factors for 
extractive industry companies’ investment decisions. Such theoretical ideas about the 
nature of the extractive industry and the pressures it faces stand in stark contrast to today’s 
management reality where, beyond the industry’s operational and location imperatives, the 
need to obtain a “License to Operate” (LtO) is central to managerial discourse: 
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Chevron: "Our approach to stakeholder consultations is designed to earn our license to 
operate … We believe in earning our license to operate and bringing benefits to 
communities where we operate.” (McLeod, 2009) 
BHP Billiton: "We understand it is a privilege to operate in communities, and that our 
licence to operate is crucial to our continued success as a company." (Nasser, 2010) 
Vedanta Resources: "Being well knit in the social fabric of our communities has 
enabled us to nurture our social license to operate and to work hand in hand with the 
local communities and the environment.” (Annual Report, 2010) 
The risk of losing the LtO has been dramatically described as “probably the single 
greatest threat to mining operations throughout the developing world” (Reichardt, 2006) 
and its importance was likened to that of financial resources (Post, Preston & Sachs, 2002). 
Such statements clearly point to the crucial nature of stakeholder relationships for 
corporate success and future expansion strategies in the extractive industries. At the same 
time, they highlight the need for a reassessment of classic international business theory and 
an expansion of current thinking to a focus beyond the internal drivers for investments 
onto the external conditions within which such investments are embedded. 
However, despite its popularity among managers, too many questions still remain to be 
answered, for example which stakeholders actually grant the LtO and especially how it can 
be conceptualized. This chapter is an attempt to systematize and work towards a coherent 
perspective on the LtO in order to limit its rhetorical and strategic usage and improve its 
realistic and managerial use. The chapter therefore extends traditional notions of local 
responsiveness in international business theory towards an incorporation of stakeholder 
thinking. Departing from a description of the extractive industry as an ideal case to 
examine stakeholder pressures, we review the use of the LtO concept by industry 
representatives and stakeholders. Based on its use by managers in the industry and the 
available academic literature, a multilevel conceptualization of the LtO is proposed and 
applied to a discussion of examples from the minerals and oil industry. Going beyond the 
related concepts of “local embeddedness” and “responsiveness”, we highlight how the LtO 
can extend current international business theory through a shift from traditional ideas about 
local responsiveness to the notion of stakeholder responsibility. We conclude with a critical 
discussion of the meaning and implications of the LtO as a concept-in-use and suggest 
directions for further research. 
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3.3. Stakeholder Pressures in the Extractive Industry
Multinational corporations from the extractive industry (EI) have been confronted with 
the most long-standing, the broadest, but at the same time also the most fragmented set of 
requests from a variety of stakeholders, especially when operating in developing countries. 
Due to the boundedness of their location choices to the availability of natural resources and 
the increasing need to explore earlier uneconomic and remote reserves, EI firms often 
operate under the most complex and challenging conditions, e.g. in politically tense 
conflict zones, under unstable regimes, in disadvantaged rural communities in developing 
countries and on the lands of indigenous peoples — often combining more than one 
challenge (Coumans, 2008). Conflicts and local resistance to extractive operations are 
more frequent than in any other industry and our opening examples show that extractive 
industry firms repeatedly had to involuntarily withdraw from investments that seemed 
viable from a purely operational and economical perspective. Responsiveness to local 
claims and circumstances is therefore crucial to avoid high transaction and sunk costs and 
is becoming a precondition for future expansion strategies (Reichardt, 2006). The EI has 
therefore been at the forefront of debates about corporate responsibilities and the role of 
multinational corporations in development (Frynas, 2009; KPMG, 2005; UNCTAD, 2006; 
van Tulder & van der Zwart, 2006; Zyglidopoulos, 2002). Mining and oil multinationals 
are also featured prominently in debates about the internationalization of MNEs from 
transition and developing countries, south–south investment, and the strategic and 
developmental implications of such developments in international investment patterns 
Athreye & Kapur 2009; Aykut & Goldstein 2007; UNCTAD 2006). These corporations are 
thus a highly relevant example for the need to integrate non-market and nonprofit 
dimensions into the study of MNEs. Nevertheless, they remain a relatively poorly studied 
subset of MNEs (Jones, 2005). 
Pressures from and conflicts with three main stakeholder groups have shown to be 
especially relevant for EI companies in the past. The first, and most directly affected 
stakeholder group are the local communities who are displaced by or located in the vicinity 
of mining and oil development. A MNEs’ interpretation of “sustainable development” 
increasingly also means corporate community involvement and responsiveness to local 
needs (Fortanier & Kolk, 2007; Jones, Pollitt & Bek, 2007; Kobeissi & Damanpour, 2009). 
Acknowledging the multiple social, cultural, environmental and economic effects of 
46
mineral and oil extraction (Banerjee, 2000; Evans, Goodman & Lansbury, 2002; 
Whiteman, 2004; Yakovleva, 2005) some EI corporations engage in a host of more or less 
successful local development projects, often carried out in collaboration with NGOs. The 
second stakeholder group entails national and international NGOs. They often support 
communities’ claims and shape the public opinion about individual corporations as well as 
the entire sector. Greenpeace’s role in the controversy about the sinking of Shell’s Brent 
Spar oil platform is a well-known case in point (Zyglidopoulos, 2002). NGOs are central in 
the escalation of conflicts around large-scale investments in contentious industries 
(Skippari & Pajunnen, 2010) and have been crucial in highlighting important issues for the 
EI such as revenue transparency, their role in climate change discussion and the 
environmental and human rights impact of EI operations (Levy & Kolk, 2002; Utting & 
Ives, 2006). The third stakeholder group are the host country governments. They have a 
high impact on the activities of EI multinationals, e.g. through their role in the granting of 
exploration and exploitation licenses, taxation and the threat of nationalization due to the 
strategic nature of the sector (Vernon, 1971; Vernon, 1981). 
The combination of an often demanding operational environment accompanied by 
conflicting stakeholder demands creates a unique challenge for EI corporations. Sparked 
by the controversy and high attention with which their operations are usually met, EI 
multinationals have been at the forefront of CSR activities and rhetoric and have been 
crucial in coining the LtO concept. This has motivated major NGOs like Oilwatch or 
Corpwatch to accuse the industry of “greenwashing” and highlight deviations from their 
stated CSR commitments. This chapter thus also faces the challenge to try to go beyond the 
rhetoric and develop the LtO into a more sophisticated concept in which the complex 
stakeholder relationships in host locations are realistically included. 
3.4 Trends in the Practical Use of the LtO Concept
Extractive industry firms in particular have embraced the LtO as a leading paradigm for 
business conduct and the achievement of long-term profitability. How central the LtO 
concept has become is apparent in industry-specific conferences, especially in Australia 
and Canada with titles such as "Social License to Operate 2010” or “Land Access Forum”. 
In 2011, the latter offered a panel discussion on “Obtaining a License to Operate” with the 
following description: 
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"The perceived right to have a physical presence of place in a community is a core 
challenge to the resources industry. Some might say it is the biggest issue they are 
facing. Gaining regulatory approval for mining and petroleum projects and developing 
the necessary infrastructure is a challenging, time and money intensive process. But 
without a social license to operate in a region, these physical and administrative 
investments can be rendered worthless.”  3
Table 2 lists additional material from a simple web search (using the terms “license/
licence to operate” on Google and different corporate websites). This quick review 
illustrates three general trends: first, community and society at large feature most 
prominently as grantors of the LtO. Secondly, the LtO, instead of being a tangible 
document, is used in a metaphorical sense. It is the perception of managers that the firm’s 
presence and operations are accepted by the local population. Finally, despite this relative 
consensus, there remains considerable variance in terms of the antecedents, outcomes and 
nature of the LtO, as well as related concepts such as reputation or citizenship. The 
importance of community, however, indicates that contributing to sustainable local 
development is widely seen as the key to local acceptance (Amaral & La Rovere, 2003). 
The lower part of Table 5 further suggests that the notion of the LtO has also been taken up 
by NGOs, consultants and the general public when discussing issues relevant for the EI 
and its stakeholder relationships. 
This characteristic of the LtO as a concept-in-use and its widespread application across 
industry actors without a clear consensus about its meaning, makes it comparable to the 
concept of “corporate citizenship”, a term which also largely originated from American 
multinationals and EI corporations (van Tulder & van der Zwart, 2006). Practitioners seem 
to attach increasing value to the LtO as a means to operationalize stakeholder relationships, 
while local communities and stakeholders embrace the concept also as an argument in 
obtaining a better bargaining position in their negotiations with investors to achieve better 
preconditions for sustainable development. Like corporate citizenship before it, the LtO 
concept has been embraced by academics (Gunningham, Kagan, Thornton, 2004; Howard-
Grenville, Nash & Coglianese, 2008; Nelsen, 2006; Nelsen & Scoble, 2006; Post, Preston 
& Sachs, 2002), notwithstanding its conceptual and managerial ambiguities. 
 http://www.futureeye.com/node/462 last accessed Jan. 30, 20123
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LtO Quote Stakeholder 
Group
Source
“Our license to operate in a country is only as good as 
the community’s attitude towards us.” Community
Eyton (2010), Head 
Research & 
Technology, BP
“Our licence to operate—it’s our reputation as a 
partner of choice. Gaining and maintaining our 
licence to operate is critical to our business. We aim 
to ensure that the communities in which we operate 
value our citizenship.”
Community BHP Billiton (2007), website
“Social license is the acceptance and belief by 
society, and specifically our local communities, in the 
value creation of our activities, such as we are 
allowed to access and extract mineral resources.”
Community, 
society
Pierre Lassonde, 
Newmont Mining 
(cited in Reichardt, 
2006)
“Most companies recognise the far-reaching effects 
that health, safety and environmental issues can have 
on their business. Like us, they believe that long-term 
competitive success depends on being trusted to meet 
the expectations of society as well as those of 
shareholders and stakeholders.”
Society, 
shareholders, 
stakeholders
Shell website
“For international oil and gas companies like BP, our 
‘license to operate’ depends on the consent of the 
societies in which we work. Mostly, we operate under 
license. We rarely work alone. Almost nothing we do 
is unregulated. To succeed, we have to be in step with 
society.”
Society Rice (2002), Director Policy Unit, BP
“The social license is intangible, renewable daily and 
granted by the people only when their needs are being 
met”
Community
Kurlander (2001), 
Senior Vice 
President, Newmont 
mining
“A ‘social licence to operate’ is earned by acquiring 
free, prior and informed consent from indigenous 
peoples and local communities.”
Community McKibben & Waters (2010)
“Due to the egregious number of safety violations and 
warnings; they should lose any license to operate 
within the United States at all.”
Host 
government
Reader comment on 
an article about the 
BP oil spill, 
Huffington Post 
(2010)
“If society gives business its license to operate, then 
surely society can demand that business takes 
responsibility for any significant negative 
consequences associates with its products.”
Society
Blog entry on a 
business ethics 
consultancy website
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Table 2: Overview of the use of the license to operate (LtO) concept 
3.5 A Theoretical Elaboration
3.5.1 Conceptualizing the LtO at Three Levels 
The LtO, sometimes also termed “social license” or “social license to operate” has 
mainly entered the field of management studies as part of stakeholder theory: 
“With respect to individuals and groups involuntarily impacted by corporate activity, in 
particular those subject to pollution, congestion, unwelcome cultural influences, or the 
like, the critical management goals have to be avoidance of harm, reduction of risk, 
and/or the creation of offsetting benefits, so that the continued operation of the 
individual enterprise — its ‘license to operate’ — remains acceptable to all parties.” 
(Post, Preston & Sachs, 2002) 
Like the many practitioner statements shown in Table 2 above, the academic definitions 
focus primarily on corporations' impact on and relationships with community stakeholders. 
Others cover the LtO from a legal perspective based on research in the pulp and paper 
industry (Gunningham, Kagan & Thornton, 2004) and, following a very hands-on industry 
approach, also in the mining industry (Nelsen, 2006; Nelsen & Scobble, 2006). Some 
authors focus on firm internal factors that influence how the need for an LtO is perceived 
and what response strategies are chosen in the face of external stakeholder pressures. They 
argue that the LtO is constructed through a continuous interaction process (Howard-
Grenville, Nash & Coglianese, 2008). 
“At the level of an individual project the Social 
License is rooted in the beliefs, perceptions and 
opinions held by the local population and other 
stakeholders about the project.”
Community Website of an LtO consultancy
“This effort would go a long way toward improving 
Chevron’s relations with host communities and, in the 
long run, strengthening Chevron’s capacity to obtain 
legal and social ‘license to operate’.”
Community Ian Gary, Oxfam America
Source Quote
Cramer (2002) "The degree to which the firm’s conduct is accepted by society."
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Table 3: Definitions of the LtO 
Despite the initial focus on communities, at the same time the LtO always also has a 
more broad societal component that resonates in many of the definitions and industry 
statements. At the most extreme, it is the stated requirement for the corporation to “earn its 
‘license to operate,’ both locally and globally, by demonstrating its respect for people and 
its contribution to building a better world” (Post, Preston & Sachs, 2002: 256). 
Others have criticized this weakly developed notion of the LtO as an obligation in 
return for the special privileges and benefits conferred on businesses by society (Hopkins, 
2007). Considering these lines of contention, it is very likely that the LtO discussion will 
move into an intellectual stalemate comparable to the one on corporate citizenship. To 
prevent such a situation, and in order to synthesize the existing literature and the ways in 
which the concept has been used by practitioners, we propose a concept of LtO that 
interrelates three levels: the societal/global, the legal/national and the social/local license 
(Figure 5). 
Before explaining these levels, however, we need to clarify how the LtO relates to other 
concepts — most importantly the concept of legitimacy (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). 
While legitimacy is primarily a theoretical construct, the LtO clearly is a practitioner 
concept and strategically employed to create a societal perception of organizational 
acceptance in society. Moreover, legitimacy is usually described as the absence of 
challenges towards the object of legitimation and as a non-rival and homogenizing concept 
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). This is often interpreted and operationalized as a 
“negative duty” approach. The LtO approach departs from a more “positive duty” 
Gunningham et al. 
(2004)
"Demands on and expectations for a business enterprise that emerge from 
neighborhoods, environmental groups, community members, and other 
elements of the surrounding civil society."
Nelsen (2006) “Comprises a set of concepts, values, tools and practices that represent a 
way of viewing reality for the communities. It not only forms the 
foundation of the mine life cycle, it also permeates each and every phase 
from discovery to reclamation."
Salim (2003) "Indigenous peoples and other affected parties do have the right to 
participate in decisionmaking and to give their free prior and informed 
consent throughout each phase of a project cycle. This consent should be 
seen as the principal determinant of whether there is a ‘social license to 
operate’.”
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approach, where practitioners emphasize the need for actively obtaining a license (and with 
it potentially also a competitive advantage) from local or state-level stakeholders, as well
as society.
Figure 5: Multilevel conceptualization of the LtO
The LtO, as it is currently used, is more immediate and dichotomous (either present or 
absent) and granted at a micro level compared to the more abstract concept of legitimacy 
that grows over time and can increase with increasing numbers of legitimizing actors/
institutions (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Legitimacy is a broader concept that relates to 
the general societal acceptance of, for example, the extractive industry as a whole. This
will be further referred to below as the “License to Exist”. The local LtO might thus be
seen as a possible expression or benefit of a firms’ overall legitimacy (Bansal & Roth, 
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2000). These ideas will be integrated into a theoretically informed operationalization of the 
practitioner’s LtO concept in order to apply it to an analysis of the challenges faced by the 
EI and extend current thinking about local responsiveness and global integration later in 
this chapter. 
The societal/global level refers to the broad acceptance of EI operations in general 
(Cramer, 2002), likened above to the overall legitimacy of the industry. Individual firms try 
to alter the image of the EI as a “dirty” industry and to align their values with those 
prevalent in the societies where operations take place in order to remain in business 
(Humphreys, 2001). Joint EI company initiatives such as the “Mining, minerals, and 
sustainable development” initiative (MMSD, 2002) are attempts to build public trust and 
contribute to the overall legitimacy of the industry, which we label the License to Exist 
because of its broad overarching industry-level implications. In moral theory, this notion 
builds on the general “fiduciary duty” of corporations and has been operationalized as the 
compliance likelihood of codes of conduct and reporting strategies (Kolk & van Tulder, 
2005). 
The national level of the LtO is concerned with obtaining necessary governmental 
licenses and permits for a local operation and complying with, for example, emission and 
waste management guidelines. Past operating performance plays an important role here 
(Birley, 2005; Zinkin, 2004) in that it paves the way in the form of what has been labelled 
“reputation capital” by a Newmont Mining executive. However, the national license is not 
entirely legal in nature. If host governments decide that companies’ activities are not 
benefiting the country enough, they might pull their support and withdraw the LtO through 
non-renewal of legal licenses, inviting competitors, or, in the worst case, nationalization of 
the industry. Governments need to trust firms for them to obtain prospecting rights and 
access to blocs of land for oil, gas or minerals exploration or to be accepted by the country 
as a retailer (e.g. selling refined petroleum). In the 1990s this was an issue for example in 
the opening up of Eastern European countries where not all foreign firms were equally 
successful in obtaining the licenses to operate gas stations from the local bureaucracy 
(Knot, 1997). 
The local LtO can be conceptualized in line with what many authors have referred to as 
the “social” LtO and portends to the management of relations with important local 
stakeholders — usually referred to as “the community” in the above quotes. Those are the 
stakeholders who could effectively prevent operations or increase transaction costs for 
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corporations at the local level, e.g. through loss of production (strikes, blockades, land 
conflict), higher costs for security provision, costs for dispute resolution (community 
consultation, capacity building stakeholder meetings, employee/management time) and 
additional costs for data gathering and verification (e.g. environmental data, consultants) 
(Reichardt, 2006). This relates to the original meaning of corporate citizenship that 
requires corporations to be responsible members of the local community in which they 
operate (Andrioff & McIntosh, 2001). The local LtO is not guaranteed by obtaining the 
support of the state and society and might not be equally persistent over time as a signed 
contract with the host country government. In that sense it is tied to “local needs” as 
referred to above by Kurlander (Table 3) and continuously negotiated. Reluctance of local 
governments to support firms in struggles with local stakeholders and normative 
expectations for good local relationships within and outside the enterprise (e.g. codes of 
conduct or policies such as ILO 169, World Bank Operational Directive 4.20) require firms 
to negotiate directly with local stakeholders and add to the need for obtaining a local LtO 
(Wasserstrom & Reider, 1998). Additionally, the increasingly sophisticated organization of 
local communities and their expertise in linking up with international activists and 
campaigns makes it harder for firms to ignore those groups and practice what has been 
called a 'right of way' policy (Wasserstrom & Reider, 1998), where trespassing and land 
use issues were resolved with small cash payments to locals without any further 
consideration of their development needs. 
Figure 5 also highlights the interconnectedness of the three levels and the two-way 
relationships among them. An industry’s overall license to exist is influenced by the LtOs 
granted to individual firms all over the world at a national and local level and by the 
existence and public debate about universal standards or “hypernorms” (Logsdon & Wood, 
2002). As for reputational effects (Fombrun, 2005), it has been shown that deviance of 
individual firms and their loss of the LtO has negative spillover effects for innocent firms 
within the same industry and thus has implications for the overall legitimacy or license to 
exist (Jonsson, Greve & Fujiwara-Greve, 2009). Internationally operating activists and 
NGOs therefore raise broader questions about the legitimacy of the EI in general and have 
successfully influenced the relationships between MNEs and host country governments 
(Kobrin, 2005) as well as considerably change public awareness of the negative impact of 
the EI on host countries and communities. Likewise, national and societal challenges to an 
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industry’s or individual corporation’s LtO can improve the chances of local communities in 
challenging individual EI corporations and motivate them to take local action. 
3.5.2 Application to the Extractive Industries 
The 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and the subsequent congressional hearing 
with executives from ExxonMobil, Shell and Chevron highlights the threat of a loss of the 
License to Exist (LtE) for corporations following an individual corporation’s 
malperformance. Likewise, the public debate about doing business in Sudan threatened the 
LtO of Western oil corporations in general and had an impact on individual firms such as 
Talisman Oil, who had to pull out of the country. In South Africa, the Black Economic 
Empowerment movement, supported by international NGOs, considerably affected the 
way individual mining firms now conduct their operations and engage in CSR by sparking 
a wider societal discussion (Hamann, 2004). The lawsuit of the inhabitants of Kivalina 
against Exxon Mobil and 23 other American oil producers because of their contribution to 
global warming and attempts to influence the public discourse threatens their overall LtE 
and would not have been possible without the current concern about climate change in the 
wider society. In general, calls for sustainable community development, that extend 
beyond the life cycle of the individual resource development project, would not be possible 
without the wide perception in society that long-term sustainability is a legitimate claim. 
On the other hand, conflicts over natural resource development bring to light conflicts 
and deeper clashes of worldviews (Mander & Tauli-Corpuz, 2006) and interests between 
different segments of society that are especially pronounced in industrializing countries 
and/or those with indigenous populations, ethnic or religious differences, and smoldering 
civil conflicts that are usually exacerbated by the prospect of resource rents. In countries 
like India or Brazil, the majority of the mainstream population supports the LtE of the 
mining and oil industry on the grounds that it is able to deliver income for national 
development, while the local LtO is routinely challenged by indigenous peoples and poor 
rural communities whose ways of life and subsistence base are threatened and who might 
not want or are unable to participate in the kind of development resource extraction might 
bring (Ali & Behrendt, 2001; Young, 1995). Faced with local resistance, EI corporations, 
claiming their legal rights and building on the national LtO, often call in the government/
police forces for support. The Sudanese government, for example, used heavy military 
force to “clear” areas for petroleum development and forestall local resistance to 
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exploitation of resource wealth (Human Rights Watch, 2003), the Indian government has 
been accused of similar activities with respect to mining and the focus on fighting so-
called Maoists in mineral rich states (Roy, 2010). 
The complexities of earning a national LtO have for example been felt by RioTinto 
operating in Guinea, where legal licenses stand and fall with the appointment of ministers. 
As a result of such turbulences, the company runs the risk of their right to exploit the 
largest known undeveloped iron ore reserve in the world being withdrawn and might incur 
sunk costs of $300 million (Ross, 2008). In Russia, Shell lost half of its shares in the 
hugely profitable Sakhalin II project after signing an initially very beneficial production-
sharing agreement with the government back in 1996. Ten years later, the technical ability 
of Gazprom to develop the reserve had increased and the Russian government, suddenly 
backing environmentalists’ claims against the company, took over ownership in the 
enterprise. This is a prime example of a government (ab)using local level claims against a 
firm to increase its own bargaining power in negotiations about the national LtO. 
The local LtO can be challenged or revoked at any time and the conditions under which 
it is granted are subject to renegotiation. If firms do not fulfill their obligations and 
promises for local development, local stakeholders will try to claim justice. In Mambia, 
Guinea, Russia’s aluminum company Rusal signed an agreement with the local community 
in 1984 and by 2008 had failed to fulfill its promises regarding the provision of public 
services to affected communities. Two people were killed and several others injured during 
local protests (BBC, 2008), only one example among many such incidences all over the 
world that make clear that EI corporations often fail to gain the local LtO. 
3.6 Incorporating the LtO into International Business Theory: From 
Embeddedness and Responsiveness to Responsibility
3.6.1 Local Responsiveness and Embeddedness 
International business theory, though interested in the investment behavior of 
multinational corporations, has so far not paid much attention to the specific stakeholder 
pressures faced by the EI and thus has not yet contributed to the concept of the LtO, a 
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lacunae that we wish to address. Two core concepts have been introduced in the 
international business literature to research and prescribe management practices: 
responsiveness and embeddedness. Both concepts are relevant, but need updating and 
repositioning. 
First, the integration-responsiveness (I-R) ideal (Ghoshal & Noria, 1989) belongs to the 
classic tenets of international business and strategy. It illuminates the tensions for 
multinational firms that arise from the need to balance responsiveness at subsidiary level 
with global efficiency, integration and headquarter control and has been widely applied at 
the level of the industry (Porter, 1986), the multinational enterprise (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
1989b; Doz, Bartlett & Prahalad, 1981; Ghoshal & Noria, 1993) and their subsidiaries 
(Jarillo & Martinez, 1990; Johnson, Farrel & Henderson, 1995; Taggart, 1997). Integration 
means exploiting cost and efficiency advantages and opportunities for standardization 
arising from multi-country operations, whereas local responsiveness is understood as 
reacting to domestic competition and host country demands while sufficiently 
differentiating operations to handle global competition. The classic international business 
thesis as formulated in the “integration-responsiveness grid” (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989a; 
Doz & Prahalad, 1991) portrays extractive industries as a prime example of “global 
industries” that combine a high pressure for integration and a low pressure for 
responsiveness (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: The traditional integration-responsiveness grid
Levitt’s original work on globalization reinforced this impression: oil majors and 
mining companies serve global markets with relatively standardized products (Levitt, 
1983). Pressures for integration and responsiveness vary not only across firms and 
countries, but also between functions within businesses, e.g. CSR and human resource
management (Doz & Prahalad, 1991; Muller, 2006; Rosenzweig & Noria, 1994). Previous
studies however, favored the examination of pressures for global integrationlxxii and only 
more recent work tried to investigate the environmental, industry-structural, and firm-
related factors that influence the local responsiveness of subsidiaries (Birkinshaw, 
Morrison & Hulland, 1995; Kobrin, 1991).
The I-R model has been criticized for a number of reasons: for instance its lack of 
conceptual clarity which has lead to problematic empirical validation Luo, 2001), or its
ambiguity as regards the nature of the pressure (exogenous, endogenous representing 
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managerial choices) and its relationship with performance (Venaik, Midgley & Devinney, 
2004). 
Second, the concept of embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985; Polanyi, 1944) has also been 
widely applied in the international business literature, e.g. with respect to the integration of 
foreign subsidiaries into the local economy (Dunning, 1995), local clusters (Porter, 1998, 
2000) and the potential of FDI to contribute to regional development (Lall & Narula, 
2004); Pavlinek, 2004; Phelps, MacKinnon, Stone & Braidford, 2003). Other studies 
examined institutional embeddedness (Choi, Raman, Usoltseva & Lee, 1999), the 
relationship between local embeddedness and employee attitudes (Newburry, 2001), or 
relational embeddedness between parent and international joint ventures (Dhanaraj, Lyles, 
Steensma & Tihanyi, 2004). Local embeddedness through connections and local networks 
is a source of information, knowledge and physical resources, but also of power and 
legitimacy (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). In terms of legitimacy, embeddedness created 
through corporate citizenship activities is said to help companies to overcome their liability 
of foreignness in a host country location (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006). What can be 
learned from those studies of firm networks is that embeddedness enables firms to obtain 
reliable information to categorize other actors in the network and inform decision-making 
regarding which players are important for the focal firm (Karamanos, 2003). Applied to the 
EI context, higher embeddedness of Shell in local stakeholder relationships with local 
groups in the Niger Delta might have facilitated recognition of the importance of the 
oppositional movement led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, before it was too late for the company to 
take sensible action. Even 15 years after the original case materialized, the company is still 
struggling (in American and Dutch courts) with this issue. 
Such local knowledge and learning issues have brought some authors to equate local 
embeddedness with local responsiveness, arguing that subsidiary managers possess crucial 
local knowledge that is needed at MNE headquarters and that knowledge and technology 
transfer to parents improves through embeddedness (Andersson & Forsgren, 2000; 
Hakanson & Nobel, 2001; Ling, Floyd & Baldridge, 2005; Mu, Gnyawali & Hatfield, 
2007). The local context is seen as a source of important information which headquarters 
are unable to obtain and that local responsiveness/embeddedness can thus deliver strategic 
advantages (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986; Birkinshaw, 1997). 
Despite the prescriptions for local responsiveness and the seemingly high value of firm 
embeddedness into local networks, the international business literature is ripe with 
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examples of under-adaptation of firms to their local environment, be it in marketing (Dow, 
2006), human resource management (Johnson, Lenartowicz & Apud, 2006), or 
internationalization strategy (Magnusson et al. 2008). Similarly, for extractive industry 
operations, local adaptation is normatively seen as a specific success factor (Hamann, 
2004), though it is often not reached in practice. 
3.6.2 From Responsiveness and Embeddedness to Responsibility 
Both the mainstream responsiveness and embeddedness approach have their 
limitations. The added value of the LtO concept to traditional international business theory 
is that it upgrades the idea of local responsiveness as mentioned in the I-R grid approach to 
include also the increasingly challenging stakeholder relationships that firms in the EI in 
particular face. 
Local responsiveness as it is currently used is strongly biased towards market-seeking 
MNEs and their need to adapt products and services to suit host country markets and be 
responsive to local institutions and business cultures (Harzing, 2000; Luo, 2001; Roth & 
Morrison, 1990). Pressures for responsiveness originate from customers and business 
partners: other local stakeholders are rarely considered in such a context. Our discussion of 
the LtO has shown the importance of a more diverse set of stakeholders that challenges the 
applicability of the classic I-R grid to the EI. 
Due to the specific nature of the industry, responsiveness is not just a question of being 
able to “successfully confront cultures, markets, and business practices” (Luo, 2001: 452) 
and of gaining some competitive advantage through exploitation of those differences. 
Local responsiveness in the EI often means securing the operability of a project or 
reducing transaction costs to a tolerable size. Current conceptualizations of local 
responsiveness do not account for this situation. Firms trying to obtain or maintain their 
local LtO usually do so with initiatives that are summarized under the label of corporate 
social responsibility. The traditional I-R framework (Figure 6) can thus be reformulated 
into an integration-responsibility (I-R2) framework (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7: Adapted I-R grid: from responsiveness to responsibility (I-R2)
Figure 7 illustrates that the initial distribution of industries in the I-R framework 
changes considerably in the I-R2 grid. Professional service firms, for instance, experience
much less pressure for local responsibility than for responsiveness. Manufacturing 
industries (such as the car and chemical industries) have to be split-up into a “low” and 
“high” polluting segment, in order to take into account pressures of responsiveness and 
responsibility. In this case it seems increasingly obvious that responsibility overrules
responsiveness as an influencing factor for internationalization strategies. For specific
consumer goods the pressure for local responsiveness (and adaptation) remains high. C. K. 
Prahalad’s (2006) notion of the “bottom of the pyramid” builds on this idea and is basically 
a marketing approach built on responsiveness to the needs of billions of so far untapped 
customers at the lower end of the market. However, the claim that this strategy can be
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coupled with responsibility — in short that it might lead to alleviating poverty — is highly 
disputed (Hopkins, 2007). Responsiveness and responsibility in consumer product markets 
are not the same. 
With respect to the location of EI multinationals in the I-R2 grid, we can see that it 
strongly depends on their position in the global value chain. The more vertically integrated 
and upstream and the bigger they are, the more they are prone to both pressures for 
integration and responsibility. While less integrated and smaller EI firms and those more 
active in downstream activities only face one of these pressures, the former for 
responsibility and the latter for higher integration. 
The LtO is most relevant in the area encircled by the dotted line in the updated I-R grid. 
Firms outside this area benefit from low direct threats to their overall LtO. They might, 
however, as in the case of downstream EI firms, suffer from negative spillovers should the 
LtO of a firm from the same industry that is more vertically integrated be threatened. It is 
thus not the case that the LtO is irrelevant for all firms outside the oval. However, the 
direct threat to the LtO through a lack of responsibility is lower for these industries. 
The need for a shift to local responsibility has also been emphasized elsewhere. From 
an international strategy perspective, London and Hart caution that “the transnational 
model of national responsiveness, global efficiency and worldwide learning may not be 
sufficient” and argue further that MNEs need to change their strategies in order to develop 
“a global capability in social embeddedness” (London & Hart, 2004: 350). 
3.7 Discussion and Conclusions
Our review of the specifics of the extractive industry, cases of failed or contested 
investments in this business and practitioner perspectives on how to confront this situation 
shows that natural resource development takes place in a complex and challenging 
stakeholder environment. We traced the emergence of the concept of the LtO among 
corporate executives and stakeholders of the extractive industry. The varieties of uses of 
the LtO concept suggests that, like sustainability or globalization, it is an “empty signifier” 
that takes on different meanings at different times and for different actors (Laclau, 1996). 
Nevertheless, we have tried to develop a first theoretical conceptualization of the LtO 
based on the scant academic literature and its current importance as a “concept-in-use”. 
This conceptualization proposes three interconnected levels of LtO that highlight the local, 
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national and societal requirements posed upon the extractive industry (and potentially also 
other industries). This approach combines the multiple ways in which the LtO has been 
selectively used into one overarching concept to highlight what has also been shown in a 
brief case review and application of the concept to the extractive industry. EI firms have 
rarely been able to obtain the LtO at all levels, especially when operating in developing 
countries. Discussing the LtO at all relevant levels can help to unveil contradictory 
activities undertaken by EI firms when trying to reconcile the diverse stakeholder 
challenges they face. While they engage heavily in CSR and community initiatives to gain 
the “local license”, these firms might at the same time demand support from the host 
country government in violently suppressing local resistance movements. Likewise, while 
funding alternative energy projects, many EI corporations have been accused of lobbying 
activities to deny climate change and maintain their overall license to exist (Levy & Kolk, 
2002). 
Despite failed investments and high sunk costs incurred by many EI firms, current 
thinking in international business on local adaptation has largely ignored this industry 
(Jones, 2005) and has evoked an illusion of nearly total discretion on the side of MNEs 
when it comes to investment decisions and the degree of local responsiveness (Shenkar, 
Luo & Yeheskel, 2008). Traditional approaches to local responsiveness and embeddedness 
of MNEs in their host locations do not take into account some of the specific challenges of 
the extractive industry. On the contrary, subsequent versions of the I-R framework have 
been simplified rather than being extended (Venaik, Midgley & Devinney, 2004). A 
reformulation of the traditional integration-responsiveness to an integration-responsibility 
grid was presented that captures the complexities raised by the notion of the LtO and might 
help save the original idea from its present critics. 
The emphasis on local communities as a crucial set of local stakeholders strengthens 
the link between stakeholder theory and international business that has so far focused on 
MNEs’ relationships with host governments (Fagre & Wells, 1982; Vernon, 1981) and, 
more recently, international NGOs (e.g. Doh & Guay, 2004; Teegen, Doh & Vachani, 
2004). The multilevel LtO concept highlights the importance of all three stakeholder 
groups and points out the increasing importance of the local license that, in interaction with 
the national and societal LtO, should be incorporated much more strongly in international 
management thinking. The emergence of the LtO rhetoric points to the fact that managers 
have realized this importance. 
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The I-R2 grid points out that the “local license” is also relevant for other industries, and 
the multilevel LtO can potentially be applied to a wider set of corporations than has been 
done here. In the Indian state of Orissa for example, 11 out of 14 mega-investment projects 
in the mineral but also mineral processing and service industry (together nearly 40 bn 
USD) are halted or delayed by community protests despite having been granted a national/
legal license to set up business (Bisoi, 2009). Likewise, after nearly two years of struggle, 
considerable sunk costs and the suicide of a number of farmers, Tata’s Nano car plant was 
relocated from one Indian state to another (BBC, 2008). These examples speak for the 
relevance of the multilevel LtO concept and the importance of including stakeholder 
considerations in international business theories about the investment behavior or MNEs. 
Future research should examine whether and how the LtO terminology is applied in other 
industries and what alternative concepts are being employed. 
This contribution has also illustrated that the notion of the LtO, in particular the way it 
is currently used, needs to be critically examined. From an industry perspective, employing 
the LtO concept is a matter of “hegemonic strategizing” (Utting & Ives, 2006: 16) in an 
attempt to shape the corporate responsibility discourse in favor of the extractive industries, 
to define what it means to gain a LtO and who is able to grant it. The risk is that, 
employing the LtO discourse, corporations interact with specifically selected stakeholders 
who are perceived to have the power to actually influence the firm’s conduct to gain a LtO 
from this stakeholder group that then provides a tangible “insurance” against stakeholder 
activism. They might further use the LtO rhetoric to imply a continuous “license” equal to 
a legal license, which is the risk that lies in the use of such a term. Another risk is the 
ignorance of the role of the state in discussions that are focused on obtaining local licenses 
in the sense of a “right of way”. This always carries the risk that individual licenses are 
“bought cheaply” from the local population with promises and CSR projects that 
ultimately often fail to produce the expected benefits. 
Our multilevel conceptualization and discussion of the LtO is thus relevant, because it 
points out the three levels at which an LtO needs to be obtained and the tensions emerging 
from competing stakeholder claims. It also highlights the fact that the LtO is not some 
“thing” to be obtained or a one-time achievement that legitimizes the operations. The LtO 
is a process of ongoing negotiations between the corporation and its stakeholders who 
continuously evaluate corporate performance according to criteria they deem important 
and who influence and compete with each other. The terminology “license” in that sense 
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seems not to fit the actual processes underlying it, but is now too deeply rooted in 
managerial discourse to be changed. A multilevel perspective on the LtO might counteract 
a tendency to apply the concept in a way that allows it to appear all too manageable and 
continuous. The level of the national LtO also emphasizes the role of the state and society 
in pressuring corporations to operate according to overarching principles, which avoids a 
situation where corporations only invest in social issues that might gain them a local LtO 
while ignoring issues of broader importance or claims of stakeholders that are not powerful 
enough to threaten their license. Our approach might help in safeguarding the LtO concept 
from its early supporters who adopt a too superficial and strategic understanding of the 
concept which makes it meaningless. 
Future work should elaborate the preliminary conceptualization of the LtO presented in 
this contribution and further strengthen the link between International Business and 
stakeholder theory. In light of the increasing importance of EI multinationals for 
developing and transition economies (Hoyos, 2007), that often function as shareholder-
independent strategic extensions of their home country governments, future work should 
also examine the firm internal factors (Howard-Grenville, Nash & Coglianese, 2007) that 
might influence differing perspectives among managers on the need to gain an LtO at all 
levels or how to obtain it. Although such corporations are less receptive to the traditional 
influence tactics of NGOs (e.g. shareholder divestments, public shaming), they too suffer 
from increased operating costs and the potential “inoperability” of a project due to local 
resistance and might forge even stronger alliances with repressive national governments 
than has been possible for shareholder-owned corporations. 
With respect to the embeddedness of the MNE, some suggest the need of a “cultural 
embeddedness” (Shenkar, Luo & Yehesekel, 2008). Our case discussion has shown that 
this seems hard to achieve. One could argue that even the hiring of local employees might 
not considerably improve this situation due to the clashing interests and worldviews, and 
the tensions within many developing countries that we have discussed above. Here it is the 
“relative power or powerlessness, accorded to various cultures and cultural 
practices” (Escobar, 2006: 8) that should be examined by management scholars instead of 
supporting a focus on corporations’ embeddedness into dominant cultures. 
Finally, the role of smaller EI corporations that are less globally integrated deserves 
further attention in light of the current discussion about local responsiveness/responsibility. 
Due to their smaller size and focus on specific locations that are then crucial to the 
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business success of the entire firm, such corporations have potentially more to lose from an 
unsuccessful investment and high sunk costs caused by local resistance. Although they 
might not have the funds available to implement large CSR or corporate citizenship 
programs, their need to embed themselves locally might be stronger and result in a more 
wise use of available funding. The success of such firms might prove the idea that it is (as 
often) not size that matters for the success of community investments (Jones, Pollit & Bek, 
2007). 
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4. CONFLICT AND ASTROTURFING IN NIYAMGIRI
The importance of national advocacy networks in anti-corporate social 
movements  4
4.1 Abstract
Traditional models of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) and stakeholder 
management do not capture the nuance and dynamics of (counter-)organizing processes 
around anti-corporate mobilization. Based on the case of a resistance movement against a 
planned bauxite mine on tribal land in India, we develop a process theory of interactions 
between local, national and international actors within transnational advocacy networks. 
These encounters are not always friendly and are often characterized by conflict between 
actors with disparate goals and interests. We highlight the importance of national advocacy 
networks (NANs) in anti-corporate social movements and describe the conflicts and 
disruptions that result from ignoring them. Our findings also point to the role of corporate 
counter-mobilization strategies in shaping resistance movements. Our narrative revolves 
around a particular focal actor in the anti-mining campaign: a young tribal man who 
emerged as a passionate spokesperson of the movement, but later became a supporter of 
the controversial mine. Our findings contribute to a richer understanding of the processes 
underlying transnational and national anti-corporate mobilization. 
4.2 Introduction
"The time has come to fight; there is no time to waste. That is why we are stopping the 
bulldozers… Even if we die, we will not let Niyamgiri go. That is why we want you to 
join our struggle."  
(Jika, video published by an international NGO 2008) 
 This chapter has been written with Gail Whiteman and Bobby Banerjee and was published in Organization 4
Studies 34(5-6), 2013. The online version of the article can be accessed here http://oss.sagepub.com/content/
34/5-6/823.  
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"I realized that this mining project will not have a detrimental effect on our livelihood 
and culture in any way. It would rather usher in development in our area." 
(Jika, national TV interview 2010) 
The Niyamgiri mountain range in India is a chain of hills covered by dense old-growth 
forests, rich in biodiversity and largely untouched by modern infrastructure. For the 8000 
members of the Dongria Kondh tribe that inhabit the region, the mountains are a source of 
livelihood and carry deep religious significance. The mountains also contain a rich deposit 
of bauxite and one mountain, Niyam Dongar, is the proposed site for a large bauxite mine 
that will supply an existing refinery located on the plains. Since 2002 the multinational 
company behind this project, Vedanta Resources, has faced considerable opposition from a 
continually evolving alliance of local communities, Indian activists and political 
organizations, as well as international activists and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). Many of the Dongria Kondh and their supporters claim that the open-pit mining 
project would destroy their local environment, contaminate the water supply of the entire 
area, severely impact their livelihood and culture, and desecrate Niyam Dongar, the 
mountain they consider the abode of their god. 
The social movement against Vedanta is an example of a local movement that 
developed into a transnational advocacy network (TAN), where social movement actors 
from various countries and organizations engaged in a common ‘battle’ against a 
corporation (McAteer & Pulver, 2009; Zavestoski, 2009; Davis, Morill, Rao & Soule, 
2008). In this paper, we narrate the story of Jika, a Dongria Kondh in his early twenties and 
one of the few English-speaking members of his community. During 2006, after a period 
of involvement with national activists, Jika emerged as the key spokesperson of the anti-
mining movement and became the public face of the resistance against Vedanta. Over a 
three-year period, Jika appeared in numerous Indian and international articles, and was 
featured on television and documentary films about the campaign to save the mountain 
from mining. At the time of writing, a Google search with his name yields more than 1000 
results – an impressive return given the complete lack of internet access in Niyamgiri. Jika 
also played a crucial role as a grassroots organizer of community resistance and as a 
conduit for international and Indian activists wishing to gain access into the remote 
Dongria communities. However, on July 27, 2009, Jika ‘changed sides’, announcing his 
support for Vedanta’s bauxite mine in a YouTube video. The opening quotes highlight his 
volte-face and what appears to be a sudden and unexpected transformation from strident 
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opposition to mining to an avid supporter of the mine as a means to achieve local 
economic development. 
How are we to theorize these events? What can they tell us about the dynamics within 
transnational movements and about the role of corporations in counter-mobilizing? Despite 
the potential power of transnational advocacy networks to achieve social change, 
relationships between actors within the network are not always smooth (Bebbington et al., 
2008; Jordan & van Tuijl, 2000; Rodrigues, 2011). Yet, the issue of heterogeneity, 
disruption and conflict within transnational advocacy networks remains under-researched. 
Astroturf organizing, corporate efforts to form or support artificial grassroots groups that 
resemble the genuine grassroots opposition they face (Beder, 1998), further adds another 
layer of complexity to TANs that requires deeper empirical investigation. We address these 
two gaps through our analysis of the anti-Vedanta movement and the story of Jika in an 
attempt to unveil the mechanisms and interactions within and against the anti-corporate 
movement. Our longitudinal case study describes and analyses the events and interactions 
leading up to and following Jika’s dramatic reversal as well as the changing structure of the 
advocacy network. Our paper makes two main contributions to organizational studies of 
transnational anti-corporate mobilization. 
First, we highlight the diversity of actors involved in anti-corporate resistance and 
argue that too little attention has been paid to national advocacy networks (NANs) and the 
heterogeneity of local and national conditions under which domestic movements seek 
transnational support. Rather than framing anti-corporate movements as a static front 
opposing the corporation, we highlight actors’ dynamic interactions and differences in 
interests, power, ideology and background, which we label social movement organizing. 
Second, we point to the active role of the corporation in countering the resistance 
movement. In the context of anti-corporate mobilization, social movement organizing is a 
process that is embedded within changing constellations and networks of organizations and 
actors whose activities (directly or indirectly) have a bearing on the activities of a 
corporation and evolve in interaction with corporate counter-mobilization activities. Jika’s 
defection represents only one of several other disruptions in the complex process of social 
movement organizing at different scales, but one in which the active role of the targeted 
corporation in disrupting and co-opting social movements should not be underestimated. 
We argue that current theories of stakeholder management do not capture this complexity. 
In developing a process theory of anti-corporate mobilization and counter-mobilization we 
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hope to contribute to a fuller and more nuanced understanding of conflicts between market, 
state and transnational coalitions of civil society actors. 
Our paper is organized as follows. First, we introduce the theoretical background of our 
study. Drawing on accounts of conflict in transnational movements and the critical role of 
NGOs in transnational networks, we point out that organization studies has largely ignored 
the often disruptive nature of transnational anti-corporate organizing efforts, and that there 
has been insufficient attention paid to NANs. We review the literature on heterogeneity and 
conflict in anti-corporate movements from other fields to add more nuance to their 
discussion in management and organization studies. Second, we introduce our case study, 
method and our sources of data. We then present our findings in form of a rich narrative, 
followed by a discussion of the theoretical implications of our findings. Based on our 
findings we develop a process theory of the resistance movement that can also be applied 
to other anti-corporate movements. We conclude by identifying directions for future 
research. 
4.3 Transnational Advocacy Networks and Anti-Corporate 
Mobilization
Transnational advocacy networks are international networks of actors who collaborate 
on a particular issue and use informational and symbolic resources to influence power 
holders – usually national governments and multinational corporations. Much of the 
literature on TANs has emerged from studies in international relations, political science 
and sociology where the focus is on states and international organizations as targets of 
mobilization around particular global issues (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Smith, 2004; Smith & 
Johnston, 2002; Tarrow, 2001). 
TANs bring together local, national and international social movements and 
international NGOs (Tarrow, 2001). Domestic activists provide grassroots information 
about local struggles and their transnational supporters use their clout with international 
organizations and other governments targeting national governments and corporations to 
achieve domestic policy change and empower anti-corporate activism (Doh & Teegen, 
2004; Kapelus, 2002; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Ideas and tactics generated in movements, 
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such as the peace, human rights, women’s and environmental movements are said to spread 
from the Western world to countries in the so-called ‘periphery’ of the world system 
(Smith, 2004). This basic assumption leads to an emphasis on the role of international 
NGOs – most of them with their headquarters in the ‘core countries’ – that strategically use 
information to influence power holders and provide know-how, material resources to 
domestic activists and social movement organizations in the periphery, giving them the 
leverage they need to achieve policy gains through a ‘boomerang pattern of 
influence’ (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 12). 
Keck and Sikkink (1998) emphasize the importance of good collaboration between 
activists at different levels but do not go into detail of the workings of such transnational 
networks. This is a gap we hope to address with our study of the anti-mining campaign in 
Niyamgiri, which we think has applicability more generally. The social movement against 
Vedanta is not an isolated case. Corporations from the extractive industry sector (oil and 
gas, mining as well as the extraction of renewable natural resources) often have significant 
social, environmental, and economic impacts at the local and national level which turns 
them into prime targets of anti-corporate mobilization at the local, national and 
transnational level (Banerjee, 2008; Bebbington et al., 2008; Kapelus, 2002; Whiteman, 
2009). Social movements, especially when amplified by transnational networks, can 
influence CSR practices (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007), the investment decisions of 
multinational corporations (Skippari & Pajunen, 2010), and provide support to weak 
stakeholders increasing their chances of holding multinational corporations to account 
(Doh & Teegen, 2004; Kapelus, 2002). 
There are two major shortcomings in much of the management literature on anti-
corporate movements. First, the focus is primarily on powerful and formally organized 
Western NGOs, who amplify the voices of weak domestic stakeholder groups in 
developing countries to reach out to Western supporters, who then in turn have the power 
to hold the corporation to account in a classic boomerang pattern. National level actors and 
the ‘decentralized, non-hierarchical, grassroots-based social movements’ (Boehm, Spicer, 
& Fleming, 2008, p. 170) that usually are at the forefront of anti-corporate mobilization at 
the local level are generally ignored. Second, there is an assumption that coalitions 
between NGOs and local corporate stakeholders are stable. We argue that behind the 
visible protests and NGO campaigns against corporations that are the focus of most of the 
literature (de Bakker & den Hond, 2007; Doh & Teegen, 2004; Jordan & van Tuijl, 2000; 
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Soule, 2009), lies an unstable conglomerate of actors with changing and often conflicted 
relationships over the life cycle of a campaign. To address these shortcomings we 
introduce the concept of national advocacy networks to account for national social 
movement structures, using the example of India. 
4.4 Intersecting Networks: TANs and NANs
Transnational advocacy networks are often conceptualized using the well-known 
boomerang model, which assumes that transnationalization occurs because of weak 
influence of domestic activists and their lack of technical know-how and material 
resources (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Smith, 2004). The argument is that local movements 
from countries in ‘the periphery’ seek transnational support because they face high levels 
of repression and lack the political resources to influence policy at the domestic level. As 
Smith (2004, p. 313) argues, ‘the world-system hierarchy makes both elite and social 
movement actors on the periphery […] far less able to affect the global economic and 
political decisions that shape their environments’ which is the reason why they need 
transnational support from the so-called ‘core countries’. 
While certainly true for many countries, we argue that the assumptions of the 
boomerang model and the core-periphery distinction do not capture the full diversity of 
conditions under which local social movements transnationalize and are not attuned to the 
specifics of anti-corporate mobilization in countries such as India. The Indian national 
context is characterized by a strong civil society and decades of social mobilization in a 
democratic system. India also has a long history of social movement organizing (see Ray 
& Katzenstein. 2005) from the independence movement in the early 1900s to more recent 
farmers’ rights struggles and anti-corporate movements (Banerjee, 2011a; 2011b). These 
include social movements against multinational agricultural giants Cargill and Monsanto 
(Herring, 2005; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), protests against CocaCola in Kerala (Raman, 
2010), to the current protests against mining and metal multinationals like Vedanta and the 
Pohang Steel Company from South Korea. National level networks and social movement 
organizations such as the National Alliance of People’s Movements or the National 
Campaign against Big Dams are examples of the very active national advocacy networks 
that pose a ‘serious challenge to the dominant ideology of meaning and patterns of 
development’ in the country (Swain, 2010, p. 49). 
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These networks comprise a class of experienced domestic activists who are 
internationally networked, resourceful and media savvy (Katzenstein, Kothari & Mehta, 
2001; Shah, 2004; Swain, 2010). Anti-Monsanto activist Vandana Shiva, anti-Narmada 
dam figurehead Medha Patkar and social activist Arundhati Roy are prominent, 
internationally known examples but there are many more who have gained national 
prominence. Despite being classified as a developing country, India cannot be considered a 
‘peripheral’ country, neither in terms of its economic development and growing importance 
on the world stage, nor with respect to the strength of its domestic activists and social 
movement organizations. The core/periphery distinction of the boomerang model therefore 
does not capture the full diversity of conditions under which local social movements 
transnationalize, and cannot account for the national context in which mobilization occurs. 
To address this domestic gap, we introduce the concept of the national advocacy 
network, or NAN (see Figure 8). NANs consist of national activists, NGOs, community 
organizations, research organizations and independent media groups that are engaged in 
national-level advocacy on behalf of the numerous local struggles in remote parts of the 
country. NANs, with their focus on domestic goals, operate alongside internationally 
oriented actors and, as we will show, this may result in collaboration but also in conflict 
and disruption. NANs can be conceived of as national ‘social movement 
communities’ (Staggenborg, 2002) at the often neglected meso-level of analysis in social 
movement studies (McAdam, 2003). Our assertion is that at the domestic level, NANs 
operate according to the same principles as TANs – empowering local grassroots activists 
through the provision of technical and strategic know-how and leveraging local 
information into broader campaigns to influence national power holders. We argue that 
rather than lacking influence at the national level as assumed in the boomerang model, in 
most cases NANs and the grassroots groups they support do have various pathways of 
influencing the state and corporations. Local resistance strategies (such as blocking access 
roads to prevent the construction of a mine) can be surprisingly effective in delaying 
progress of projects and national-level lobbying under democratic circumstances might 
result in political influence-taking on corporations. Nevertheless, NAN activists may 
decide that transnational networks might be valuable to disseminate information and gather 
broader support for their cause. However, this process of local-national-transnational 
activism has not yet been explored and we argue that the NAN concept enhances our 
understanding of this process by extending the traditional boomerang model to include the 
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national context as a factor that impacts the preconditions from which support is being 
sought and thus shapes the relationships within transnational networks. 
Figure 8: Extended boomerang model
A NAN perspective represents a meso-level focus that is well suited to uncover 
dynamics, relationships and processes within movements rather than the conditions of their 
emergence and outcomes (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; McAdam, 2003; Staggenborg, 2002). 
Such a perspective can illuminate the mechanisms of TAN formation and the conflicts
accompanying that process. Moreover, the structure of NANs can account for the role of 
individual actors and informal networks of activists in addition to formally organized 
NGOs that are the dominant focus of studies on anti-corporate movements. Individual
actors can become important figures in social movements, even if they are not official
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‘movement leaders’ of organized resistance movements (Juska & Edwards, 2005). Other 
authors have also highlighted the role of individual domestic activists in the process of 
framing and ‘selling’ local issues to outside supporters (Bob, 2005), recruiting new 
activists (McAdam, 2003), building transnational linkages (Sikkink, 2005) and 
coordinating organizations and networks in larger movements (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992). 
Thus, the NAN is conceived of as a set of engaged, more and less formally organized and 
networked national actors in a country’s internal advocacy efforts. 
NAN actors, in contrast to transnational advocacy organizations, are less interested in 
the creation of a global polity (Reitan, 2007) but focus their attention on targeting powerful 
stakeholders at the national level. While transnational activists may shift their focus to 
other struggles once a particular campaign is over, local and national activists often 
continue to operate in the region. The local and national focus of NANs may at times be at 
odds with the expectations, strategies and behaviors of transnational actors. There is a 
growing awareness that transnational networks are not always as benign as they might 
appear and that more powerful Western activists and NGOs often have different interests in 
and understandings of local grievances (Bob, 2005; Holzscheiter, 2011; Jordan & van 
Tuijl, 2000; Smith, 2004). 
Studies have shown that TANs often fail to fulfill the ‘promises of 
empowerment’ (Rodrigues, 2011, p. 3) and underrepresent the interests of domestic 
activists (Dingwerth, 2008). For example, in her comparative case study of two Latin 
American movements that received transnational support, Rodrigues (2011) found that the 
main reasons for the absence of local empowerment were the lack of long-term support by 
international NGOs and the inability of local groups to consolidate the gains provided by 
transnational support. Her work highlights the importance of national-level activists and 
organizations for guaranteeing some form of continuity in the movement and acting as 
mediators between international and local actors. Despite their adherence to a common 
cause there are tensions between national and transnational actors and transnational NGOs. 
Western NGOs often tend to promote their own agenda, which at times may conflict with 
local interests, (Jordan & van Tuijl, 2000; Rodrigues, 2011). As Jordan and van Tuijl 
(2000) argue, successful and equitable cases of cooperation and interaction in transnational 
campaigns are the exception rather than the rule. 
A study on a transnational campaign against child labor in the Pakistan soccer ball 
industry by Khan and colleagues (2007) is one of the few critical accounts of transnational 
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mobilization in management studies and exposes the different interests and meanings of 
campaign success for TAN participants. Supporting earlier findings from the Bangladeshi 
garment industry (Brooks, 2005), Khan and colleagues showed that while at first sight 
successful in stopping the use of child labor, the transnational campaign ultimately 
condemned producer families to even deeper poverty. The authors describe how local 
villagers, deprived of their livelihoods after the ‘successful’ international campaign, 
attacked the vehicles of international NGO staff, but they do not explore in more detail the 
events leading up to this situation, or which actors were involved, nor the tensions within 
advocacy networks (Khan et al., 2007). While not discounting the value that transnational 
support can bring to local struggles, we argue that there is a need for a more critical 
analysis of power relations between actors in transnational networks while recognizing that 
international NGOs have the potential to abuse their power within TANs (Bob, 2005; 
Dingwerth, 2008; Holzscheiter, 2011; Mendelson & Glenn, 2002). 
In our study, we track the emergence and development of what became a transnational 
anti-corporate movement, focusing on the interactions and disruptions taking place among 
focal actors ranging from national and international NGOs to domestic activists and 
individual local actors. We provide a detailed account of the relationships within a 
transnational network that is sensitive to heterogeneity and conflict, and takes into account 
the role of corporations as key actors influencing the elements and direction of the 
network. Our case study thus provides a richer and more complex picture of inter-, and 
intra-group dynamics, and shifting priorities and loyalties that result. 
4.5 Method
This paper is part of a larger study of the resistance against Vedanta and other 
development projects in Orissa. Responding to calls for more qualitative and ethnographic 
research on the meso-level dynamics within social movements (McAdam, 2003), 
ethnographic fieldwork conducted by the first author from November 2008 to March 2009 
and again from March to May 2010 was the main source of empirical material. The 
transformation of our main protagonist, Jika, from a resistance icon to supporter of the 
project occurred in the northern summer of 2009. His transformation from a tribal ‘village 
kid’ to a central figure in the anti-mining campaign emerged as a key theme during the 
process of ‘progressive focusing’ of the case study during the first field trip (Silverman, 
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2010). His being ‘pulled at’ by all major actors involved in the conflict, his ‘defection’ in 
2009, and the way in which his story was repeatedly discussed by key informants make 
Jika’s experience an ‘extreme’ case (Eisenhardt, 1989) within the larger case study that 
offered an excellent opportunity to examine the dynamics within transnational networks 
and the role of corporations in counter-movement organizing. We present our rich 
empirical material in form of a narrative (Chase, 2005; Langley, 1999; Whiteman & 
Cooper, 2011). All individual names were changed in the narrative to protect people’s 
identities but we specified the nationality of the individual to be able to distinguish 
between domestic and foreign activists. We did not change the names of the key 
organizations involved because their involvement in the resistance movement is publicly 
documented. 
4.5.1 Data sources 
Our narrative is built from six sources:  
(1) Three in-depth interviews with Jika, the central protagonist in our narrative.  
(2) Twenty-nine unstructured interviews with nine activists, five managers, seven 
NGO, and two government staff, who were involved in the Niyamgiri struggle at 
either the local, national or transnational level. Multiple interviews at different 
times were conducted with some of these respondents.  
(3) Participant observation and ethnographic interviews conducted during a field trip in 
the Niyamgiri mountains by the first author along with five Delhi-based activists in 
December 2008, guided by Jika and two members of his tribe.  
(4) Participant observation and ethnographic interviews by the first author who lived 
and travelled with different activists on various occasions, totaling a period of 
about 3 months during which intensive contact was maintained with local and 
national Indian activists.  
(5) Email exchanges and postings on a daily electronic mailing list (list server), where 
up-to-date information on anti-displacement campaigns in Orissa and other states is 
distributed among activists.  
(6) Regional and national newspaper articles, press releases, legal documents, research 
reports and other documents related to the case published between 2002 and 2011. 
All interviews, except four of the five interviews with Vedanta staff and the government 
officials who did not give their permission, were recorded (in total over 45 hours) and 
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transcribed verbatim. Detailed notes, that also contained short verbatim quotes, were taken 
during interviews when recording was not allowed, and written up in a detailed report 
directly after the interview. Extensive handwritten field notes were maintained during 
phases of participant observation, and later written up in detailed field reports covering 
events, interactions, discussions and first tentative theoretical connections made by the first 
author. 
4.5.2 Validity checks 
When gathering this type of retrospective information, hindsight bias and the potential 
for informants’ inaccurate recall of information need to be taken into account (Fischhoff & 
Beyth, 1975). Respondents were permitted to skip certain events when they indicated they 
could not recall them properly, and subsequent cross checking of information with other 
participants and data sources was done to ensure accuracy of the description of particular 
events. Hindsight bias was addressed by comparing information gathered at different 
points in time. Multiple visits to the field and on-going contact maintained with key 
informants in between field trips allowed us to juxtapose explanations given after Jika’s 
defection with statements and observations recorded during the time when he was still 
involved in the movement. Finally, the empirical material used to build the final narrative 
was triangulated using the diversity of data sources and available interviews. 
4.5.3 Data analysis 
All empirical material was compiled and analyzed with two purposes in mind. First, the 
history and evolution of the anti-Vedanta movement was reconstructed and triangulated 
from the diversity of gathered information. Second, using theme analysis (Dutton & 
Dukerich, 1991; Plowman et al., 2007), we explained ‘the pattern of interpretations and 
actions over time’ (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991, p. 522) with respect to the interactions of 
movement actors at local, national, and international levels, their conflicts and 
interpretations of events. The initial coding of all interview material by the first author 
resulted in 58 broad themes that emerged from respondents’ discussion or activities. These 
themes were then jointly discussed by all authors and narrowed down to ten categories by 
grouping the larger number of themes. Examples of these categories are: ‘disruption and 
conflict’, ‘Jika’s emergence’, ‘national advocacy’, ‘negative grassroots impact of NGOs’, 
‘mobilizing people’, ‘goal conflicts in the movement’, ‘counter-movement’, and 
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‘interaction among movement actors’. The category ‘negative grassroots impact of NGOs’, 
for example, grouped all statements about activists’ perceptions of how the NGO system 
had negative consequences for grassroots mobilization. The category ‘Jika’s emergence’ 
grouped all statements related to his emergence as a central movement figure and 
spokesperson. ‘Counter-movement’ comprised all themes to do with pro-corporate 
activities by the government, Vedanta, or local pro-corporate groups. 
These categories and related themes were then used in a third step for a detailed 
analysis of all interviews. The detailed coding explicitly showed the depth and breadth 
with which each category and its themes were supported by the empirical material and 
allowed us to focus our analysis. The additional textual material, like newspaper articles, 
reports, legal documents, et cetera was used to further augment our analysis, especially 
with respect to reconstructing the history of the movement. The narrative was then written 
up by the first author using our reconstruction of the history of the movement as well as the 
central categories and themes as a guideline. Some of the more central categories and 
related themes were used as headings and sub-headings. The narrative went through a 
number of iterations following discussions among all authors about their understanding of 
the dynamics within the movement and the interactions of key actors in it, as well as the 
degree to which different themes were supported by the empirical material. 
4.6 Findings
Our findings distinguish four periods of relative continuity in terms of the activities and 
actors involved: local resistance, NAN support and emerging international interest, rapid 
internationalization, and conflict and re-localization. Without assuming a predictable 
progression between the phases, examining the four periods enables us to capture the 
interactions between activities and emerging networks. Setting temporal brackets, we can 
examine ‘how actions of one period lead to changes in the context that will affect action in 
subsequent periods’ (Langley, 1999: 703). Specific events in the process of anti-corporate 
movement organizing indicate the discontinuity of the system and represent ‘turning 
points’ in which structural changes occur that have an influence on further interactions 
(Hernes & Bakken, 2003). Based on our analysis of the anti-mining movement in Orissa 
we propose a process model of resistance movements as shown in Figure 9. While we do 
not wish to generalize our findings from a single case study to all social movements we 
79
believe there are certain patterns, contextual factors and underlying logics that can enable 
us to develop a process theory that is both interpretive (i.e. has multiple stories and actors) 
and critical (i.e. giving voice to local actors whose role may be marginalized due to the 
influence of more powerful transnational actors) (Langley, 2008). 
Figure 9: Process visual map of mobilization and counter-mobilization 
4.6.1 Local resistance (2002–2003) 
The resistance against Vedanta emerged in 2002, when Vedanta Aluminium Limited 
started to acquire land for an aluminum refinery project at the foothills of Niyamgiri on 
land inhabited by Kutia Kondh tribal people and other subsistence farmers. The refinery 
was to be supplied with bauxite from a mine in the Niyamgiri mountains located on the 
lands of another tribal group, the Dongria Kondh. The affected villagers quickly mobilized 
at the village level and later formed a resistance organization that was supported by 
citizens of a nearby town. Resistance was mainly spontaneous but often involved hundreds 
of people, although organized mass protests were rare during this time, since resistance 
networks were still being formed. A high profile international NGO had been working with 
the rural communities for some years, providing traditional development aid. The local 
head of the NGO was therefore present and got involved very early with the emerging 
resistance movement against the refinery. The agitation against Vedanta started at a time 
when the international NGO shifted its mission from providing aid to a rights-based 
advocacy approach. The grassroots campaign against Vedanta represented an immediate 
opportunity to demonstrate this strategic shift. 
Overall, the movement against Vedanta at that time consisted of a largely localized and 
unstable alliance of actors with different interests, a lack of systematic communication, 
strategic planning and leadership, and no transnational activities. Early protests targeted 
the refinery construction in the plains only. Little attention was paid to the proposed 
mining venture in the mountains. Since the international NGO and the urban resistance 
organization lacked contact with the remote Dongria Kondh communities, the initial 
mobilization did not involve them. Over time, information about the mine reached the 
Dongria villages in the mountains, first through the efforts of a local NGO that worked 
with the Dongria on improving sanitation and farming methods, and later through NAN 
activists. When in early 2003 some Dongria leaders wanted to protest at a public hearing 
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about the project, they were forced out of the meeting by Vedanta security staff and police 
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(Amnesty International, 2010). As shown in the process map (figure 9), the Orissa 
government strongly supported Vedanta’s mining and refinery project from the beginning. 
4.6.2 NAN support and emerging international interest (end 2003–early 2006) 
During this period, organized rallies and protest demonstrations, often with thousands 
of participants replaced the largely uncoordinated resistance against land acquisition for 
the refinery. Governmental land acquisition teams and Vedanta security personnel 
allegedly repeatedly intimidated protestors and tried to repress local resistance. This period 
also saw the emergence of pro-Vedanta groups of small business owners and potential 
contractors from nearby areas along with others hoping to benefit from industrialization in 
the region. Connected to this, groups of so-called ‘goons’ started a campaign of fear and 
intimidation in the refinery area and villagers were warned not to participate in any anti-
corporate protests. According to activist reports by Indian activists, local community 
members and international NGOs, resistance leaders and their families were frequently 
arrested, threatened and beaten. In 2005, one anti-Vedanta activist was killed in a car 
accident under suspicious circumstances that locals felt were never properly investigated 
by the police. Members of a youth club, ironically funded by Vedanta as part of their CSR 
activities, assaulted anti-Vedanta protestors with company-sponsored cricket bats. The 
company also mobilized local development NGOs to promote their CSR initiatives that 
promised economic benefits to local villagers provided they stopped opposing the refinery 
project. Several reports documented the apparent collusion between the state government 
and Vedanta in the systematic repression of the anti-Vedanta movement (ActionAid, 2007; 
Amnesty International, 2010; Council on Ethics, 2007). 
This repression also affected NAN activists who started to become involved in the 
Vedanta case from 2003 onwards. These activists came from diverse backgrounds and 
included young university graduates working as researchers for Indian NGOs, activist 
film-makers interested in spreading the word about people struggles all over India, lawyers 
providing pro-bono support to grassroots struggles, seasoned community organizers as 
well as full-time activists who once worked for national or international NGOs but had left 
their organizations because they were dissatisfied with the NGO movement and wanted to 
operate as individual activists and researchers. NAN activists started attending local protest 
events, mobilizing villagers and making connections between grassroots activists and other 
anti-industrialization struggles across Orissa. Citing their experiences with earlier 
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struggles, many of these NAN activists argued that the case of Vedanta’s refinery and 
planned mine was only one example of the reckless industrialization policies of the Indian 
government: 
"As you can see in the tribal populated areas of India that only mineral based industries 
and industrialization on the base of mineral industries [...] it is something like a looting 
of resources […] just exporting the raw products [...] is not at all employment 
generating. It is not in the interest of middle class even. And the tribal people they will 
be displaced and will become destitute. This development model has to be stopped. 
[…] Our ultimate goal is to stop this process, have an alternative development model 
[...] in which the tribal people, the village farmers who are dependent on agriculture 
and forest resources... the model should keep their survival in the center.” 
(State-level activist, March 2010) 
Due to the systematic lack of information and exclusion from any public hearings 
conducted by Vedanta and the local authorities (Amnesty International, 2010), many 
Dongria Kondh until quite late were not aware of the mining plans, the connection between 
the refinery and a later mine , as well as the potential impacts of a mine on their lives. Even 
the NGO-led alliance had until then focused its efforts on the refinery and did not seek to 
collaborate with the Dongria Kondh on the mining issue at the time because they did not 
have access to the remote hill communities. Moreover, the Dongria traditionally had little 
connection with the people in the plains. Resistance among the Dongria grew rapidly as 
soon as they faced the first impacts of Vedanta’s mining plans in the form of the building 
of roads and other construction activity on their ancestral lands. Through the mediation of 
NAN activists, Dongria Kondh leaders officially joined the anti-Vedanta organization in 
the plains. Starting in 2004, NAN activists had not only locally mobilized people but also 
filed a number of petitions with the government that ultimately reached the Indian 
Supreme Court. Public awareness of the Niyamgiri case increased within India and several 
government and civil society research teams visited the remote Niyamgiri mountains to 
conduct social and environmental impact assessments and fact finding missions on 
allegations about Vedanta’s activities, such as illegal test blasts and construction of roads 
and facilities (Amnesty International, 2010; Padel & Das, 2010). 
Through their informal networks, these early NAN actors disseminated information 
about the anti-refinery struggle to the wider NAN network until it reached a group of 
activists in Delhi who had formed the ‘Delhi Solidarity Group’ to support anti-mining and 
other struggles. By 2006, a number of Delhi-based activists became involved in the case. 
These activists worked independently and were not affiliated to any specific organization; 
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however, they were connected to a wide network of other activists, support groups, and 
national as well as international NGOs, and became the backbone of the Indian national 
advocacy network (NAN) supporting local Niyamgiri communities in their struggle for 
land rights. Together with state-level and local activists, the Delhi-based activists visited 
the mountains to collect information and make local connections that would enable them to 
successfully channel grassroots information to the national level where they started to 
lobby the central government and organize protest events in the national capital. 
Our process map depicts how the initial local and grassroots resistance of the Dongria 
slowly evolved into national activities by NAN activists that provided a broader platform 
to local voices within the country. Largely disconnected from this movement were the 
international NGO's activities against the refinery that were entirely dependent on the local 
network of their staff, who did not collaborate much with NAN activists. A NGO 
publication from that time illustrates that there were two rather separate movements in the 
Niyamgiri region: the one focusing on the refinery was a small local NGO-led network, the 
other was a national-based campaign against the entire mining and refinery project and 
unbridled industrialization in the region. A call to action at the end of the NGO publication 
mentions only three ‘campaigning groups’ apart from the NGO itself: a forum of anti-
refinery citizens from the nearby town where the NGO's campaign leader was one of the 
core founding members, the local organization of affected communities that had been 
founded with the support of the NGO, and a third organization for protection of the rights 
of India’s tribal people. The publication does not make any mention of the efforts of state 
and national-level activists against Vedanta and the emerging resistance movement by the 
Dongria in the hills. In early 2006 the first international anti-mining activists from the UK 
travelled to Niyamgiri and began to publicize the Niyamgiri struggle in the UK, marking 
the beginning of another phase of resistance against Vedanta. 
4.6.3 Rapid internationalization (2006–2008) 
According to local and national activists, two main factors led to the establishment of 
the refinery in 2007: repression by Vedanta, police and local pro-Vedanta groups, and the 
lack of coordinated leadership in the resistance movement at the grassroots level. NAN 
activists accused the international NGO of fragmenting the resistance movement by 
making grassroots activists dependent on their financial support and not making 
connections with other national resistance activities. During this time, Jika, the young 
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Dongria Kondh man, rose to central importance in the anti-mining movement at 
Niyamgiri. Jika grew up in a village close to the plains and a nearby city that had more 
contact with the outside world than other more remote Dongria hamlets. From a young 
age, he was familiar with the activities of locally operating NGOs and at the age of 17, he 
decided to live with a Christian missionary who had opened a school. Learning English 
from the Bible, Jika soon became the only member of his tribe at that time fluent in three 
languages: Kui, the local tribal language, Oriya the state language, and English. He began 
supporting local NGOs in their work and started interacting with several Dongria villages 
in the mountains. Until 2006, however, Jika had not been part of the emerging resistance 
movement. His role in the movement began to change significantly once international 
activists recognized his multilingual ability. Ian, a UK photographer and activist, 
‘discovered’ Jika and hired him as his guide and recommended him to other visitors: 
"I said to him ‘Look, you know, you can, you can make some money being an 
interpreter and a guide to these people [activists, NGOs] so you can get some sort of 
income and you help educate your people about what is taking place’.” 
(Ian, December 2009) 
Another UK activist, Charles who was well connected with the NAN, and Sunil, a 
filmmaker and anti-mining NAN activist from Orissa’s capital, also met Jika when 
traveling to the mountains to document the emerging grassroots movement. Though 
impressed by his ability to speak English, they initially did not see him as a person who 
could be a leader of the emerging resistance in Niyamgiri. Looking back, Sunil claims that 
Jika was ‘not very interested’ in the resistance because he seemed happy wandering around 
the mountains talking to his fellow tribals about God and the things that he had learned 
from the local NGOs. As Ian put it, Jika was ‘just a village kid who went around the hills 
singing songs about Jesus’. 
However, Jika’s multilingual ability was an asset for Ian, Sunil and Charles, all of 
whom hired him as a guide during their trips through the villages and eventually each of 
them developed a friendship with the young man. Charles invited Jika to his house to talk 
about his tribe and the threat of mining and encouraging Jika’s musical interests, began to 
teach him to play the violin. He also gave Jika a book to read, which Jika later claimed had 
as much influence on him as the Bible did previously and eventually led him to leave his 
‘home’ at the missionary’s house. The book, ‘Earthworm and Company Man’, written by 
an Indian activist, describes the exploitation of tribal populations in India by the onslaught 
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of industrialization into their lands and their subsequent loss of livelihood. Jika later 
described his reactions to the book: 
"That time, I didn’t know what is Niyamgiri [laughs]. […] When I read this book about 
the tribe, I realized what they are and that I am a member of the Dongria Kondh. I then 
knew that this was something to protect." 
(Jika, December 2008) 
"I was reading this book and … it is really we have to fight for my people, for my 
land." 
(Jika, March 2010) 
Jika also stayed with Sunil, who later recalled spending long nights with Jika talking 
about the mountain and its god, Niyam Raja, and making plans about the future of the 
Dongria Kondh. Ian even claimed that he "talked him [Jika] out of” his belief in 
Christianity. Ian also played a role in publicizing the Niyamgiri case in the UK media by 
bringing a number of UK news agencies to Niyamgiri, all of who used Jika as a guide, 
quoting him as a spokesperson and resistance leader. Increasingly, state-level activists 
encouraged Jika to speak at resistance meetings that they organized together with the 
Dongria communities. As Jika explained: 
"Nobody came and warned us about this [the mining]; we had to learn about it by 
ourselves. Now that I have learned I am telling everyone. Just today I visited three 
villages. When I arrive I call all the villagers and explain to them what is happening. I 
tell them how we will fight and that we have to remain strong at this moment. I have 
talked to different activists, and sometimes they come with me to help our people to 
understand what’s happening." 
Ashok, a seasoned activist from Orissa, claimed that it was he who taught Jika how to 
‘organize people’. Charles also took Jika to Delhi for a protest meeting where he 
introduced him to other activists, notably Medha and Sanjay originally from Orissa, who 
were well-connected with the Delhi and Orissa activist movements and had earlier worked 
for international NGOs in the capital before turning to activism. They also used Jika as a 
guide on their trips to Niyamgiri and encouraged him to travel from village to village to 
educate his people about their forest rights and the potential impacts of a mine on 
Niyamgiri. 
Within a few months, through his regular interaction with activists, local, national and 
international NGOs, Jika evolved from being a tour guide and local informant to become 
the public face of the anti-Vedanta resistance, and a key actor in the mobilization of the 
Dongria Kondh. He appeared in a number of national and international newspapers, was 
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cited on many NGO websites, and featured in two documentaries and several video clips 
reporting the struggle: 
"And all of a sudden he was embraced by everyone, he was kind of the darling of [the] 
Niyamgiri, you know. This sort of young, you know energetic, tribal kid who 
powerfully worked to help his people. And I got him on BBC, I mean, I sent so many 
people there to him and so many magazines, stations and newspapers and stuff." 
(Ian, photographer/activist, UK) 
Over a two-year period (2007–2008), Jika visited over 100 Dongria villages mobilizing 
support against Vedanta’s plan to mine Niyam Dongar. He played tour guide to a host of 
national and international activists, resistance members, photographers, film-makers and 
researchers (including the first author). Supported by activists from the NAN, he became a 
skillful public speaker and community organizer occupying a central position in the 
national campaign against Vedanta. Jika became the main conduit and native informant for 
anyone wanting access to the Dongria Kondh villages. He even met high-ranking national 
and international politicians on trips to Delhi, organized by NAN activists. After the 
Norwegian Government’s decision to disinvest from its shareholdings in Vedanta due to 
ethical concerns (Council on Ethics, 2007), Jika personally thanked the Norwegian 
Ambassador for his country’s support. The Norwegian Ethics Council had received 
considerable input and support by NAN activists and organizations that had conducted 
several studies on Niyamgiri and disseminated their information and provided local 
contacts. As a result of the Council’s report and the subsequent disinvestment decision, the 
international campaign against Vedanta grew in strength and a number of international 
NGOs took up the issue and began to lobby other institutional shareholders. 
During this period the international NGO that had been working in the plains where it 
supported the anti-refinery struggle began taking more interest in the Dongria and the 
mining project and had begun an international campaign against Vedanta by staging a 
protest at the company’s Annual General Meeting in London in the summer of 2006. 
Internationalization of the movement was not without its problems: Indian NAN activists 
were critical about how the local NGO staff publicized the case in the UK media by 
claiming she represented the affected tribal people. Charles and Ian both used their 
connections in the UK to convince another international NGO with an indigenous people 
focus to take up the Dongria’s case. Later, another international human rights NGO 
followed and several smaller international NGOs took up the case, if not by doing local 
research but at least by publishing it on their website and promoting the movement abroad. 
What began as a small, local and disorganized struggle by this time truly was an 
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international movement supporting a couple of hundred tribal forest dwellers against the 
might of a multinational corporation and the Indian State. 
4.6.4 Conflict and re-localization (2006–2008) 
We will describe the activities and events during this period in three stages: conflicts 
within the anti-Vedanta movement, tensions caused by pro-corporate mobilization, and the 
re-localization of the movement as an outcome of these conflicts and tensions. 
Conflicts within the movement. As discussed earlier, during the internationalization 
period, NAN activists already held the first international NGO at least partly responsible 
for losing the struggle against the refinery construction. They accused the organization of 
having had a "damaging" influence on the movement because it would "intervene in the 
field" directly instead of just amplifying local voices from the grassroots as they expected 
(Medha, February 2009). Based on this and other experiences, many Indian NAN activists 
at state and national levels shared a general suspicion towards the negative local effects of 
the activities of international NGOs in general and felt a need to restrict their role in social 
movements: 
"As far as our experience is concerned, the role of NGOs is very controversial. We feel 
that if a certain NGO, which is understanding its limitation just [...] restricts itself 
giving some information support or logistic support, then this is OK. But if any NGO, 
national or international, locally they start playing the role of leading the movement, 
giving direction to the movement, they are to be suspected." 
(State-level activist, March 2003) 
According to Delhi-based NAN activists, the first international NGO in Niyamgiri had 
created a ‘parallel leadership’ within the anti-mining resistance and misrepresented tribal 
culture to the outside world through the staged mass worship event that it had started 
conducting in March 2008. While NGO staff claimed that the event was a way to 
‘showcase Dongria culture’, NAN activists maintained that mass worships were not 
consistent with actual Dongria Kondh customs. Even the organization's attempts at giving 
an international platform to local voices was met with criticism. From 2008 onwards, the 
NGO flew local community members to the UK to voice their complaints in front of 
Vedanta’s Board of Directors at the company’s Annual General Meeting (AGM). While 
such tactics generated international attention and definitely played a role in further 
disinvestments from Vedanta (see Figure 2), they did little to strengthen local activism and 
in fact, caused deeper divisions within the overall resistance movement. The NGO was 
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criticized for speaking on behalf of the affected tribal people and for misrepresenting the 
movement by portraying members of other tribal groups that were not part of the resistance 
as spokespersons of the movement. The following incident at the 2009 AGM of Vedanta 
illustrates the dysfunctional relationship between NAN activists and international NGOs. 
Sagar, an Indian activist living in the UK had come to protest at the AGM with hand-
written banners and a megaphone. Most other protesters, in branded red and yellow shirts 
and with professional banners, had clearly been mobilized by the two international NGOs 
involved in the campaign at that time. Sagar arrived and nearly immediately started to 
shout anti-Vedanta slogans in Oriya instead of English, claiming to carry ‘the voice from 
the ground’ to London by using local language and causing a stir among those present. He 
protested loudly when asked to stop shouting to not cause disruption of the ongoing 
interview with Bianca Jagger that was being conducted by one NGO on the sidelines of the 
protest. 
Another NAN activist claimed that the international NGO was not collaborating with 
people other than those it supported financially (and who were thus dependent on it). He 
also claimed the organization had collaborated with a local politician who had coined the 
slogan ‘Don’t take Niyamgiri, take another mountain’ which he felt betrayed the 
movement. For NAN activists, the issue was much broader than a mine on Niyamgiri. A 
mine elsewhere, so the argument, would simply shift the problem and not address broader 
issues of tribal rights to land and their own way of life as well as corporate and 
governmental accountability. The international NGO was accused of pushing its own 
agenda and ignoring these more general struggles. Apparently, a number of NAN activists 
had become so frustrated with its involvement in different grassroots movements all over 
India, that there had been discussions about sending an official complaint letter to the 
organization's Indian headquarters. 
Hence, when another UK NGO with a specific focus on indigenous peoples joined the 
struggle and sent a staff member to Niyamgiri for a research trip, one Delhi activist saw it 
necessary to warn him not to "repeat the same mistakes” as the first international NGO 
(Medha, November 2008). Again, Jika served as the paid guide and interpreter during this 
visit and a film team was later sent to produce a documentary about the resistance 
movement causing more rifts and tensions. Despite his lack of access to electricity and the 
internet in his mountain home, the film team gifted Jika a laptop to stay in touch. This 
raised discontent among Indian activists in Delhi and Orissa who, at the same time, had 
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arranged a desktop computer for Jika at the office of a local NGO near his home village. 
Moreover, during the second visit the NGO's staff had less time to meet with NAN 
activists, leading to accusations that it was ignoring local knowledge and ideas about the 
campaign. Aware of the discontent that had been caused among local activists, a NGO 
member later commented: 
"It was a much faster, frantic trip with no time to visit everybody and I think a few 
people’s noses got put down as a result. And I think it was also, because it wasn’t one 
person traveling alone asking lots of questions but it was three people with a lot of, you 
know, high-tech equipment with a clear plan. I don’t know, I think we gave the 
impression more that it was … ehm … that our objective was a selfish one." 
(International NGO staff, October 2009) 
Well aware of the different decision making styles and organizational processes 
between the NAN the international organization, he added that there was not always ‘an 
awful lot of time to convince people that you're not there to screw them over’. Essentially, 
the NGO had started to make its own decisions about what direction the movement should 
take without consulting with NAN activists. 
The following episode vividly illustrates the turf war within the anti-mining movement. 
At the end of 2008, a group of activists from Delhi (along with the first author) 
conducted a field trip to Niyamgiri. Jika had agreed to guide a group of five through the 
mountains. While the NAN activists were waiting for him at Charles’ house close to 
Niyamgiri, Jika called to inform them that he was already occupied in guiding a Korean 
film team that had been sent by one of the international NGOs and that had offered to pay 
him for his services. When Medha informed the group about Jika’s unavailability, a heated 
debate erupted about the ‘interference’ of international NGOs in grassroots resistance: 
"How come [the NGO] just gives out his phone number? We have to get him a new 
number as soon as possible. […] They [foreign NGOs] are destroying the movement by 
putting him in such an elevated position and it creates conflict in the village. […] This 
is another extractive industry happening." 
(Activist, December 2008, field notes) 
Only after several phone calls and considerable pressure, Jika decided to abandon the 
Koreans and join the NAN activists from Delhi as a guide. However, the Korean film crew 
was determined to get their footage and ventured out alone in their hired jeep, looking for 
their elusive guide. In the evening of the same day, the Koreans encountered the NAN 
activists at Jika’s home village. An acrimonious confrontation between Indian activists and 
the Koreans ensued, with Jika caught in the middle. Despite Jika’s popularity with 
international activists and the media, NAN activists took great pains to explain to the 
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Koreans that Jika was just one person within a larger collective of grassroots actors and 
that the NGO had no right sending the film crew to Niyamgiri without giving Jika the 
chance to consult his people. 
This conflict also came at a time when a Marxist political resistance organization had 
started to become involved in Niyamgiri. The organization supported broader struggles for 
land and economic rights among disadvantaged sections of the Indian population and was 
considered by NAN activists to be a more legitimate and effective local actor than 
international NGOs. They therefore sought good relationships with the Marxist leaders and 
were not willing to jeopardize their own position by not adhering to the ban on 
international press and NGOs in Niyamgiri that had been announced by the Marxist 
organization. 
Jika, encouraged by NAN activists had joined the Marxist organization together with a 
couple of other Dongria youths that the NAN activists hoped would emerge as local 
leaders. As a proof of his willingness to ‘do or die’ for their cause, Jika had three hammer 
and sickle symbols tattooed on his body. His new organizational membership however, 
was in conflict with his role as an international guide as the encounter with the Koreans 
showed. That night, Jika was visibly upset about the confrontation between NAN activists 
and the Koreans and admitted reluctantly that the Marxist organization had warned him 
that they would withdraw their support if he was being ‘corrupted by the money of 
foreigners’. 
After a long discussion, mainly led by NAN activists and only weakly supported by 
Jika, the Koreans decided to leave Niyamgiri. This episode strongly influenced activists’ 
attitudes to and support for the NGO’s engagement and seemed to confirm similar negative 
experiences with other international NGOs. NAN activists criticized the lack of sensitivity 
expressed by the organization, the lack of consultation and alignment of strategies. Jika, 
however, later expressed how he had felt sorry for the Koreans that night: 
"My heart was very sad that time. They have come to meet some purpose […] [laughs] 
How can you oppose, no? They have come spending lots of money to meet my people." 
(Jika, March 2010) 
Why were NAN activists so motivated to present Jika as "one among many" and a 
"member of the collective" to the Korean film team? Our process model shows that Jika’s 
role as a spokesperson and community mobilizer and the "darling of Niyamgiri", as Ian 
had put it, did not remain unchallenged. The more he rose to fame, travelled to Delhi and 
other places, the more local people doubted his trustworthiness and accused him of taking 
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money and gifts from outsiders. His attempts at dressing up as a Dongria Kondh, growing 
his hair long and wearing more traditional clothes and jewelry for photos and resistance 
meetings were criticized by other Dongria Kondh and he began to face accusations and 
distrust in every community that he visited. Based on their experiences with other 
movements, NAN activists saw the risk of co-optation for Jika whom they considered too 
young and inexperienced to be able to deal with his sudden popularity. They strongly 
encouraged the young man to create strong bonds with the grassroots political 
organizations they deemed supportive of tribal peoples’ interests (as opposed to more 
mainstream political parties) and to let other spokespersons and leaders emerge next to 
him. NAN activists were also conscious of their own role in making Jika the public face of 
the resistance and even before his actual defection they were aware of the tensions and 
pressures that Jika experienced as a result of his role. Jika also regretted the disruptions 
that the movement had caused in his daily life. He complained that his life had been 
entirely taken over by the campaign and he was being pulled at by too many parties, 
including his father who wanted him to study or get a job: 
"And everybody came to me, political party, NGO people ‘Jika, Jika’ they took me this 
side, that side, that side. I went this side, that side… I don’t have time, nothing I can 
do." 
(Jika, December 2008) 
"Sometimes I was utterly tired that time, means I had no peace that time. […] You 
know there is this big foreign company and only Jika is fighting. It’s OK if there are 10 
or 7 Jikas, it’s OK, it would be easy for them. But if Jika will go to every village, Jika 
will do everything, what can one Jika do?" 
(Jika, March 2010) 
"Every time [my father] will scold … ‘Don’t come to my house! Study or you don’t 
come to my house!’ My mom also, my village people also. I was very angry. I don’t 
want to stay in family but I will fight for my people. Like I was mentally … broken. So 
I couldn’t study because of these guys [activists], I [also] couldn’t go to my family." 
(Jika, March 2010) 
Reacting to such complaints, some NAN activists urged Jika to deal with these 
tensions, arguing that ‘times are tough and Jika also needs to be tough’ and demanded that 
he filled his role as a community mobilizer: 
"He was built up as a leader of the resistance over years. Everybody cares for him, is 
giving him presents and attention and now, when it is time for him to do something, he 
just shies away from any kind of responsibility, he shies away from doing the hard 
work, he just wants the glamour, like taking white people around Niyamgiri and seeing 
his name in the newspaper. But when it comes to telling people about the Forest Rights 
Act, he doesn’t do it. Medha gave him a booklet about the Act a year ago and he still 
92
didn’t read it. This is what is important and what he should be doing instead of playing 
around with his laptop." 
(Sunil, February 2009, field notes) 
These quotes indicate the tensions and contradictions that Jika faced at the end of this 
period. Torn between his loyalties to local activists, NANs, foreign NGOS and his own 
community, Jika became the perfect target of corporate counter-mobilizing strategies, as 
we will see in the next section. 
Counter-mobilization. Repression by state police, corporate security forces and local 
pro-Vedanta supporters increased during the anti-refinery protests. Physical assaults and 
intimidation of protesters at meetings and public hearings, specific targeting of NAN 
activists before resistance meetings, delaying activists at train stations and following their 
vehicles, all of these tactics contributed to the demise of the anti-refinery movement. When 
resistance against the proposed mine emerged in Niyamgiri, both the corporation and state 
responded with counter-mobilization efforts in an attempt to quell opposition to the mine. 
Jika recounted that Vedanta supporters were present at many resistance meetings and they 
made him understand that he was being watched. Two black jeeps driven by pro-Vedanta 
‘goons’ regularly traversed the mountains and some Vedanta supporters even occupied a 
hut in a Dongria Kondh village to demonstrate their continued presence and intimidate 
villagers. Dongria Kondh women were threatened and at one point were too afraid to walk 
to the weekly market. Pro-corporate ‘thugs’ appeared in villages and at resistance 
meetings, intimidating attendees and those who spoke out against the mine. The heavy-
handed tactics and violence by various pro-corporate actors are well documented by 
international NGOs, building on information gathered with the support of local and NAN 
activists (ActionAid, 2007; Amnesty International, 2010; Council of Ethics, 2007). 
Some NAN activists were afraid that Jika, due to his high public profile, was in danger 
of being falsely charged, arrested, or even killed like the anti-refinery leader who died in a 
mysterious car ‘accident’ in 2005 and whose death was never properly investigated by the 
Orissa police. In 2009 some Dongria men attacked a Vedanta exploration team that had 
illegally entered their forest, resulting in severe injuries for one team member and a burnt 
jeep. Afterwards, Sunil feared that the incident could have severe consequences for local 
resistance leaders like Jika: 
"People will be arrested, framed on false charges, people like Jika, Mukti, Anil, etc. 
will be the first to be targeted. And if that does happen, a bigger casualty than Kalinga 
Nagar [another struggle area in India where 12 tribal people had been shot by the police 
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in 2006] cannot be ruled out. If it doesn’t happen while the elections are on then it will 
definitely happen when they are over." 
(message to a non-public activist Facebook group) 
Jika was also well aware of the possibility of his arrest and in 2008 during our trip to 
the mountains had joked when we passed a newly constructed jail that he would end up 
there. He had also heard of rumors about a bounty on his head allegedly set by local 
construction company contractors eager for the mining project to proceed. It is hard to 
ascertain whether Vedanta actively participated or merely tolerated repression of the anti-
mining movement by pro-corporate groups. Reports about vehicles of pro-corporate thugs 
entering and leaving the refinery and well known pro-corporate local businessmen being 
seen together with refinery managers support such assumptions. What is relatively clear 
however, are Vedanta’s attempts at influencing the Orissa government to curb the activities 
of activists. In a press release in 2009, Vedanta urged the Orissa government to limit the 
activities of "foreign" NGOs and activists in Niyamgiri because they were "provoking 
innocent tribals to defame the government and the company" and "forcedly interacting" 
with local people. Extensive press coverage of alleged corruption of government officials 
by the company supports the view that Vedanta was hardly an innocent victim of the anti-
mining resistance movement. Finally, Jika reported that from 2008 on Vedanta personnel 
and local company supporters regularly contacted him with offers of money and assistance 
in an attempt to buy him out of the resistance movement. 
In its counter-mobilization activities, Vedanta imitated a number of strategies employed 
by activists. Where NAN activists tried to connect grassroots struggles across Orissa by 
taking Jika to other locations of anti-mining struggle and organized delegations of activists 
to visit Niyamgiri, Vedanta organized a visit of several Dongria Kondh to another bauxite 
mine to "learn about the benefits” that would accrue from mining in the region. 
Communication strategies of NAN activists in the form of videos featuring local 
testimonies and documentaries describing negative social and environmental impacts of 
the mine were countered with pro-industrialization and pro-mining videos produced by the 
company and its supporters. Jika’s exit video followed a similar pattern, showing his 
conversion from an anti-mining leader to a promoter of minerals-based industrialization. 
As described above, Jika’s grassroots legitimacy was never as stable as NAN activists 
might have wished. That, together with his personal desire to study and pursue a career 
made him receptive to Vedanta’s offers of a better life. Rumors, that Jika and other activists 
claimed were spread by pro-mining groups, were prevalent about Jika accepting money 
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from Vedanta and other pro-corporate sources. During this period Jika was contacted 
repeatedly by refinery managers and local businessmen resulting in his defection from the 
anti-Vedanta movement in the summer of 2009. Jika explained his position in a later 
interview: 
"When the company people they met me they asked ‘Oh Jika can you take some 
money? What do you want?’ They were thinking Jika is a married person and with 
money he will be silent. I told ‘Sir, I don’t want anything, If you want to help me, my 
aim is education. I’ll study and study and work for my people’. They were very happy. 
‘OK no problem we can help you for your education. No problem’, they told like that." 
(Jika, March 2010) 
From early 2009 onwards, Jika gradually reduced his involvement with the resistance 
to the point that activists found it difficult to reach him by phone. Rumors about him 
having ‘changed sides’ intensified and were confirmed by his official exit video that 
appeared on Youtube in July 2009. In the video, Jika explained his decision with the same 
passion he had earlier displayed when mobilizing Dongria communities against the mine. 
Supporting the the anti-NGO rhetoric regularly employed by the pro-mining movement as 
a counter-mobilization tactic, he argued: 
"And we were misguided by the NGOs […] different NGOs from other countries are 
coming to our Dongria Kondh area. […] Actually, they are not working for our tribe 
peoples’ interest, they are working for their own interest. They never want development 
for my people. They want that Dongria people should be like that, they should be in the 
forest, they should be naked, there should be no development in that area. So they 
never wanted development for my people. So, all our people oppose them. Nobody will 
help them for those things. So, if they will come next time we just will send [them] out 
from our boundary, we will not allow them to enter into our area." 
(Jika, July 2009, video) 
Jika further claimed in the video to have finally realized that Vedanta’s CSR initiatives 
were the only way to lift his tribe out of poverty and that his engagement with the company 
enabled him to work for the betterment of his people in a more effective way than being 
part of the anti-mining movement: 
"Because our people are in darkness, they don’t know what is light, so we have to show 
them light, because they also need development. They need development like other 
people that live in the plain area and they don’t want to oppose the mining. They will 
support the mining and we request to Anil Agarwal chairman of Vedanta, please, he has 
to start mining on the top and he has to develop our Dongria Kondh people. Otherwise 
no NGOs, no political party can develop my people. [...] This is the time. Vedanta has 
come which can really [bring] development, which can do really development for our 
people, we hope. And we’ll join with this company and we’ll help [the] company. […] 
But my aim … I will study. I have time I’ll study, I’ll do a job, and I’ll work for my 
people not only against the company. […] I will stay neutral… Actually, I’m not this 
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side and not this side. Means, middle, means if I’m thinking my aim is education. First, 
I will do my education [in] three years [then] I will see what can I do." 
(Jika, March 2010) 
So for a CSR investment of about Rs 7000 (about 117 Euro) annually for three years 
plus provision of room and board at a management school in Orissa’s capital, Vedanta had 
transformed Jika from a community mobilizer and anti-mining activist into a fervent 
supporter of the mine. It had become nearly impossible for activists to get hold of Jika to 
try and persuade him to re-think his decision as the company had given him a new phone 
and he had apparently discarded the one given to him by activists. Although Jika regretted 
losing many good friends among the NAN activists, he tried to downplay his defection in 
March 2010 arguing that politicians changed sides all the time and that he was not the only 
young Dongria man being ‘sponsored’ by Vedanta. 
Re-localization. At the end of 2008, when the episode with the Korean film team 
occurred, power relations within the resistance movement had begun to shift. During 
2009–2010, the Marxist organization had grown in importance and had begun to change 
the nature and direction of the resistance movement in an effort to make it part of a larger 
national movement against the government’s development and industrialization policy. The 
Marxist organization had announced a ban to stop the influx of foreigners into the 
mountains in order to build more sustainable grassroots resistance structures. NAN 
activists supported such a strategy and urged Jika to find other local youth to join the 
movement. Thus, the emergence of a new organization changed the processes of 
mobilization in Niyamgiri and the power dynamics between key actors because the 
resentment against international NGOs and their tactics diminished the latter’s influence. 
After Jika’s defection, the international NGO that had already been involved in the anti-
refinery movement continued with its parallel mobilization internationally and organized 
another protest at Vedanta’s AGM in London. The NGO presented a young tribal man to 
the international audience claiming he was a Dongria Kondh, a claim countered by NAN 
activists and Dongria villagers who asserted that the youth was from a village in the plains 
and had nothing to do with the anti-mining movement in the mountains. After his return 
from London, the young man was seen together with Jika and openly admitted that he was 
not against the mine but had agreed to speak at the AGM only because of the opportunity 
to travel to London. 
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Although many were deeply disappointed at Jika’s defection at a personal level, NAN 
activists and international NGOs claimed that grassroots resistance was still strong and had 
not been affected by Jika becoming a Vedanta supporter. None of the activists saw Jika’s 
exit as an endpoint in the resistance movement and many pointed to the fluid nature of 
grassroots organizing processes: 
"Many people had projected him as a symbol of the movement. They became very 
disillusioned […] but it’s a test for the dynamics of a movement also whether it can 
sustain [itself]. Some leaders will be taken over, some might be purchased, some will 
become frustrated. These things will happen and in the process new leadership“also 
emerges. That is also the charm of a movement, we can say [laughs]." 
(State level activist, March 2010) 
The continued strong commitment among the Dongria to oppose the construction of the 
mine and the changing resistance structures were demonstrated during a mass gathering of 
tribal people on top of the Niyamgiri Mountain in the spring of 2010. Organized mainly by 
the Marxist organization, the event was similar to the much-criticized mass worship first 
organized by the international NGO. The major difference was in the ownership of the 
event: whereas the NGO event was seen as being externally imposed, this time there was 
considerable local involvement of people and more grassroots mobilization by the political 
organization as well as support from NAN activists. As a telling reflection of the shift in 
power dynamics, the gathering explicitly excluded foreign NGOs in an attempt to unite 
tribal people and poor farmers on the issue of land rights and anti-industrialization 
struggles. The Marxist organization sent one of its activists to Niyamgiri where he took 
over Jika’s earlier job, traveling from village to village and mobilizing the Dongria Kondh 
against the mine. NAN activists claimed that as of March 2010, the resistance activities 
had become much more locally grounded as opposed to earlier phases where international 
NGOs and activists had been the dominant actors in the anti-Vedanta movement. 
4.7 Discussion and Conclusion
Our case study vividly illustrates the role of national advocacy networks in shaping 
local resistance and transnational dynamics, a role that has largely been neglected in the 
traditional boomerang model (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). We argue that in countries like 
India, with its strong civil society and long history of social movements, it is critical to 
consider national and transnational dynamics within anti-corporate mobilization over time 
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(summarized in Figure 10). Our narrative also shows the tensions and disruptions that 
occur when diverse actors come together to mobilize against a common target. It appears 
that the presence of a strong NAN makes within-movement conflict more likely especially 
when a grassroots movement internationalizes. It would be naive to assume that 
interactions within movements are purely benevolent and that the various individual and 
collective actors are easily aligned towards a common goal just because they claim to fight 
the same corporation. Our findings support and extend earlier work that argues that it is not 
the presence of transnational support per se that makes anti-corporate movements 
successful (Bebbington et al., 2008; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; McAteer & Pulver, 2009). 
Actors within transnational movements need to manage internal differences; national 
advocacy actors need to hold powerful transnational actors within such networks to 
account while dealing with corporate counter-mobilization strategies at the same time. We 
find that in social movement organizing NANs may or may not seek support from TANs 
and that their motives for doing so may be different from the usually assumed disparities in 
material resources, knowledge and influence. Nationally powerful NANs might seek 
transnational support to gain an additional arena in which to fight corporations while at the 
same time maintaining their powerful role nationally. 
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Figure 10: Process model of transnational mobilization and counter-mobilization
In addition, our case highlights the need for a process approach to studies of social
movements. In the organization studies literature, process thinking has been put forward as
a way to conceptualize organization among networked actors (Hernes, 2008). Hernes and 
Bakken (2003), for example, conceptualize events as important decision points that are
connected by processes. Jika’s defection in that sense is an event that resulted from the
processes of recruitment by NAN activists and international NGO actors and the elite
defection tactics used by the pro-mining movement. While some scholars describe anti-
corporate movements as a fixed coalition of actors confronting a corporation with a set of 
observable events that have particular outcomes (King & Soule, 2007; Soule, 2009), others
adopt a more dynamic approach (Diani & McAdam, 2003; Koopmans, 2004). 
Emphasizing the ‘movement’ in social movements, these studies focus on the ‘ongoing 
accomplishment of collective action’ (McAdam, 2003, p. 285). A process view on anti-
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corporate mobilization tries to identify mechanisms that underlie particular events and 
strategic decisions by the involved actors to ‘penetrate the logic behind observed temporal 
progressions’ (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995: 1385). Based upon our empirical material, we 
identified internationalization and localization as two central processes in transnational 
anti-corporate movements that recursively interact under the influence of a third central 
process, counter-movement activities by the company (and the state). Figure 10 illustrates 
the processes unfolding within the social movement campaign against Vedanta in 
Niyamgiri. 
We observed four mechanisms in each of these three central processes: 
internationalization processes were characterized by scale shifts, brokerage, recruitment 
and publicity mechanisms. Mechanisms underlying localization processes consisted of 
scale shifts, recruitment, politicization and strategic adaptation while the mechanisms of 
counter-organizing processes were strategic adaptation, lobbying, elite defection, CSR and 
public relations. This confirms earlier findings about mechanisms of social movement 
organizing (Koopmans, 2004; McAdam, 2003; Walker 2012). Our main contribution is the 
integration of these mechanisms within a larger framework of the complementary and 
recursive anti-corporate movement organizing processes of internationalization and 
localization and the consideration of the effects of counter-mobilization on them. Using our 
model, we are able to draw a much clearer picture of the processes involved in anti-
corporate social movement organizing and corporate counter-organizing in general, that 
can be expected to occur also in other cases of anti-corporate mobilization. 
Internationalization is characterized by the mechanisms of scale shift – the ‘shifting up’ 
of movement activity from the grassroots and national level to the international realm, such 
as through the organization of protest events at Vedanta’s AGM. Scale shift often is a result 
of brokerage, where NAN activists connect grassroots struggles to international NGOs. 
Charles, albeit originally from the UK but deeply embedded in the NAN against Vedanta, 
brought the resistance movement against Vedanta to the attention of an international 
indigenous peoples rights NGO in London. He and other NAN activists shared their 
information with international NGOs to persuade them to publicize the case abroad. 
Recruitment is another mechanism of the internationalization process. Identification, 
selection and presentation of local spokespersons like Jika (and his replacement at 
Vedanta’s AGM) at international events are key aspects of transnational mobilization. Our 
narrative shows that recruitment of local people by international NGOs was a major reason 
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for conflict within the movement and was criticized by NAN activists because the local 
recruits had nothing to do with the grassroots resistance movement or because NAN 
activists feared to lose control over the process of recruitment and publicity. Finally, 
publicity is a key internationalization mechanism for transnational mobilization. The story 
of the resistance movement depicted by impressive visuals and images of the Dongria 
Kondh, as in Ian’s photos and the NGO's documentary, was particularly appealing to 
Western audiences eager to take up the cause of a tribal community living in harmony with 
nature and battling a destructive multinational corporation. The Dongria Kondh were 
interesting enough for the international media to fill what has been labelled the ‘tribal slot’ 
– the strategic use of indigenous identity primarily by Western NGOs to promote their 
movements (Bruijn & Whiteman, 2010; Li, 2000). 
Localization is a second process, also characterized by scale shift, this time from the 
international back to the national and grassroots levels. Localization is fostered by 
politicization of grassroots movement actors and their continued mobilization around 
issues such as land rights and their growing links to local political organizations. The 
Marxist organization and NAN activists played a key role in the politicization of the 
Dongria Kondh. Mobilization for these actors involved connecting the Dongria Kondh to a 
network of other struggles in Orissa that were attempting to change government policy on 
mineral investment and extraction. Finally, as in internationalization processes, recruitment 
of suitable local leaders to mobilize and represent the movement at national and local 
events is a key mechanism in localization. Jika’s case clearly shows how such recruitment 
mechanisms can create conflicts and tensions between individual actors while causing 
disruptions in the resistance movement leaving key actors vulnerable to corporate counter-
mobilization strategies. Strategic adaptation was the final mechanism in localization 
processes in our narrative. NAN and grassroots activists realized the potential of the mass-
worship first organized by the international NGO and adapted the strategy to publicize the 
tribe’s struggle and obtain wide media coverage. Instead of welcoming this assimilation 
and localization of their strategy, the NGO continued to organize their own separate mass 
event. But NAN activists also emphasized differences, rather than commonalities with the 
NGO. This lack of collaboration reflects ideological differences and cleavages and the 
need to create and defend one’s own ‘turf’ between actors at various levels in the anti-
corporate movement that complicate transnational social movement organizing. 
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The last element of the model describes how corporate strategies can influence social 
movements through astroturf organizing. While this phenomenon has not received much 
attention in the study of anti-corporate movements, a few recent studies have emphasized 
the need to pay more attention to corporate non-market strategies directed at stakeholders, 
especially at the grassroots level (Walker, 2009; 2012). In the Niyamgiri case, CSR played 
a key role in counter-mobilization or astroturfing. CSR literally and figuratively became a 
weapon used by the corporation to counter the resistance movement, culminating in the 
elite defection of Jika. We have described earlier how the company’s CSR initiative of 
sponsoring a local youth club resulted in the severe beating of anti-Vedanta protestors by 
members of the same club using cricket bats purchased by the company. In 2012, Vedanta 
launched a massive CSR advertising campaign with the theme ‘creating happiness’ using 
local communities to sing the praises of the company and highlight the benefits created by 
mining. Pro-Vedanta actors also began publishing online videos with local testimonies – 
just like the resistance movement, which constitutes another case of strategic adaptation. 
At the political level, the company also engaged in extensive lobbying in an attempt to 
influence the government to support land acquisition, provide police protection for their 
construction activities as well as prevent the movement of activists and NGOs in the 
Niyamgiri area. Finally, Jika’s story shows how corporate managers and other pro-mining 
supporters (allegedly businessmen from nearby towns) directly targeted key actors in the 
movement to persuade them to change sides and support the mine. These elite defections 
had, at least temporarily, a destabilizing effect on the resistance movement. 
Future studies of anti-corporate movements should also pay more attention to the 
context in which transnational anti-corporate mobilization occurs. When transnational 
advocacy is added to existing, and often very effective grassroots and national 
mobilization, the complementary processes of internationalization and localization are set 
in motion. Anti-corporate movements need both elements: strong grassroots action and 
engagement at an international level to be successful when fighting multinational 
corporations. A transnational movement against the Niyamgiri mine alone, for example, 
would have not been able to halt the illegal deployment of construction vehicles in the 
mountain for which local people blocked the road in January 2008. Moreover, without 
strong local resistance and the emergence of Jika as a tribal leader, the legitimacy of 
transnational engagement would have diminished. Investors would not divest from a 
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company without receiving ‘proof’ of its destructive actions and grassroots resistance 
against it. 
The efforts of NAN activists also significantly contributed to raising national awareness 
about the case through lodging cases in local and national courts, providing material used 
in various court cases, conducting protests in the capital, and supporting local people in 
filing claims against the government. These efforts also resulted in putting pressure on the 
Indian government and influenced the decisions of the environmental ministry and 
garnering support for the struggle from leading politicians. Moreover, it can be argued that 
through their efforts at connecting the Niyamgiri struggle to other struggles against mining 
across the state and country, NAN activists contributed to a more sustainable and long-
term learning and mobilization of communities affected by mineral development. Our 
extended boomerang model (Figure 8) adds such a national perspective to studies on 
transnational anti-corporate mobilization that takes into account the national context of 
mobilization and the historical mobilization structures that might exist in many countries. 
We believe that the concurrent processes of internationalization and localization are 
crucial in the context of social movement organizing against multinational corporations. 
We have provided empirical evidence to develop our process model that explains the 
movement-countermovement dynamics of social movements, which we believe is a 
significant contribution to the field. Unlike most studies that focus on the origins of 
movements we have discussed how a particular social movement evolves over time, the 
power dynamics between key actors, conflicts and disruptions and the range of 
mobilization and counter-mobilization strategies employed (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). 
Despite the temporal arrangement of our process model we do not see the process of 
resistance as a neat, orderly and linear process but one that is fluid, multivalent and 
contested with feedback loops that breakdown alliances, create new ones, and produce new 
forms of behavior among key actors. The outcomes are multivalent in the sense that ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’ outcomes remain contextually based. For example, one could argue that Jika’s 
defection was a bad outcome for the movement but a good outcome for him personally as 
he was able to get access to education and build a new life. That particular disruptive 
event, in part influenced by corporate strategies to co-opt resistance against mining, had 
consequences for subsequent actions of both, NANs and TANs as well as the Dongria 
Kondh. Thus, NANs and TANs provided the bridging mechanisms and chains of influence 
that informed actions at the local, national and transnational levels. 
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4.8 Epilogue
In September 2010 the Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests revoked the ‘in 
principal’ environmental clearance that had been granted to Vedanta for the mine at Niyam 
Dongar, and one month later also stalled the expansion of Vedanta’s refinery. The Orissa 
Mining Corporation, Vedanta’s partner in the project, is seeking to overturn this decision 
by appealing to the Indian Supreme Court. Hearings had not yet been conducted at the time 
of writing. While the ruling to stop the mine represents a remarkable victory for the 
movement, key actors continue their mobilization and counter-mobilization efforts. For 
example, Vedanta-sponsored local NGOs have petitioned the Orissa High Court to allow 
the refinery expansion; Jika released a music CD with traditional Dongria Kondh music as 
part of Vedanta’s CSR to promote the tribe’s culture; and the company has widely 
publicized a rally of tribal people from the foothills of Niyamgiri who demanded ‘industry 
and development’ for their area. The last of these pro-corporate protests happened in 
August 2012, amidst rumors that the refinery had to be shut down due to lack of cheap 
local bauxite. It appears that Jika has successfully been transformed into a pro-corporate 
community mobilizer. According to reports by activists, in late 2010 Jika played a key role 
in mobilizing a Dongria community to deny access to an international fact-finding team 
sent to the mountains by one of the international NGOs. 
In April 2012, due to extensive NAN lobbying and a 2011 report by Amnesty 
International that refuted Vedanta’s environmental impact assessments, the Environment 
Ministry halted the environmental hearing process for the company’s refinery expansion 
plans. In May 2012, the Forest Department even filed three cases against the CEO of 
Vedanta Aluminium Limited, under the Orissa Forest Act for encroaching village forest 
land for the refinery construction in 2004 – a victory for the movement that was widely 
reported in the UK where it was portrayed as a ‘real-life Avatar’ fight similar to the 
Hollywood blockbuster (Burke, 2012). 
Locally, the situation remained full of tension and characterized by attempts to weaken 
the movement. In early 2012 local pro-Vedanta groups assaulted several Dongria Kondh 
members who were preparing for the annual mass-worship. Other Dongria were arrested 
on the charge of ‘indulging in Maoist activities’ (Mohanty, 2012). In August 2012, NAN 
activists revealed that Vedanta had donated nearly six million USD to political parties in 
the last three years. In the same month, executives reported that the Lanjigarh refinery 
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might be shut down due to the additional costs of importing bauxite from other mines, 
which resulted in large pro-Vedanta demonstrations by factory workers and their families. 
By September it appeared that the anti-Vedanta movement had won at least a temporary 
victory – several national papers reported that the company planned to shut down the 
refinery in December 2012. 
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5. "OUTSIDE INSTIGATORS'' AND "CRIMINALS"
Legitimacy attacks on anti-corporate protesters through adversarial framing 
5.1 Abstract
Based on qualitative empirical material on the more than decade-long struggle of local 
communities and their supporters against a large-scale mining and refinery project in 
Orissa, India this paper examines how supporters of the project frame their adversaries. 
Based on past descriptions in the literature of how those who are attacked generally react 
to protest, I identify and define two master frames that seem to find widespread application 
across a range of movements in different locations: the outsider and criminal master frame. 
Next to arguing that these two frames provide a vocabulary to future studies of the framing 
of resistance, I show how both frames were employed in the specific case examined here to 
delegitimize adversaries and weaken the opposition against the mining project. The 
harmful effects of adversarial framing for the local resistance movement are illustrated 
with a short narrative. I conclude with a critical discussion of these findings and argue that 
corporate managers and their supporters might contribute to the emergence of 'dangerous 
stakeholders' who lack legitimacy but possess power and urgency with negative 
consequences for community stakeholders and the corporation. 
5.2 Introduction
"The responsibility of giving the land is [the] government’s."  
(Vedanta Manager, Jan. 2009) 
"We are here on invitation of the government of Orissa." 
(POSCO Manager, Jan. 2009) 
Orissa is one of the poorest Indian states but one of the richest when it comes to 
mineral resources. The Orissa state government, like many other governments around the 
world, considers minerals-based industrialization a key driver of economic development 
and tries to attract foreign direct investment in this sector. Vedanta, the Korean Pohang 
Steel Company (POSCO) and several other minerals companies in Orissa, enjoy the full 
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government support for their large-scale projects but at the same time face strong and 
extended local opposition (Dash & Samal, 2008). For example, supported by national and 
transnational activists and NGOs, local villagers resist the Vedanta refinery and mining 
project in the Niyamgiri mountains for over a decade now (Kraemer, Whiteman & 
Banerjee, 2013). Similarly, POSCO has struggled since 2005 to establish their steel plant 
and harbor that would be India's largest FDI project if ever established (Park, 2011).  
Large-scale international projects like the above involve multiple actors, from partners 
to suppliers and clients, that form a complex project network and depend on local firms to 
'anchor' them to the respective host environment (Aaltonen, 2013). To establish the 
legitimacy of a contested project, these supportive actors might adhere to existing rules and 
standards (conform), recruit "friendly project co-optees" (select) or lobby and influence 
regulators (manipulate) (Aaltonen, 2013: 18). While social movements might focus their 
attack on the multinational corporation behind the project for campaign-strategic 
considerations like visibility and brand name (Hendry, 2006), Aaltonen's work suggests 
that they face a conglomerate of project and public administration actors that collectively 
supports the establishment of a corporate project. Next to strategies to increase project 
legitimacy, these actors have a second set of strategies available: attacks on the legitimacy 
of protesters who challenge the legitimacy of the project. Such counter-attacks are often 
ignored in the management literature which seems surprising given the fact that the 
literature on corporate reactions to external pressure mentions legitimacy attacks as an 
equally viable strategy to co-operation for a corporation that is facing external pressure 
(Oliver, 1991).  
Framing, the ongoing and intentional attempt to shape how an audience perceives a 
particular issue, plays a central role in struggles over legitimacy between corporations and 
local stakeholders (Creed, Scully & Austin, 2002; Joutsenvirta & Vaara, 2009; Zietsma & 
Winn, 2008; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). Stakeholder legitimacy is socially constructed 
(Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997) and can thus be discursively influenced through framing. 
Framing contests (Benford & Snow, 2000; Guérard, Bode & Gustafsson, 2013) are fought 
out in two arenas: that of the factual, empirical base of the claim itself and that of the 
legitimacy of the party making a claim (Benford & Snow, 2000; Kaplan, 2008). Both, 
corporations and anti-corporate protesters, have been shown to use strategic framing to 
“vilify their opponents and create support with other actors” (Zietsma & Winn, 2008: 81; 
Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). Who wins this contest is largely determined by actors’ ability 
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to creatively identify and form coalitions with powerful partners and in the ability to attack 
the legitimacy of central actors within chains of influence (Zietsma & Winn, 2008). While 
winning is a matter of perspective, it might be that adversarial framing of opponents results 
in losses on all sides. While several studies examined how anti-corporate movements 
attack the legitimacy of corporations, legitimacy attacks on anti-corporate protesters 
themselves have so far only been mentioned in passing (Kneip, 2013; Zietsma & Winn, 
2008; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010).   
“If left-wing extremism continues to flourish in parts which have natural resources of 
minerals, the climate for investment would certainly be affected.”  
(Indian Prime Minister to a gathering of Chief Ministers, cited in Roy 2009) 
"In mineral resource areas there is a situation close to civil war."  
(Spokesman CPI-ML, March 2010) 
These quotes point right to the center of what has been labelled "India's dirty 
war" (Bahree, 2010) where the Indian government employs military force to fight Maoist 
rebels who advocate the armed struggle of the rural peasantry against the government and 
ruling classes with the ultimate goal to seize state power. Estimated at about ten to twenty-
thousand full-time armed cadres that are active in over one-third of all Indian districts with 
many more lightly armed supporters (Guha, 2007; Mahadevan 2012), the Maoists use 
guerrilla warfare to create 'liberated zones' in the Indian hinterland where state rule is 
abolished. In 2006, the Indian government started an anti-Maoist military offensive and the 
then Prime Minister described Maoism as the “single biggest security challenge ever faced 
by our country” (Bowring, 2006) . The number of violent incidences between Maoists and 
government forces has steadily increased since the start of the offensive (Kapur, Gawande 
& Satyanath, 2012). In 2009, the Maoist arm of the Communist Party of India (CPI-
Maoist) was officially declared a ‘terrorist outfit’ and is since then considered a threat for 
the integrity and sovereignty of the country. On these grounds, the Unlawful Activities 
(Prevention) Act of 1967 allows the arrest of Maoists and alleged supporters as terrorists. 
Since its start, the anti-Maoist offensive has internally displaced several ten-thousand and 
killed thousands in the states of the so-called Red Corridor, especially in Jharkhand 
(Miklian, 2012). Critics argue that the government's fight against the Maoists most often it 
results in the militarization of the very same remote regions that are earmarked for mineral 
exploitation with the goal to prevent or repress resistance against it (Bahree, 2010; Roy, 
2009).  
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Local villagers and activists who resist large-scale industrial development projects live 
in a dangerous hotbed of pressures and choices: They face the violence of pro-corporate 
local people and business men who hope to benefit from industrial development. They are 
tempted to join them by the promise of quick, but often short-term, benefits of corporate 
payments or CSR activities. They suffer the negative side-effects of militarization, ranging 
from nightly search operations and interrogations to arrests, killings and the restriction of 
freedom of movement and assembly. In some regions, they might even be confronting 
Maoist rebels who are looking to strengthen their ranks by recruiting those who are 
frustrated with the political system, lack opportunity, and are receptive to promises of 
abolishing caste and gender differences and quasi-feudal class relationships.  
This study is set in Orissa, India, in this complex and difficult context of “war, politics 
and business interest” (Miklian, 2012: 563) where the government fights Maoist rebels 
while local communities resist Vedanta's large-scale mining project that is supported not 
only by the corporation but also its local partners, suppliers and the state government. As 
with any contested industrial development project, at the very local level it is also the 
employees of these firms and others who hope to benefit (e.g. local business owners 
hoping for increased economic activity) who support the venture and therefore stand 
against those who resist it based on their claims to its environmental as well as socio-
cultural effects. How do supportive project stakeholders defend the project vis-a-vis anti-
corporate protesters in such a context? While many tactics might be employed to establish 
the legitimacy of the project and deflect protesters' attacks, in this paper I focus solely on 
how project proponents discursively attack the legitimacy of protesters. I am interested 
especially in the discursive resources employed by project proponents in framing their 
attacks on anti-corporate protesters and how these relate to the specific context in which 
the conflict takes place.   
The paper is structured as follows. I first briefly review the social movement literature 
on framing before I focus on framing contests in the context of corporate projects and 
distinguish issue framing as contest over factual claims from adversarial framing employed 
for legitimacy attacks which I focus on here. Second, I identify two master frames that 
project proponents might draw on to attack the legitimacy of their adversaries. Third, I 
introduce the case study of the protest against Vedanta's bauxite mine in the Niyamgiri 
mountains and the wider socio-cultural and political-economic context in which it occurs. I 
then use textual analysis of interviews, newspaper articles and other texts produced by 
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proponents of Vedanta's mine to show whether and how these master frames provide the 
discursive resources for proponents' framing and how they adapt these master frames to the 
specific context in which the conflict is placed. Finally, a short narrative shows the effects 
proponents' adversarial framing had on the anti-mining resistance in the Niyamgiri 
mountains. These reach from direct and often violent movement repression to rifts within 
the opposition that emerged from the threat of being branded as a Maoist or sympathizer. I 
conclude with a discussion of my findings. 
5.3 Frames, Framing and Framing Contests
The concept of frames was initially developed by Erving Goffman (1974) to describe 
the individual interpretative schemata that influence how people see the world and 
themselves. Social movement scholars use the term ‘collective action frames’ to describe 
the mobilizing power of discursive constructions, the “metaphors, symbols, and cognitive 
cues” that articulate problems in a particular way, propose a solution and mobilize people 
to action (Campbell 2005: 48; Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow, 2004). Framing in this 
context is the dynamic and strategic process of meaning-making within and among 
movements and countermovements (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow, 2004; Snow & 
Benford, 1992). Next to the presence of mobilizing structures and political opportunities, 
framing is the third central component of importance for social movement emergence 
(McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996; Snow & Benford, 2000). Unlike pre-existing 
individual cognitive schemata, strategic framing in the social movement literature is a 
deliberate and goal oriented attempt to highlight particular aspects of an issue or event 
while hiding others (Polletta & Ho, 2006; Williams & Benford, 2000). With their frames 
activists interpret reality in a certain way in order to “activate adherents, transform 
bystanders into supporters, exact concessions from targets, and demobilize 
antagonists” (Snow, 2004: 385). A good frame should fulfill three ‘core framing tasks’ to 
identify a problem and responsible party (diagnostic), propose a solution (prognostic) and 
mobilize people by presenting a need for action (motivational) (Benford & Snow, 2000).  
Successful collective action frames resonate with their target audience and correspond 
with discursive opportunity structures that reflect public opinion and attitudes (Williams, 
2004). Activists often draw on a number of widely used master frames that provide an 
archetypal interpretive lens crosscutting several movements (Snow & Benford 1992; Snow 
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2004). A master frame is an influential and inclusive collective action frame that “allows 
for numerous aggrieved groups to tap it and elaborate their grievances in terms of its basic 
problem-solving schema” (Snow & Benford, 1992: 140). Some commonly used social 
movement master frames for example are the ‘political-economy account of injustice’ that 
is used by the feminist, peace, labor and anti-poverty movement alike (Carroll & Ratner, 
1996), the ‘environmental justice’ frame employed around the world by grassroots activists 
to demand equal rights for communities affected by various types of pollution (Čapek, 
1993) or the anti-neoliberal frame employed by various movements that oppose 
globalization in its various phenotypes (Ayres, 2004). Especially with the study of 
transnational movements and protests against economic globalization (Smith & Johnston, 
2002), master frames as far-reaching diagnostic, prognostic and mobilizing categories have 
become more important than ever and provide a diagnostic category for the analysis of 
social movement framing across groups, movements, and time (Snow, 2004).  
Although social movement theory has increasingly found its way into the organization 
studies literature (see Davis, McAdam, Scott & Zald, 2005, de Bakker & den Hond, 2008; 
Vogel, 2012 for an overview), the majority of the work in both fields focuses on the 
mobilization and influence tactics of grassroots movements, disenfranchised populations, 
and on framing in conflicts between corporations and their stakeholders. Only a 
comparatively small number of recent studies in social movement studies (Knight & 
Greenberg, 2011; Messer, Adams & Shriver, 2012) and organization studies (Guérard, 
Bode & Gustafsson, 2013; Vogus & Davis, 2005) examine in detail adversarial framing 
and counter-mobilization of those who are challenged by social movements. As Guérard 
and colleagues argue: The “resistance of those under fire has been mainly overlooked” in 
management and organization studies (2013: 782). Contributing to the growing literature 
that emphasizes both sides of framing contests, this paper therefore takes a detailed look at 
how supporters of a contested mining project react to the resistance movement that formed 
against it. These studies suggest that framing contests over power and legitimacy between 
challengers and defenders take center stage once an issue has been raised onto the agenda 
(Erkama & Vaara, 2010; Zietsma & Winn, 2008) and the initial framing and counter-
framing of opponents and defenders’ position has taken place (Guérard, Bode & 
Gustafsson, 2013; Kaplan 2008). I will now take closer look at such framing contests 
before I outline the contributions I hope to make with this paper.  
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In framing contests, opposing parties try to promote their competing diagnoses of an 
issue, identify responsible actors and suggest ideas for a solution. They attempt to have 
their definition prevail in the public discourse (Benford & Hunt, 2003) and to influence the 
actions and interpretations of bystanders and interested others (Guérard, Bode & 
Gustafsson, 2013). Frames and counterframes evolve and get transformed in this 
interactive process (Benford & Snow 2000).  
I focus on the frames used by those stakeholders who can be summarized in the broad 
category of 'project proponents' with which I mean those who stand to benefit from the 
successful establishment of a mine or other industrial project. This group might include 
corporate managers, subcontractor companies and their employees, local politicians, 
officials and members of the business community who believe in a trickle down effect 
from industrial growth also for rural communities who are directly affected by land loss, 
social and environmental impacts. Local community members who hope to benefit from a 
large industrial development project like local shop, restaurant or hotel owners and other 
suppliers, but also young people hoping for training and employment might belong to this 
group of supportive stakeholders. It is important to examine the role of such groups that 
are - or might be turned into - supportive project stakeholders. Recent work on corporate 
legitimacy emphasizes the relevance of local subcontractors in establishing the legitimacy 
of large scale international industrial projects that involve multiple actors across countries 
(Aaltonen, 2013). However, beyond the embeddedness of local firms into the cultural 
norms and standards of the host region, this literature ignores the potential for negative 
ways in which such project-supportive stakeholders might attempt to defend or build 
project legitimacy in a host location through framing and counter- or astroturf organizing 
(Lyon & Maxwell, 2004). It has been repeatedly argued that local politicians, 
subcontractors and others who hope to benefit from mining are involved in the 
organization of pro-corporate countermovements that often use violent tactics to confront 
anti-corporate protesters (Padel & Das, 2010; Özen, 2007; Warnaars, 2012). Also 
politicians do take action to influence conflicts around corporate projects, with or without 
the knowledge or consent of the corporation. For example in the case of POSCO’s steel 
plant in Orissa, the same politicians that invited the company later also sent armed police 
to persuade and intimidate villagers when they started resisting the plant (Miklian, 2012). 
In such contexts, where industrial development relies on police or military support against 
protesting communities (Miklian 2012; Navlakha, 2010; Roy, 2009; Ukeje 2001) or where 
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anti-corporate protest is treated as a matter of ‘national security’, ‘public order’ and 
‘national interest’ (Baviskar 2005a; Roberts 1981 in \Banerjee, 2007; Wekerle & Jackson, 
2005) approaches that only examine corporate reactions to protest seem too narrow. My 
first contribution therefore is that I include a broader set of stakeholders that support a 
specific corporate project into my examination of counterframing activities.   
The literature on conflicts between organizations and their stakeholders has examined 
the framing and counterframing of issues and also firms’ attempts to bolster their own 
legitimacy but has so far not paid much attention to adversarial framing, especially attacks 
on the legitimacy of those who challenge corporations. Most of the organizational 
literature that applies social movement theory to conflicts between firms and their 
stakeholders examines how stakeholders gain power and legitimacy vis-a-vis firms (e.g. 
den Hond & de Bakker 2007; Derry & Waikar, 2008; King, 2008; Zietsma & Winn, 2008). 
Yet, very little is known about the defense tactics of the proponents of contested corporate 
projects. Derry and Waikar (2008) for example study the framing contest about public 
acceptance and trust between the tobacco industry and tobacco control activists. They 
show how secondary activist stakeholders employ framing to gain power and legitimacy to 
a level that the tobacco industry was forced to adopt a “public display of acceptance” of 
activists and their claims (p. 131). They argue that “attempts at collaboration and assertions 
of the firm’s trustworthiness” (p. 131) were the two options for firms to reestablish 
legitimacy. While these are certainly viable strategies, a third - and equally viable - 
potential strategy seems to be a (counter)attack on the legitimacy of activists. Also Erkama 
& Vaara (2010) do an excellent job in examining managers’ rhetorical strategies to 
legitimize a contested corporate project. They do not mention, however, whether and how 
managers attempt to delegitimize their opponents. Too little is known about the strategic 
counter-framing activities of those who are attacked by social movements (Haydu, 1999, 
Messer et al. 2012).   
I use the term counterframing to refer to the reactions of pro-project stakeholders to 
attacks on a corporate project they support. Counterframing, according to the social 
movement literature, can take the following forms: denial, counterattributions, 
counterprognoses, and attacks on the character of the movement or its members (Benford 
& Hunt, 2003). I argue that rational arguments, often backed by scientific research, play a 
central role for counterattributions and counterprognoses. Velasquez (2012), for example, 
describes in much detail the contest over scientific knowledge production between a 
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mining company, affected farmers and the state regarding the levels and causes of water 
pollution around an Ecuadorian gold mine. Similar tactics were also identified for framing 
contests within organizations (Kaplan, 2008). While opposing organizational teams 
initially tried to outsmart each other with ever more data and analyses, Kaplan argues that 
they later resorted to the last tactic, character attacks, to increase their legitimacy as 
claims-makers and “actively worked to undermine the legitimacy of the frames and 
authority of opposing coalitions” (p. 741).  
Guérard, Bode & Gustafsson (2013) develop a process model of institutional 
emergence through conflict between adversaries. Based on a study of the struggle around 
the establishment of diesel motor particle filters as a standard in the German automotive 
industry they find that, following initial framing and counterframing that is mainly based 
on diagnostic and prognostic frames, a legitimacy contest takes place. In this contest, 
movement actors try to build alliances and recruit actors whereas those who are challenged 
employ ‘buffering strategies’ to prevent this. Next to the disciplining of actors not to join 
the movement, also these authors identify de-legitimization, “attempts to discredit and 
individual, a group, and organization or a social movement” (Guérard, Bode & Gustafsson, 
2013: 811), as a key buffering strategy employed by those who are attacked. They 
conclude that social movement legitimacy “is an ongoing project that has to be constantly 
reaffirmed” (p. 813) given defenders’ buffering strategies.  
Also in the field of social movement studies, delegitimation has been identified as a 
central tool employed in framing contests and adversarial framing of other actors in the 
field of contention opponents is seen as a way to construct movement identity, vilify 
opponents, and mobilize people to action (Gamson, 1995; Hunt & Benford, 2004). Knight 
& Greenberg (2011), for example, based on their study of the battle between climate 
change deniers and climate scientists, identify five reputational dimensions in opponents’ 
framing of their adversaries: attacks on practices, moral character, competence and 
qualifications, social associations, and the exposing of real versus apparent motivations. 
Fine (2006) also shows how those who are attacked by a social movement defend 
themselves through delegitimizing frames, what he calls 'reputation work'. He argues that 
defenders pick out (assumed or real) radical elements in social movements and frame them 
as representative for the entire movement with the goal of attacking its legitimacy via the 
moral character of its members.  Based on this body of work on delegitimizing framing 
from different fields, I argue that character attacks add a different quality to framing 
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contests. They shift attention away from contests about the nature and righteousness of 
claims to how opposing parties attack one another’s “claims-making practices and moral 
character” (Knight & Greenberg, 2011: 324; Fine, 2006). It is this intersection where the 
social movement literature on counterframing connects with the organization studies 
literature on legitimacy attacks and stakeholder legitimacy where I hope to make my 
second contribution through a detailed examination of the counterframes employed by 
proponents of a contested mining project to defend the legitimacy of the project by 
attacking the legitimacy of protesters.   
Bringing together these first two contributions, I argue that first an examination of a 
broader set of project proponents is needed to really examine the framing contest around 
contested  corporate projects. Corporations whose legitimacy is challenged by local 
resistance against their operations tend to distance themselves from political discussions 
and focus their defense on legalistic arguments and scientific expertise (Joutsenvirta & 
Vaara, 2009; Messer et al., 2012). However, as the literature on the legitimacy of 
international projects suggests (Aaltonen, 2013), there are other local stakeholders 
supporting large industrial projects that need to be considered because they might engage 
in different tactics to delegitimize protest. I therefore examine framing activities not only 
by corporate managers but include the framing of other actors and especially local political 
and economic actors interested in the establishment of the contested Niyamgiri mine. 
Second, I focus on one aspect of framing, character attacks on the adversaries of a 
corporate project, instead of looking at the entire range of tactics employed in framing 
contests. More specifically and going beyond a simple case description of how defenders 
frame their adversaries, I look for the existence of master frames that might deliver the 
narrative elements and a shared vocabulary to those who defend themselves against social 
movement attacks by defaming the character of their opponents. In the next section, I try to 
identify such master frames for character attacks in previous studies on framing contests 
which is my third contribution. Again, as stated earlier, my focus are generic narratives for 
character attacks and not the entire repertoire of counterframing strategies (Benford & 
Hunt, 2003). 
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5.4 Introducing Two Adversarial Master Frames
Based on a reading of a number of studies from various disciplines that mention 
character attacks in framing contests, I suggest that there are two master frames that 
provide the narrative for a wide array of adversarial framing that attacks the character of 
the opponent. I call these the ‘outsider’ and ‘criminal’ master frame and will describe both 
in more detail below drawing on examples from the literature on delegitimization of 
protest. I follow the analytic scheme of Snow & Benford (2000) and examine the steps 
involved for defenders to make their diagnosis about opponents' character and outline each 
frame's prognostic as well as motivational elements. 
The outsider frame was already described in the early last century by German 
sociologist Georg Simmel who argued that “From earliest times, in uprisings of all sorts 
the attacked party has claimed that there has been incitement from the outside, by foreign 
emissaries and agitators.” (Simmel, 1908/1971: 146). Haydu (1999) identified this frame in 
the reaction of early 20th century industrial elites to labor union mobilization. These 
industrialists drew on a master frame that portrayed union protesters as ‘hired thugs’ and 
‘outside agitators’. It was also more widely employed by members of the upper class to 
defend their power base and transmitted through the overlap of organizations and 
personnel between the industrial and societal upper class.  
It seems that today it is international and foreign funded NGOs that are prime targets of 
outsider framing. They are portrayed as outside agitators only promoting their own 
interests and their activities are considered an affront to state sovereignty (Baviskar, 2005; 
Mayhew 2005; Riker, 2002). An increasing number of national governments draw on this 
master frame and take steps to restrict NGO activities. In Russia, for example, foreign 
funded NGOs have to self-identify as ‘foreign agents’. This term is commonly associated 
with being a spy and the law not only has administrative and cost consequences but also a 
negative impact on the public acceptance of and trust in NGOs (Maxwell, 2006). In India, 
the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act, 1976/2010 and the Charitable Trust Act, 1950 
forbid ‘political activities’ for NGOs that are funded from outside the country. While 
initially geared at the prevention of foreign secret service interference with state politics, 
these laws have recently been tightened and are now used to curb transnational support for 
grassroots movements (CIVICUS 2010; Kamat, 2002).  
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But also other movement actors are framed and delegitimized as outsiders. Syrian 
dictator Bashar al-Assad, for example, attacks the diaspora opposition against his rule as 
illegitimate arguing that “To be considered a genuine oppositional force, one must live in 
Syria with the Syrian people and experience its problems and difficulties.” (cited in Merz, 
2014).  
The diagnosis of the outsider frame happens in three steps (see figure 1): first, it 
localizes an issue to a particular place, this delegitimizes anyone not from that place to 
speak on the issue. Third, it generalizes the presence of such illegitimate outside support to 
attack the legitimacy of the entire movement. Following this diagnosis is the prognosis that 
'If outsiders are eliminated from the movement, there will be no unrest.' which results in a 
clear motivational aspect inherent in this frame: 'The activities of outsiders must be 
curtailed or their involvement in the movement stopped.'  
The second kind of legitimacy attack that protesters all over the world face is the 
‘criminal subject’ master frame. The degree to which protest is framed as criminal varies. 
In its mild form, activists’ legitimacy is attacked by accusing them of protesting in their 
own (often financial) interest. Climate change scientists for example were accused of 
knowingly employing poor methodology and promoting incorrect results based on their 
interest to maintain government funding for climate change research to their institutions 
(Knight & Greenberg, 2011). Government actors also accused environmental movement 
members of having purchased land earmarked for a road construction and now protesting 
against it to drive up compensation (Shriver, Adams & Cable, 2012). While such 
accusations will mostly not result in legal prosecution, stronger variants of the criminal 
master frame do have this potential. Fine (2006) provides a good review of how the 
American civil rights movement was weakened by its opponents and its repression 
facilitated through accusations of being infiltrated by ‘communists’ and ‘radicals’. Where 
activists are portrayed as ‘unlawful combatants’ (Žižek in Wekerle & Jackson, 2005} or 
prosecuted for law violation, arrests are a frequent result.  
In the US, the Patriot Act facilitates criminalization of activists that are framed as 
‘unpatriotic’ (Ayres, 2004) and an Eco-Harassment Bill condemns the critique of 
businesses on environmental grounds if such critique threatens business activities (Wekerle 
& Jackson, 2005; Austin, 2012). Panitch (2002) provides a more detailed overview of how 
post-9/11 anti-terrorist legislation in Canada, the US and the European Union promotes a 
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very broad definition of ‘terrorism’ that facilitates the repression of for example the anti-
globalization protests (see also Staun, 2010; Bartolucci, 2010).   
In an effort to publicly condemn and vilify resistance, it is presented as an 
‘insurrection’ and protesters as aberrant (violent) troublemakers. Such framing functions to 
justify violent repression (Cunningham & Browning, 2004).   
In the most extreme form of “discursive combat” (Shriver et al., 2012: 874), protesters 
are framed as ‘terrorists’ (Heßdörfer, Pabst & Ullrich 2010; Shivji, 2006). The terrorist 
frame gained considerable strength with the discourse on (the fight against) global 
terrorism after September 11, 2001 (Chagankerian 2013; Pokalova, 2010; Wekerle & 
Jackson, 2005) and “terrorism has been rediscovered as a unifying construction of 
dangerousness" that justifies repression (Kappeler & Miller-Potter, 2004: 35). Bartolucci 
(2010) even argues that ‘terrorism’ did not exist in Morocco prior to the 9/11 attacks. 
While initially perceived as a threat for political activists only (Keane, 1985/2010), the 
‘terrorist’ master frame has now found widespread application to counter the claims of 
dissidents, religious leaders, and anti-globalization protesters around the world. It has been 
argued that terrorism can be seen as a “securitization language game” (Staun, 2010: 403) 
itself has become inherently political as it seems to be common practice for political actors 
to use it as a tool to get rid of uncomfortable opposition on the way to reaching their 
interests (Staun, 2010). Around these issues an entirely new field of ‘critical terrorism 
studies’ has emerged in the past decade with an own journal, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 
with the aim to publish articles that “recognize the inherently problematic nature of the 
terrorism label”. The criminal/terrorism frame shifts attention on the character of 
movement actors and away from their political demands and thus makes a political 
solution or dialogue impossible. This delegitimization and depoliticization facilitates the 
repression of protest through increasing public acceptance for hard measures vis-a-vis 
criminals or terrorists (Bartolucci, 2010; Chagankerian, 2013; Pokalova, 2010) 
Comparable to the outsider frame, the diagnosis of the criminal master frame takes 
effect in three steps (figure 11). First it conflates the entire movement with its (alleged) 
radical elements. Then, emphasizing their illegal and (in the case of terrorism) irrational 
and unjustifiable acts, it delegitimizes them as criminals. Again, this is then generalized to 
the entire movement who are seen as accepting or inviting these radicals. The prognosis 
that follows from such a diagnosis is a threat to public order and security' which results in 
the motivational aspect of the frame, the call to arrest them.  
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Both, the outsider and criminal adversarial master frame have at their core the attack on 
the character of movement participants, whether these are framed as outsiders or criminal 
subjects. Table 4 below draws on articles from a variety of fields from sociology to 
development studies as well as newspaper coverage to show how various types of 
resistance have in the past been framed as caused from the outside, as criminal and even 
terrorist. 
Both delegitimizing frames are often also used in combination as the following 
corporate response to protest against the clear cutting of forest in British Columbia 
suggests framing it as “an assault on the democratic process [. . .] by a small interest group 
that didn’t get its way” (cited in Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010: 202). Also the framing of the 
Syrian opposition by Bashar Al-Assad is a good example for the joint use of all frames. 
Cited in Merz (2014), he describes the Syrian opposition as composed of “armed 
terrorists” and “oppositional groups abroad” who “are reporting to Western foreign 
ministries and their intelligence organizations”. 
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 Figure 11: Elements of the outsider and criminal master frame 
The review of a vast array of literature on framing contests and specifically attacks on 
the legitimacy of protesters suggests two master frames, the outsider and the criminal 
frame, the latter with one more and one less extreme variant, that I also expect to find in 
the reactions of pro-project stakeholders to protest. Before moving on to an introduction of 
the case study and findings, I will briefly discuss the real-world effects of framing to 
highlight the relevance of examining adversarial framing. 
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FRAMING OF PROTEST NATURE OF 
PROTEST
SOURCE
Outsider Frame
NGOs are framed as hypocritical, self 
interested and corrupt external actors who 
mobilize local communities
Social, 
environmental, anti-
mining
Welker, 2009
 
 
NGOs and activists are labeled “non-local, 
external, bureaucratic and elitist,” anti-
development” and a threat to the 
livelihoods of those involved in the local 
industry
Environmental, anti- 
mining
  
Bridge, 1998: 
234
 
 
Pro-mining groups accuse the movement 
against the Bergama mine in Turkey of 
being planned and orchestrated by an 
"external force" 
Anti-mining Özen, 2007: 
277
Zapatista rebels portrayed as “guileless but 
gullible natives inspired and led by foreign 
subversives” 
  Collier, 1994
 
 
Union protesters of the early 20
th
 century 
framed as led by ‘hired thugs’ or ‘outside 
agitators’
Union members
  
Haydu, 1999
 
 
Political actors frame the US communist 
movement as directed by ‘puppet masters’ 
in Moscow in a ‘countersubversive master 
frame’
Political Noakes, 2000
Activists accused of being paid by foreign 
sources to foster their interest
Environmental Shriver et al., 
2012
President Assad accuses the armed Syrian 
opposition movement as “outside 
aggressors fighting for foreign interests”
Political Merz, 2014 
Criminal Frame
G8 summit protesters in Genoa are arrested 
under laws usually reserved for dealing 
with the mafia
Anti-globalization
  
Boyle, 2011
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Climate scientists accused of material self-
interest and wanting to maintain 
government funding for climate change 
research, climate sceptics in turn are 
framed as driven by industrial interests 
Environmental Knight & 
Greenberg, 
2011
Environmentalists are blamed to protest in 
order to drive up land prices for their own 
benefit
Environmental 
 
Shriver et al., 
2012
 
 
Union protesters framed as ‘lawless mob’ 
in the early 20
th
 century
Workers’ rights Haydu, 1999
 
 
Pro-import actors framed protesters as 
“violent radicals” and as a threat to social 
stability
Anti-US beef import 
protesters in Korea
Lee, 2012: 407
Pro-nuclear proliferation accused protesters 
to be allies of the Soviet Union which 
resulted in repression as ‘communist 
organizations wanting to weaken the 
American democracy’
Anti-nuclear Benford & 
Hunt, 2003
Criminal - Terrorist Frame  
Anti-POSCO protesters are associated with 
Maoists by the company and negotiations 
broken off for matters of internal security
Anti-mining Miklian, 2012
Anti-globalization protesters are compared 
to terrorists in their “disdain for democratic 
institutions” in the Canadian national press 
Anti-globalization Panitch, 2002
Ugandan gay rights activists are labeled 
terrorists who “plan the destruction of our 
country” by a Minister
Gay rights
  
Smith, 2012a
 
 
Protesters are persecuted by the anti-terror 
police in Turkey after opposing the 
construction of a shopping mall in Gezi 
Park
Environmental, anti-
neoliberal
  
e.g. Adams, 
2013
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Table 4: Examples for the application of the outsider and criminal master frames 
5.5 Effects of Framing
Frames have significant influence on movement outcomes (Campbell, 2005) through 
their consequences at the individual and societal level. Individually, they influence 
attitudes, collective identity and thereby generate support for social movements (Snow, 
2004), it also shapes political and discursive opportunities (Benford & Snow, 2000). The 
official frames promoted by state agencies and government elites are of crucial importance 
in shaping the “context in which social movements rise, prosper, and decline” (Noakes, 
2000: 669). Conservative governments for example apply the terrorism master frame to 
normalize the repression of progressive movements and to foster an urban securitization 
agenda (Wekerle & Jackson, 2005). In the context of contested infrastructure and corporate 
projects, state and private sector actors often collaborate to influence the public discourse, 
as has been shown for example for a large road construction project (Shriver et al., 2012). 
Corporate framing also might justify and legitimize grassroots astroturf organizations that 
support their projects (Austin, 2002; Pichardo, 1995; Shriver et al., 2012). These grassroots 
organizations tend to be more violent in their expression than corporate and government 
representatives who often distance themselves from such activities (Shriver et al., 2012). 
Nevertheless, I argue that grassroots violence would be impossible without elites providing 
the broader frames to justify their behavior and again highlight the importance of including 
a broader set of actors into examinations of framing contests around corporate projects. I 
will now outline how the delegitimizing master frames identified above might facilitate 
repression of social movements. 
Activists of the Environmental and Animal 
Liberation Front are labeled ‘domestic 
terrorists’
  Wekerle, 2005
 
 
Environmentalists are ‘anti-American’, 
‘fundamentalist’, ‘eco-terrorists’ and 
‘extremists’
Environmental Austin, 2012; 
Shriver et al., 
2012
Ethnic separatists in Turkey and Chechnya 
are framed as terrorists 
  Pokalova, 
2010 
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The 'outsider' frame makes first hand grievance or affectedness a requirement for 
legitimate claims. Simmel considers the outsider - the stranger as he calls him - as "the 
freer man" who "examines conditions with less prejudice" and against objective standards 
(Simmel, 1908/1971: 146). Because the actions of the stranger are not confined by 
"custom, piety or precedence" (Simmel, 1908/1971: 146) (s)he has the potential to disrupt 
existing agreements and dependencies. The outsider frame denies legitimacy to speak on a 
specific local issue to those who advocate for environmental protection or the rights of 
minorities in more general terms and are not subjectively affected. As a result, this frame 
diffuses attention away from the initial targets, causes and broader political motivations of 
protest to the person(s) behind it (Pokalova, 2010; Simmel, 1971; Wekerle & Jackson, 
2005). Criticizing outside involvement, the outsider frame also hinders the emergence of 
trans-movement linkages that are important for mobilization (Polletta, 1999).  
The 'objectivity' that Simmel claims for the stranger is attacked by the 'self-interest' 
variant of the criminal frame. Far from objectivity, this frame suggests dishonest motives 
behind each and every expression of movement support. Movement supporters morality 
and legitimacy to speak for others is questioned by portraying their activities purely self 
interested. The ‘negative radical flank effect’ of the (assumed) presence of deviant 
individuals or groups in a social movement erodes movement legitimacy while the 
‘positive radical flank effect’ would be that moderate movement members move toward the 
political center because they represent an alternative to radical elements (Fine, 2006).  
Moreover, the 'criminal' master frame stigmatizes resistance and protest as a threat to 
public order. This has been said to facilitate the policing and repression of movements 
through legal persecution and increased public tolerance for hard measures against 
protesters (Della Porta & Fillieule, 2004; Pokalova, 2010; Shriver et al., 2012). Looking at 
the effects of the terrorist frame as the most extreme variant of the criminal frame, others 
have argued that instead of asking what terrorism is and looking for definitions, scholars 
should focus on “what ‘terror does’, that is, what the language game of terror and 
securitization does or what happens when something or someone is articulated 
linguistically as a terror threat.” (Staun, 2010: 414). Framing groups as terrorists is far 
from innocent (Bartolucci, 2010; Staun, 2010). The terrorist frame makes way for 
preventive actions in the name of national security and deflects attention away from 
underlying economic and socio-political causes of conflict (Banerjee, 2011; Heßdörfer et 
al., 2010). The pure labeling act already creates a different sense of urgency and implies 
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and rationalizes the applicability of national security laws instead of normal jurisdiction 
and thus more severe means of punishment (Staun, 2010). Staun further argues that 
terrorism “is neither something objective (terrorist in itself) nor something subjective (a 
matter of individual perception), but something intersubjective and inherently political and 
institutionalized” (p. 411). In this sense, the ‘terrorist’ frame influences societal norms and 
public acceptance for particular anti-terrorist actions: increased control of movement and 
access to particular places and also the re/definition of the scale of political and non-
political behavior (Williams, 2003).  
It has also been argued that, especially in developing countries, the terrorist label 
renders socially acceptable governments’ defense of first world business interests against 
their own citizenry (Sheptycki, 2005). Moreover, beyond the actual policing of protest, the 
criminal master frame functions to create an atmosphere in which dissent, and even the 
potential for protest, is being criminalized and socially controlled, thus not only policing 
existing movements but foreclosing the spaces for them to emerge (Starr, Fernandez & 
Scholl, 2011). Overall, the repeated application of master frames in different contexts 
contributes to their visibility and facilitates future framing of protest elsewhere as it 
“dramatically structures readings of related protest events” (Boyle, 2011: 115). It is 
therefore important to study and make visible the framing of protest and its direct and 
indirect effects.  
I have argued above that while master frames provide the script for a broad narrative, 
they need to be adjusted in order to resonate in a particular societal and political context. I 
also discussed the potential effects of the two delegitimizing master frames for social 
movements. I will now briefly present the case study and method before answering the 
following three research questions. What are the frames that proponents of the contested 
corporate project employ to attack the legitimacy of the protest movement? Can these 
frames be traced back to the two master frames introduced above? And, finally, what are 
the concrete effects these frames have for the repression of the social movement? 
5.6 Case and Method
The East Indian state of Orissa is one of the poorest Indian states, rich in mineral 
resources, and has a long history of public protest against large scale industrial 
development projects (Padel & Das, 2010). The Indian Ministry of Home Affairs considers 
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Orissa to be one of the three states most affected by Maoist activity. About two-thirds of 
the remote Niyamgiri mountains belong to Rayagada district, officially declared a Maoist-
affected area and the remainder lies in Kalahandi which is considered ‘at threat’ of 
becoming Maoist (Singh, 2010). This paper draws on a case study of the conflict about the 
establishment of a bauxite mine in these mountains that are home to the Dongria Kondh 
tribe (see figure 12). The majority of the Dongria Kondh, left political parties, national and 
international NGOs, individual activists, and anti-mining civil society groups oppose the 
mining of Niam Dongar, the sacred mountain of the tribe and located on their ancestral 
land. The mine is supported by an equally complex melange of some tribal people, pro-
mining civil society groups, local business men, the local government, as well as mining 
multinational Vedanta Resources. We have shown elsewhere, how important it is to 
consider the organizing and counter-organizing activities among these groups and not 
mistake conflict parties as stable entities (Kraemer et al., 2013). Figure 12 shows how the 
development of the local resistance movement relates to the global discourse on the war 
against terror, the emergence of the anti-Maoist military offensive. It also outlines key 
dates in the legal fight between proponents and opponents of the mine that culminated in 
the final verdict against the mine in summer 2013. It also marks the arrest of Lado 
Sikkaka, a local tribal and member of the resistance movement, for Maoist activities. I will 
outline the events around this emblematic arrest in more detail in my narrative below.  
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Figure 12: Rough timeline of the protest, legal conflict, and macro level context
 
This paper draws on 26 interviews conducted by the first author in the course of two 
field trips, one from November 2008 to March 2009 and another from March to May 2010 
(see figure 12). These covered nine local, state-level and national-level activists from the 
anti-Vedanta movement, nine middle and top-level managers of Vedanta Resources Plc., 
one POSCO manager - a company that faced similar opposition as Vedanta, four NGO 
staff, a Orissa government bureaucrat, one local TV journalist, and the spokesperson of a 
politically left marxist organization that is alleged to be a frontline organization for 
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Maoists in India and that was mobilizing people in the Niyamgiri mountains around their 
land rights. Interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. Extensive notes were 
taken and written up into a detailed report directly after the interview for the four managers 
who refused to be audio recorded. Additionally, on an ongoing basis from summer 2007 
until the time of writing, the first author conducted desk research on developments in 
Niyamgiri through Facebook groups, an online list-server covering several anti-mining 
struggles in Orissa and the English speaking press about the Vedanta case as well as the 
anti-Maoist fight of the Indian government, extracting data on the development of the 
framing contest between corporate and state elites and anti-Vedanta protesters. 
An initial theme analysis (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991) of interviews with activists 
revealed ‘branding of anti-corporate resistance’ as a central theme. The emic term 
‘branding’ was especially prominent and used to describe the framing of anti-corporate 
activists in a particular way with the goal to facilitate repression. The collection of 
qualitative material was progressively focused (Silverman, 2009) on this topic, also paying 
attention to the context and effects of such branding and seeking corporate texts that 
represented the corporate perspective on anti-corporate protesters for further frame 
analysis. 
Struggles around legitimacy largely are discursive struggles of framing and counter-
framing that are visible in speech acts and media reports (Joutsenvirta & Vaara, 2009; 
Joutsenvirta 2011). Based on a variety of empirical material from interviews, newspapers, 
and corporate texts, I construct a rich narrative (Czarniawska, 1998) about the conflict 
about the contested mine in Niyamgiri. Into this narrative, I integrate the framing of the 
anti-mining resistance in Niyamgiri and their national and international supporters as well 
as the effects that such framing had for the resistance movement. For discursive analysis, 
small but significant amounts of text are already sufficient (Silverman, 2001), especially if 
they originate from influential actors or are widely disseminated such as press releases or 
statements by corporate executives. Next to trying to identify the two delegitimizing 
master frames described above, I will analyze and contextualize the frames to study 
meaning-making by opponents of a contested corporate project in its socio-cultural and 
political context.  
I present my findings in three sections. First, I provide a rich narrative account of 
incidences in Niyamgiri that relate to the framing of the local anti-mining resistance. Then, 
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I focus on how mining managers frame the protest before I contextualize these findings 
with quotes from corporate and government elites that relate to the Indian context. 
5.7 Findings
5.7.1 Minerals-based development - a cure for the Maoist threat? 
“If left-wing extremism continues to flourish in parts which have natural resources of 
minerals, the climate for investment would certainly be affected.” 
(Indian Prime Minister to a gathering of Chief Ministers cited in Roy, 2009) 
“Maoist violence is inflicting a far greater and insidious toll than the unending death-
count […], targeting the economic sinews of the nation, and sapping international 
confidence in India’s capacities for growth and ordered governance.”  
(Singh, 2010) 
“Although geographically the region of Maoist insurgency seems remote, it contains 
large deposits of iron ore, coal, and many other materials that a nation on a steep 
growth curve desperately needs. Most importantly, a permanent region of instability at 
the heart of the country would spell disaster for the free flow of trade and commerce in 
the nation.“ 
(Gupta, 2007: 179/180) 
These quotes speak for the fear among those in India who benefit from economic 
growth brought about by mineral development. The new closeness between the Maoists 
and India's popular people's movements against the social and environmental impact of 
such industrial projects clearly seems to be a reason for concern among those groups.  
The Indian government tries to tackle the Maoist challenge with a two-pronged 
strategy. Economic and infrastructure development shall discourage the general population 
from joining the radicals out of economic motives while military interventions and arrests 
shall tackle the problem of armed cadres (Government of India Planning Commission 
2012). To foster the economic development goals, forest regulations were relaxed in 
Maoist affected districts to facilitate infrastructure development and increase accessibility 
for industry (Vishnoi, 2013) and special police forces are dispatched to secure industrial 
development projects. Despite the many historic negative examples (Padel & Das, 2010), 
mineral exploitation is therefore widely promoted as a route to development and a cure for 
extremism. The head of Orissa’s Dongria Kondh Development Agency, for example, 
argued in an interview “mining means development” and was convinced that only 
companies like Vedanta were able to create “completely alternative livelihoods to poverty 
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and extremism” for the Dongria Kondh. Likewise, several Vedanta managers, off and on 
recording, expressed the idea that a lack of economic development and participation in 
India’s economic growth was motivating the Dongria Kondh's assumed support for the 
Maoist rebels: 
"There [in Niyamgiri] is no hospital, there is no school, there is no proper colleges […] 
if that went into a different channel and, you know, condenses across one common 
frustration called Maoists, I wouldn't be surprised." 
(Vedanta Manager Lanjigarh, March 2010) 
The assumption among the Vedanta leadership seemed to be that the combined mine 
and refinery project could singlehandedly alleviate poverty in Niyamgiri and Orissa, serve 
all needs of the local population and thus eradicate the assumed reasons for sympathy with 
the Maoists: 
“The Lanjigarh Project is critical at the national, state and local level owing to its role 
in the social and economic wellbeing especially of the local community and the scale of 
contributions that it is financially making to society at large. As the sole major industry 
with almost the entire local community depending upon it for their livelihood; the 
Lanjigarh Alumina Refinery can well be construed as an engine of economic growth 
and sustenance for the region. It is creating jobs, promoting education, introducing/ 
facilitating healthcare services and facilities and in the process ensuring community 
development for local people, including the vulnerable Dongria Kondhs and Kutia 
Kondhs.” 
(Vedanta, 2012: 11) 
Repeatedly, the Vedanta management made sweeping arguments about the potential 
impact of the project and portrayed the Niyamgiri project and Vedanta as a company as an 
indispensable development engine: 
“[…] The project is expected to change the profile of the entire district bringing 
considerable direct and indirect employment, infrastructure development, community 
development, social-economic development and empowerment.” 
(Press release Vedanta 9th Dec. 2009) 
“In these areas, we are working towards eliminating poverty, food, school education, 
right to health care services, medical treatment. […] I am trying to see how we can 
eliminate poverty completely from Bihar, Orissa, Rajasthan […]”  
(Anil Agarwal, Chairman Vedanta, June 2010) 
In an even larger context, and using references to Indian pride and the right to 
development, the company leadership clearly saw minerals-based industrialization as a 
way to quickly become equal to other developed nations with a large minerals sector: 
“How long you want us to be powerless and without water? India has more resources 
than developed countries like Australia and Canada. How long do you want to wait? 
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I’m looking at India to be on the fast track where we can compete with the world 
shoulder to shoulder.” 
(Anil Agarwal, Chairman Vedanta, June 2010)  
 Given such an importance attached to the Niyamgiri project and Vedanta as a 
whole, how did project proponents react to challenges to its legitimacy?  
5.7.2 Outside instigators and criminals - Framing resistance against the mine in 
Niyamgiri 
In interviews and their external communication the Vedanta leadership and 
management left no doubt about their idea that the resistance against the mine was caused 
by outside actors who were assumed to mobilize the Dongria Kondh: 
“The resistance is fabricated from London and mainly related to the tribal people.” 
(Vedanta Corporate Communications Manager, January 2009) 
“CEO M. S. Mehta […] implied that the Dongria were voting ‘no’ [to mining] because 
of the presence of outside observers.” 
(Report about Vedanta’s 2013 AGM on List server) 
“The NGOs, they try to tell people to resist. […] They mobilize people from this area 
telling them to oppose this particular project. […] It is only a few people, better-
knowers at those NGOs who are doing this protest. The local tribals are very simple 
[and believe the] misinformation that these NGOs are trying to put into the minds of 
these people.” 
(Plant Manager Vedanta Lanjigarh, January 2009) 
The last interview quote is exemplary for the widely shared perception among 
managers that tribal people were unable to even imagine the benefits industrial 
development would bring for them and were therefore easily swayed by NGOs.  
Other supporters of the project repeated nearly identical statements to those made by 
corporate managers during interviews and in the press. A newspaper report about the 
upcoming vote about mining in Niyamgiri in summer 2013 cites the president of Adivasi 
Bikash Parishad, described as a local "pro-industry group" in the article as saying: 
"Many outsiders are visiting our area and trying to influence the villagers against the 
Niyamgiri mining project. These activities disrespect the SC [Supreme Court] verdict 
which says that proceedings of the gram sabha should take place independently. It is 
unfortunate that the state government has not taken any action against them." 
(Business Standard, May 2013) 
When asked about the motivation for external actors to create resistance in Niyamgiri, 
the answer was usually self interested motives. Local politicians were accused of abusing 
the conflict for gaining votes while NGOs were looking for funds. One manager argued: 
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“Some manufacturers [of protest], some political activists are protesting because of the 
money. […] besides the politicians also some NGOs are there. They are not really… 
they are really small, […] they are only exploiting money to distract people from the 
right path. In the name of Niyamgiri, they will be getting so many funds from inside the 
country and outside the country also, so people have a lot of money and they will divert 
people from the project.” 
(Ass. GM Corporate Affairs Vedanta, February 2009) 
The CSR Manager of POSCO also shared the opinion that any resistance was created 
from outside. He argued that “local people never create problems” but that it was “a 
handful of […] people with vested interests” that he also referred to as “negative elements” 
and “mischief mongers” coming from outside “spoiling people’s minds” that were stirring 
locals up to resist against the company's steel plant and other industrial projects. He also 
identified politicians and NGOs as the main suspects behind resistance against the 
industry: 
“It is so easy to organize some kind of opposition and if you dissect the people who are 
opposing that project, who are taking the leadership of [opposing] that project, you will 
find them… they are politicians who have failed in the hustings. They want to 
somehow survive. Okay? Now, yesterday in that rally, today there has been a report, I 
saw it on television. 2000 people they are claiming were there. I doubt that. Normally 
I've seen that people said it was 2000 and it was 200. But even those people 
themselves, all of them are from outside Orissa. […] Obviously, the NGOs have 
brought them. All of them. So they are professional people who are being brought in 
every time there are protests. They are brought in and their photographs are in the 
newspaper and the leaders who speak are all professionals. It is like some people 
decide that they are the voice of society. They don't allow [local] people to speak for 
themselves.” 
(POSCO CSR Manager, January 2009) 
Vedanta's communication to the press suggests that the perception of outside actors 
being behind the protest culminated in calls upon the authorities to restrict the movement 
of foreign activists: 
“[…] foreign NGOs who have been circulating a lot of false information about the 
entire mining activity in Orissa […] There has been a sudden movement of foreigners / 
foreign NGOs in Lanjigarh, Kalahandi district in the past few days. Strangely 
foreigners coming on tourist visa from countries like Italy, Germany, Australia, 
Denmark, UK etc. have become frequent and they are freely moving in the region. 
These people have been forcedly interacting with local tribals and disturbing their 
peace.” 
(Press release Vedanta, 9 Dec. 2009) 
“VAL [Vedanta Aluminium] has been demanding proper regulation of foreign NGOs 
and visitors in tribal areas saying that it has started yielding positive results as the 
former could hold Palli Sabhas [village meetings] successfully. [...] Earlier the Vedanta 
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Group had asked the state government to restrict entry of foreign non-government 
organizations (NGOs) in Lanjigarh area, saying they were instigating locals. The 
company, in a letter to the state Home Ministry, had sought restriction on movement of 
such foreign nationals, besides investigation into their source of funding.” 
(Patnaik, 2012) 
“They (foreign NGOs) are enemy of industrial development in the state. If such NGOs 
and foreign nationals have come on tourist visas, why are they camping in jungles of 
Kalahandi, Rayagada. If they do not abide by rules, they should be sent back.” 
(Vedanta executive cited in Press Trust Of India 2009) 
A Vedanta manager in another location where the company was also facing community 
protest, complained that the government was not taking stricter action against activists 
which he referred to as "trouble makers": 
“Many times our government is also not very tough on people who are breaking laws. 
We need to take more actions. Because after all, the land is to be given by the 
government. Okay? And okay, you need to explain to the people and all that but that is 
there. But the people who are nuisance makers, the people who are trouble creators - 
how to take care of them? That is not taking place.” 
(Plant Manager Vedanta, interview January 2009) 
Repeatedly, Vedanta executives connected their criticism of outside interference to 
India's colonial past. Some statements can be read as appeals to acknowledge India's 
sovereignty and highlight the ability of its government and scientific elite to govern the 
country: 
 “I think it's very important at this point to know that the whole opinion or perception 
[about Vedanta’s operations] was getting hijacked or driven by people sitting miles 
away not honoring the people who are qualified or entrusted with this job to monitor 
and examine our growth model.” 
(CEO Vedanta, AGM 2009) 
“[…] there seems to be a desire that the administration of Orissa and the administration 
of India should be run from here [London]. Actually I feel I'm going back in time. 
There is no attempt to understand Indian law, Indian procedures and in what manner 
people are now operating in India, there is a complete ignorance, I'm totally amazed. 
[…] If anybody has any grievance, including you, Amnesty [International] or anything, 
there is a National Human Rights Commission, which is a very vigorous and strong 
party who is headed by a Chief Justice of India, every member of this commission is 
like a supreme court judge. You please bring anything to their notice and it will be 
enquired into. We are subject to our country's laws and human rights commission. And 
this human rights commission activity is something which is respected all over the 
world, it's not a body that can be just pushed around. So we would very much like to 
have, especially from an organization like Amnesty, you can rest assured that it would 
be given the most detailed consultation. ” 
(Member of the Board, Vedanta, AGM 2009) 
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Also in reaction to Amnesty International's 2010 report that outlined human rights 
violations, and negative health impacts and lack of informed consent for the mining and 
refinery project, online news sources cited a Vedanta press release saying: 
“The report implicitly criticizes a number of highly respected Indian governmental, 
regulatory and independent assessment organizations, including the Supreme Court and 
the state of Orissa, all of whom have reviewed, refined and endorsed the approach 
manifested by Vedanta.” 
(Livemint.com 2010) 
But not only managers, also other interested actors framed the protest in Niyamgiri as 
externally caused. The head of a governmental institute on tribal people issues in the 
capital of Orissa for example located the roots of anti-mining protest in “agencies from 
outside who inject and sensitize people” with which he meant NGOs. To illustrate his 
point, he recounted the story of another mining company whose project in Orissa had been 
stopped by a NGO campaign. According to him, the involved organizations had been 
sponsored by a competing Australian mining multinational.  
Vedanta also lists several newspaper articles on its website that cite various ‘industry 
experts’ who, in line with the company, criticize foreign funded NGOs as the cause of 
conflicts with communities. According to these reports, NGOs were “obstructing the 
Indian development agenda” by hindering Indian companies to exploit the country’s rich 
mineral reserves. 
Below, I narrate the developments in Niyamgiri in the time period between 2009 and 
2010 to explore further how the anti-mining resistance was framed in public during a 
period when the anti-Maoist military initiative had reached the region. 
5.7.3 “I told them I was not a Maoist.” 
These words were uttered by Lado Sikaka Majhi an anti-mining social movement 
activist with the Niyamgiri Surakshya Samiti (‘Niyamgiri Protection Committee’ NSS) and 
a member of the Dongria Kondh tribal group, after his arrest by anti-Maoist paramilitary 
forces in August 2010 and several days in jail. 
Lado and two other anti-mining activists had been on their way to the train station 
where they were to board a train to Delhi in order to attend a meeting on the Forest Rights 
Act (FRA) - an important piece of legislation about tribal customary land rights. In an 
extensive interview with a national newspaper (Sahu 2010), Lado reported how their 
vehicle was stopped by about a dozen men with rifles. After taking the car keys and 
everyone’s mobile phones, the men then forced the activists into their car without telling 
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them why they were arrested and where they were going. Two activists were released from 
the car shortly after, but Lado had to remain in the car: 
“I could not see where they were taking me because I was blind-folded. After about 
four hours, my blind-fold was removed and I found myself in a police station. There 
they started beating me with bamboo sticks. They accused me of being a Maoist, 
organizing Naxal meetings on the Niyamgiri hills and uniting the Dongria Kondhs to 
protest against Vedanta. I told them that I was not a Maoist and organizing meetings of 
the Niyamgiri Surakshya Samiti, fighting for the protection of the hills. But they did 
not listen to me and beat me.” 
(Lado Sikaka Majhi, August 2010) 
In the days of his arrest, Lado was interrogated repeatedly and coerced into signing two 
documents: a statement that he had sheltered Maoists and another blank piece of paper. He 
was released after four days with the warning: “No further meetings.” A police official 
justified his arrest in a local newspaper: 
“Our men had picked him up on the assumption that he had links with Maoists. But 
later we found that he was a member of Green Kalahandi [a local anti-mining 
organization]. So we released him. This is what we do normally in these areas. There is 
quite a heavy movement of Maoists in Lanjigarh area.” 
(Mohanty, 2010) 
From about spring 2009, the anti-mining protest of the Dongria Kondh was at threat of 
being connected to the activities of Maoist insurgents. Local newspapers and Vedanta-
friendly websites reported that Maoists had put up anti-Vedanta posters around Vedanta’s 
refinery at the foothills of Niyamgiri. At the same time, a number of Dongria Kondh 
testified in front of a fact finding committee on Vedanta’s environmental and legal 
violations. The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) conducted first combing operations 
in Niyamgiri, allegedly to find Maoists. Members of the police force entered Dongria 
Kondh villages without notice, interrogated people and searched huts to look for 
incriminating material. The main target of combing operations were villages where people 
had testified to the committee and were members of Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangha, a tribal 
land rights organization regularly portrayed in Indian mainstream media as a Maoist 
frontline organization (Nayak, 2005; Pradhan, 2009). A representative of the organization 
explained in a TV interview: 
“The police chase us all the time. And when we go into hiding, they label us as 
Maoists. It's the police who are creating Maoists.’’ 
(NDTV, 2010) 
Shortly after the testimony, the dead body of one of the witnesses, Arsi Mahji, was 
found close to Vedanta’s refinery compound wall. Despite the obvious threat to their lives 
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and the intimidation through the combing operations, Lado Sikaka and hundreds of other 
Dongria Kondh mobilized to demand the closure of Vedanta’s refinery at the foothills of 
Niyamgiri. With their protest they had to confront not only the police but also local 
Vedanta supporters: small business owners, construction entrepreneurs, and their recruits 
from the villages.  
Although he denied that there were Maoists in the Niyamgiri mountains, a regional 
police official in summer 2010 admitted that CRPF had been stationed and various 
checkpoints set-up in Muniguda, a small town at the foothills of Niyamgiri and a key entry 
point into the mountains. He reasoned that “they [the troops] are not for 
Niyamgiri” (Singh, 2010) but did not provide an alternative explanation for their presence. 
This was given by a Vedanta official in the same article, who accused the tribal people in 
Niyamgiri to be a “threat for national security” (Singh, 2010). In November 2010, again 
two Dongria Kondh were arrested as Maoist supporters by the CRPF. More arrests 
followed in December: 
“The Special Operation Group of Odisha police and the CRPF on Tuesday based on the 
information a Maoist camp was being run in the Niyamgiri jungles conducted a raid 
and arrested five Maoists including two hardcore Maoists, a woman and two minor 
girls.” 
(The Pioneer, Dec. 16th 2010) 
In December 2010, Vedanta asked the central government’s Ministry of Environment 
and Forest to explain its decision to ban mining in Niyamgiri despite an earlier ruling that 
had allowed it. When they did not receive a reply immediately, Vedanta managers jointly 
with Orissa’s Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik asked the Indian Prime Minister to put 
pressure on the Environment Ministry for a speedy decision. At the end of February 2011, 
the Dongria Kondh gathered on top of Niyam Dongar for an annual mass meeting to renew 
their vow to protect the mountain and fight for the closure of the refinery. The gathering 
was attended by national activists and who managed to give it some national media 
coverage. Shortly after, pro-Vedanta men destroyed a shrine that the Dongria had 
constructed on the mountain top and more CRPF were stationed in the Niyamgiri 
mountains. Activists and a report commissioned by the Ministry of Environment 
(Ramanathan, 2010) accused Vedanta of supporting the police operations, for example by 
hosting the police forces in one of their defunct mid-day-meal centers for children in 
Lanjigarh (advertised by the company to provide “one square meal per day” to local kids). 
Police presence grew steadily from then on and by May, CRPF also inhabited a market 
building originally intended to store fair trade products produced by the Dongria Kondh. 
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With CRPF stationed directly at the foot of Niyamgiri, the pressure on the Dongria 
Kondh through combing operations markedly increased, especially prior to another mass 
resistance meeting that the NSS had announced for the end of March. According to 
activists, Vedanta supporters stepped up their presence in Niyamgiri. They took over an 
empty hut in one of the villages and from this base ventured into neighboring communities 
to question and intimidate people and show their presence at meetings of anti-mining 
protesters. Their black jeep allegedly was repeatedly seen as it entered the Vedanta refinery 
compound. 
In early May, three additional platoons of CRPF were dispatched even deeper into the 
Dongria Kondh’s traditional territory. One platoon each was stationed close to the three 
most strongly resisting tribal villages. According to a local NGO representative, an 
"atmosphere of terror" was created by the sheer presence of police in the middle of the 
mountains, their holding up of villagers for random interrogations and by the blank shots 
that were fired into the night. As a result, many Dongria Kondh stopped attending the local 
market – the women, according to activists, afraid of sexual assaults and violence and the 
men fearing to be held up as Maoist supporters. Indian activists were highly concerned: 
“The day is not far when we will hear that either a Dongria Kondh lady has been 
sexually tortured by the forces or that a man of the tribe has been killed by them. […] 
By framing anti Vedanta activists as Maoists they want to create fear amongst all of us 
who want to extend solidarity with the people of Niyamgiri and throttle any sort of 
activism within the constitutional framework. In other words they want to send out a 
message that activists from nearby cities and towns will be in trouble if found in 
Niyamgiri. While repression continues unabated in Niyamgiri the Dongria Kondh have 
been left alone to protect themselves.” 
(Activist on ‘Save Niyamgiri’ Facebook group, May 2011) 
The CRPF publicly announced that Maoist posters demanding the release of a Dongria 
Kondh who was under arrest for his alleged Maoist connections had been found in 
Niyamgiri. Local people alleged that during combing operations the police had paid more 
attention to Forest Rights Act (FRA) information and application materials instead of 
looking for Maoist leaflets or posters. Also, villagers were interrogated and asked about the 
names of external activists and organizations that were teaching locals about the FRA. 
Activists widely expressed their fear that during the searches documents could be 
destroyed that would have helped the Dongria to claim official land rights under the FRA. 
In 2012, again right before the annual mass gathering, Dongria Kondh leaders were 
threatened by the CRPF to not oppose the mining plans (Amnesty International, 2012). 
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Albeit much less compared to local activists, also NGO staff faced repression. In April 
2012, an Amnesty International researcher was traveling to villages near the refinery to 
gather information from the affected communities when he was approached by two police 
officials who asked him about the names of the villages he had visited. 
“The police officials said they had received calls from the 'company’s intelligence' 
stating that 'persons belonging to foreign organizations are trying to spread false 
propaganda against the plans for the mine and refinery’s expansion'. During the 
encounter, the police officials received telephone calls which they said were from the 
Kalahandi district superintendent of police, Sudha Singh, and the 'company’s 
intelligence'. The police cautioned Amnesty International against visiting the Niyamgiri 
hills and meeting the Dongria Kondh community. The police asserted that the hills 
were being frequented by Maoists who had, in March 2012, abducted two Italian 
tourists and held them hostage for about a month before releasing them in exchange for 
the release, from prison, of their jailed colleagues. The police said the Orissa authorities 
had issued orders banning ‘outsiders' from visiting the hills.” 
 (Amnesty International, 2012) 
Further incidents between the CRPF and Niyamgiri villagers also occurred in 2013 and 
in June 2013 CRPF soldiers shot on a group of Dongria Kondh adults and children who 
had been bathing in a stream. In a letter to the Human Rights Commission in Orissa’s 
capital, Bhubaneswar (Foil Vedanta, 2013) activists cite one of the victims: 
“This is an assault on our very lives. The CRPF has no right to shoot at us without any 
provocation. Villagers bathing in a stream are not Maoists. Little children are not 
Maoists. These are our mountains, our forests, our land. Because of the CRPF, today, 
we cannot roam around freely in our own area. We do not feel safe anymore, we have 
to live in fear and insecurity. Our lives do not matter to the state, they can kill us 
whenever or wherever.” 
(Duku Jakesika, June 2013) 
In another incident, a group of Dongria women were held up and questioned, one of 
them was video recorded while she reported the encounter: 
“Few days back we were gathering forest products near our village. At that time so 
many armed forces arrived and they pointed guns at us and surrounded us. They started 
asking ‘Where is Lada?’ [meaning tribal leader Lado Sikaka] ‘Where have you hidden 
the Maoists? Where have you hidden the weapons? Why are you opposing mining?’ 
Someone from behind yelled Íf you resist the mining you will be killed like dogs’.” 
(Anonymous, cited by Foil Vedanta , 2013) 5
This renewed CRPF pressure came at a time where local villagers were asked by the 
Indian government to hold a referendum on mining in Niyamgiri. At one of these 
referendums, the formerly imprisoned Lado Sikaka publicly demanded the government to 
withdraw the police forces from the mountains: 
 www.foilvedanta.org (last accessed 22.11.2015)5
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“Why do the police, armed force destroy our fields and crops in the name of combing 
[for] Maoists? Why are they entering our territory? Withdraw them immediately.” 
(Lado Sikaka, August 2013) 
Especially on Indian NGOs and international ones with physical offices in India had to 
be afraid to be shut down for political activities or being associated with Maoists. 
According to an activist blogger, in Jharkhand, Orissa’s neighboring state, numerous 
NGOs had been shut down in 2010 “as sympathizers of the Naxalites” without clarifying 
the meaning of this term and creating a fear among NGO staff that any protest against 
government or mining activities in the Red Corridor would be treated as Naxalite activity. 
“NGOs are afraid of working directly on mining. Because government people they are 
harassing them, they will threaten that their license will be taken away. […] In many 
areas they would say those people are Maoist when they raise their voice for 
democracy. That is a difficult thing to work with. We face problems in that we have so 
many organizations we want to work with but that fear this kind of harassment.” 
(International NGO staff, Bhubaneswar, December 2008) 
“Those [NGOs] who even want to come to the forefront but they cannot come, because 
they are the creature of the statutes, the government statute. So they cannot say ‘Yes, I 
want to oppose the policy of the government’. Then their foreign funds will be stopped. 
That has happened.” 
(Delhi activist, January 2009) 
The fear of being shut down as a Maoist sympathizer even resulted in ruptures within 
the anti-Vedanta movement when it was channeled into an overly strong motivation to 
distance oneself from the grassroots resistance. Asked about the annual protest meeting on 
top of Niyam Dongar in spring 2010, a local staff of one of the international NGOs 
involved in the anti-Vedanta mobilization was clearly uneasy and argued that her 
organization had “certainly not been part of it”. In her fear of being associated with anti-
government activities, she even accused the local organizers of Maoist connections: 
“I have heard some people say that it was done by Naxals. […] I just keep out of all 
this […] and the government of India is very strict on us. See, all this violence and 
things like that… I feel it doesn't help because the state can right now install a few 
platoons of police and nobody will be able to move out of that place and which will be 
a miserable condition for the tribal people and for especially women and children. We 
have seen what is happening in Dantewara, Chhattisgarh, what's happening in Koraput 
now. We don't want the same thing in Niyamgiri.” 
(International NGO staff, Bhubaneswar, March 2010) 
However, members of the protest movement were clear about their difference from the 
Maoist insurgents. In spring 2013 when the gram sabhas (village votes) were being held 
for the affected villages to decide whether they want mining or not, Maoist rebels tried to 
prevent these democratic activities from happening. However, social movement 
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organizations from the national advocacy network organized a mass event in May to 
motivate people to attend the votes: 
“This democratic mass movement had more impact on tribals of the area and the tribals 
realized that Maoist stance in relation to Niyamgiri agitation was not in favour of the 
interests of the localites,”  
(State spokesperson of CPI-ML (New Democracy) in The Hindu, 2013) 
5.8 Discussion
The extractive industries are notorious for long standing and often violent conflicts 
about the set-up and running of their high-impact projects. The struggle around the 
Niyamgiri mining and refinery project is only one among many similar cases around the 
world (Banerjee & Yousfi, 2014). On both sides of such struggles, conflict parties form 
alliances, build chains of influence and engage in mobilization and counter-mobilization 
activities (Kraemer et al. 2013; Zietsma & Winn, 2008). Most of the work in management 
and organization studies on conflict between corporations and their opponents, however, 
focuses on stakeholder attempts to influence the corporation. Moreover, studies of framing 
contests between corporations and their opponents have so far paid more attention to 
legitimacy attacks on the corporation. Counter-attacks on the legitimacy of protesters are 
hardly examined (but see Erkama & Vaara, 2010; Shriver et al. 2012, for exceptions). Most 
studies also largely ignore the role of the wider alliance of supportive project stakeholders 
that, similarly to the movement against the corporation, can extend from the local until the 
(trans-) national level in such framing contests.  
Therefore, adding to earlier work on the discursive defense of corporate projects 
(Erkama & Vaara, 2010), I contribute to the literature with a detailed theorization of 
delegitimation through adversarial framing. Based on the literature on framing contests, I 
zoomed in on legitimacy attacks on opponents through adversarial framing as a specific 
tactic that is usually employed when framing and counter-framing of the issue is 
unsuccessful. Based on a review of studies that covered how government and corporate 
elites defended their position through attacks on protesters' legitimacy, I identified and 
theorized two master frames: the outsider and criminal master frame. I discussed their 
diagnostic, prognostic and motivational elements (Benford & Snow, 2000) as well as their 
potential effects on the targets of such framing. I thereby provide a terminology and 
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interpretation template for future studies of corporate framing of resistance against their 
operations.  
I also hoped to identify these two, and potentially other, master frames in my case study 
of the conflict around the Niyamgiri project in which I examined the reactions to 
community mobilization against the mine. My empirical material covers the adversarial 
framing of a range of supportive stakeholders over a timeframe of several years at the 
height of the transnational protest against the project. I also provide a short narrative to 
illustrate the effects of such framing for the grassroots social movement and its supporters.  
I will first discuss how mine supporters employed both master frames to discredit 
protest against the Niyamgiri project before I examine how they were adapted to the Indian 
context. I then discuss the implications of my findings for the stakeholder and framing 
literature, pointing to opportunities for future research. Finally, I return to the specific 
context in which this study was placed and discuss the broader implications of my 
findings. 
5.8.1 The outsider frame  
Vedanta's managers and other supporters of the mine and refinery project heavily relied 
on the outsider frame to blame foreign NGOs and external activists for stirring up the tribal 
people of Niyamgiri. They argued that the local resistance movement would not exist if it 
was not for external influence-taking. The conception of 'outsiders' seemed to include 
national-level activists, as well as international NGOs and supporters of the anti-mining 
struggle. The outsider frame not only denies local actors their agency but is also grounded 
in stereotypes about tribal people as 'primitive' and 'backwards' and unable to understand 
the implications of a large industrial project. Moreover, by blaming the resistance on 
outside instigators, proponents of the venture entirely discounted local grievances and 
motivations for protest (Simmel, 1908/1971, Wekerle & Jackson, 2005) and allowed 
managers to ignore the large numbers of protesting people and villages in Niyamgiri. The 
day-to-day negative experiences of many of the affected people in the refinery region (see 
e.g. Amnesty International 2010, 2012) and legitimate worries of the Dongria Kondh about 
the impact of the mine on their ability to live their normal lives were entirely ignored as 
potential legitimate causes of the protest.  
While it cannot be denied that external actors, ranging from individual supporters and 
activists to networks and organizations such as political parties and national and 
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international non-profits that were part of the national or transnational advocacy network 
(Kraemer et al., 2013) were important for the Niyamgiri movement, several spontaneous 
and early mobilization activities in Niyamgiri (Padel & Das, 2012) suggest a strong 
grassroots opposition to the mine.   
In line with our theoretical expectations, the motivational aspect of the outsider frame 
were demands towards the authorities to curb the influx of NGO staff and other foreigners 
into Niyamgiri - a clear attempt at counter-organizing with the goal to influence local 
attitudes about the mine.  
5.8.2 The criminal frame 
Managers often used terms like 'enemy' or 'nuisance makers' in reference to foreign 
activists who were accused of traveling on tourist visa, camping in the wild and disturbing 
the 'peace' of tribal people. Such statements can be interpreted as attempts at 
criminalization of the movement supporters. The argument about the risks to tribal 
lifestyles through foreign activists can be interpreted as a deflection of the earlier activist 
critique of the stationing of Central Reserve Police Forces in Niyamgiri who had feared 
negative influences on the cultural integrity and safety of the Dongria Kondh and speaks 
for how frames and counter-frames evolve in interaction (Snow, 2004). The criminal 
framing was used to justify demands to restrict activists’ free movement in the Niyamgiri 
hills and expel them from the country if they were found ‘guilty’ of abusing their visa 
status.  
Another variant of the criminal frame were accusations that particular supporters of the 
movement were acting not on legitimate grounds but in their own self-interest. This was 
especially employed with reference to NGOs and politicians who were accused to act in a 
certain way in order to attract funding or votes. It has been argued that such frames that 
portray adversaries as dishonest and criminal can be seen as attempts at preventing the use 
of a ‘victimization’ frame by the movement (Knight & Greenberg, 2011). It appears that 
those who publicly have been established as immoral and criminal subjects will have a 
hard time portraying themselves as victims of repression and thus are unable to “appeal to 
and mobilize the attention, sympathies, and support of third parties” (Knight & Greenberg, 
2011: 337).  
Finally, the criminal master frame was also employed in its most radical variant when 
members of the resistance movement were orally framed and repressed as Maoist 
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guerrillas. Based on academic definitions of terrorism, Indian Maoists are not terrorists but 
a social movement that employs radical tactics. Terrorism implies violence against 
innocent targets that are not actually opposed but are hit based on opportunity or for their 
representativeness for or connection with a target group (Schmid & Jongman 1988 in 
Staun, 2010). Victims of terrorism are seen as 'message generators' in this definition and 
used to manipulate the actual target audience - beheadings of Westerners by the IS being an 
illustrative case in point here. Nevertheless, Maoists in India are treated with anti-terror 
legislation and our narrative further suggests that the anti-Maoist fight lends itself as a 
welcome tool to clear regions earmarked for industrial development projects from 
protesters. These findings make an important contribution to management studies that 
usually focus on win-win and solution-seeking tactics like CSR and communication 
strategies when corporations are faced with stakeholder protest (Laasonen, Fougère & 
Kourula, 2012). More violent means of local ordering (Hönke, 2012) however, are rarely 
analyzed. I argue that the outsider and criminal master frame together were used to 
delegitimize the movement in Niyamgiri and thereby create a certain level of public 
acceptance for the violent repression of protest (Della Porta & Fillieule, 2007; Welker, 
2009). 
The criminal framing makes use of the fact that boundary control is impossible in 
social movements like the one in Niyamgiri. It is impossible to say whether there are 
Maoists among those who appear for large scale protest events. The movement is therefore 
vulnerable to accusations of welcoming radical or other disreputable elements in their 
middle and susceptible to claims that these kinds of individuals are emblematic for the 
movement (Fine, 2006). Again, as argued above, the empirical material clearly speaks 
against the tendency to conflate the Niyamgiri movement with Maoists. In summer 2013 
all 12 villages that were asked to cast their vote about the mine voted against it with high 
participation numbers. This is despite attempts by the Maoists to prevent this democratic 
decision-making process as a symbol of state power that were countered by the movement 
with a large march (padayatra) through the region to motivate locals to attend the vote. 
During this and similar events, movement members made every effort to distance the 
"democratic mass movement" from the activities of the Maoists.  
In summary, it can be argued that the outsider frame helped proponents of the mine to 
successfully shift any discussion on the conflict away from potential real grievances to the 
'trouble making' of external activists. The criminal frame on the other hand was employed 
144
to justify the militarization of the Niyamgiri mountains and argue for the positive 
economic impacts of the project which was expected to reduce the alleged local support for 
the Maoists.  By presenting protesters’ activities as outside of dominant norms, values and 
definitions (Suchman, 1995) by connecting it to outside instigation or terrorist activity, 
proponents of the project tried to discursively de-legitimize the anti-mining resistance and 
used their impression management tactics to influence public perceptions of opponents’ 
legitimacy (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). 
As a result, by framing the opposition as illegitimate and threatening to the public order, 
positive or meaningful engagement between corporations and the opposition is prevented. I 
will now turn to a discussion of how the master frames were adapted to the specific context 
of the case studied here. 
5.8.3 Frame adaptation 
While on the one hand master frames provide broader diagnostic categories, these are 
subject to frame translation and adaptation (Benford & Snow, 2000; Campbell, 2005). My 
findings show how context-specific individual action frames were constructed on the base 
of the two master frames through bricolage by actors with particular interests, norms and 
cognitive identities operating in this specific context (Campbell, 2005). The outsider and 
criminal master frames were adapted to resonate with the culturally and contextually 
influenced ‘sounding board’ (Williams, 2004) of audiences in Orissa/India. The major 
context-specific factors that clearly shaped how both master frames were adapted in the 
case studied here were first, Indian sensibilities about issues of colonialism and state 
sovereignty and, second, the national government's military offensive against the Maoists 
and the global discourse about the fight against terrorism which I will discuss in more 
detail below.   
The outsider frame was tactically amplified through references to India's colonial past 
where British rulers had decided the fate of the country from afar. Making use of the Indian 
anti-colonial sentiment that has its roots in the Independence movement which united 
Indians under a strong national identity, proponents of the mine portrayed international 
NGOs and activists as foreign adversaries that were - again - trying to impose their will 
and perspectives on the Indian people ‘sitting miles away’, as one manager put it. The 
emancipatory anti-colonial discourse was also referenced in supporters' frames when they 
rejected foreign expert opinions and research. Repeatedly, interviewees emphasized the 
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qualification of Indian experts and rejected the findings and reports of outside observers 
such as the Norwegian Pension Fund's Council of Ethics or Amnesty International arguing 
that they lacked an understanding for Indian matters and ignored the activities of equally 
qualified Indian experts. The anti-colonial framing helped especially Vedanta's managers to 
shift attention away from the fact that Vedanta, as a company traded on the UK stock 
exchange, in fact is answerable to European institutions and the European public as well as 
to the local communities affected by its operations. In that sense, the involvement of 
especially UK-based NGOs in the social movement seems justified. 
This frame adaptation benefits from an overall critical stance vis-a-vis foreign NGOs in 
India that are often criticized as being run by foreign money and to act in the interest of 
outside actors. Conspiracy theories about the impact of foreign NGOs on Indian matters 
were ubiquitous among interviewees supportive of Vedanta as well as among many 
activists. This shows how powerful this frame adaptation was in the specific context. 
Second, I want to discuss the wider discursive and political opportunity structure 
around the fight against terrorism that influenced how the criminal master frame could be 
employed in the context studied (Kriesi, 2004; Polletta & Ho, 2006; Snow, 2004).  
The global availability of the anti-terrorist discourse originates from the global war 
against terrorism following the 9/11 attacks (Chagankerian, 2013; Pokalova, 2010; Wekerle 
& Jackson, 2005). In India, the anti-Maoist offensive that was launched in 2006 provides a 
national equivalent. Since the fight against the Maoists was declared a national priority, the 
topic is strongly and regularly present in the mainstream media, rendering the framing of 
opponents as terrorists readily available in the Indian context. Together, political structures 
and alliances, the accessibility of the political system, and the reporting practices of the 
mass media shape public attitudes and create an ”institutional common sense that defines 
some claims and ways of making claims as feasible, appropriate, even rational.” (Polletta 
& Ho, 2006: 197). The radical tactics of the Maoists are condemned as 'terrorist activity' so 
as not to disturb the moral values of the wider society when violently repressing them. 
Likening anti-mining protesters to Maoist terrorists renders it publicly acceptable to treat 
them in a similar way. Our narrative on the effects of the anti-Maoists combing operations 
and arrests on the anti-mining movement in Niyamgiri shows how such geopolitical and 
national conditions and associated framing opportunities materialize in tangible effects in 
terms of local protest policing (Della Porta & Fillieule, 2004).  
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Likewise, these moral values of society are decisive for how controversial corporate 
activities are being legitimated and how particular corporate practices such as CSR are 
publicly constructed (Joutsenvirta 2011: 71; see also Kneip, 2013). There was a clear effort 
to frame corporations as key contributors to poverty alleviation and construct them as able 
to remedy the assumed causes of sympathy with the Maoists in remote regions like 
Niyamgiri. Again, this can be interpreted as an attempt to shift attention away from the 
negative consequences of large-scale minerals-based development to the assumed positive 
societal benefits which would outweigh negative impact on a few directly affected 
villagers.  
5.8.4 Theoretical implications  
It has long been argued in the field of social movement studies that movements around 
the world tend to take similar forms and use the same master frames to respond to the 
challenges of economic globalization because they face a globalized threat, comparable 
opportunity structures and transnational actors facilitate the diffusion of tactics (Giugni, 
2002). This study aimed to contribute to a growing field of literature on framing contests 
and responses to protest by those who are attacked (Fine, 2006; Guérard, Bode & 
Gustafsson 2013; Knight & Greenberg, 2011) and argues that the same is true for the actors 
that face these globalized movements and their master frames. Where corporations and 
their supporters are faced with comparative threats, they are likely to draw on the same set 
of tactics and responses. I have focused on the master frames such actors employ to defend 
their projects and argue that the outsider and criminal master frame I identified in this 
paper will also be relevant in comparable conflicts around the world. Both frames are 
inclusive and flexible which are typical master frame characteristics (Benford & Snow, 
2000). This means that they are easily adapted to specific contexts in order to resonate with 
local audiences and to describe a wide range of possible behaviors.   
Framing is an important tool for opponents to discursively construct reality and can 
open up or limit political opportunities (Benford & Snow, 2000). While there might be 
Maoist activity in Niyamgiri and external support for the movement, so to say an 
undeniable 'reality', it is the effect of framing if anti-mining protest is widely considered as 
organized by left radicals or outside support for the movement shunned as external 
influence taking rather than a normal part of social movement formation in times free 
information flow from the local to the transnational level. This speaks for the power of 
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framing to discursive reality construction amidst given structures (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005). 
Corporations and other powerful supporters of contested industrial projects do have the 
power to considerably shape public opinion about anti-corporate protest. Their voice is 
heard by local supporters of a project who might draw on the frames promoted by 
corporations to justify violent action against protesters. This is where this paper contributes 
to the literature on CSR and stakeholder engagement.  
The classic stakeholder literature identifies salience of certain stakeholders for 
corporations based on their characteristics, mostly power, urgency and legitimacy 
(Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997). It has also been shown how stakeholders take strategic 
action to increase their salience, for example through the construction of chains of 
influence (Zietsma & Winn, 2008). What has been, however, largely ignored so far are 
systematic discursive attacks on the legitimacy of stakeholders and the master frames that 
are behind them. My findings show that managers and other interested stakeholders 
through their adversarial framing were actively involved in the discursive construction of 
the ‘dangerous stakeholder’ (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997) which the authors describe as 
powerful and with urgent claims but lacking legitimacy or societal acceptance. The authors 
further describe the coercive tactics used by dangerous stakeholders and list employee 
sabotage and some tactics of environmental activists in the same sentence with “religious 
or political terrorists using bombings, shootings, or kidnappings to call attention to their 
claims” (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997: 877). The authors recommend that firms identify 
such stakeholders and take measures to prepare for their actions while denying them any 
form of acknowledgement so as not to encourage similar behavior. There is no mention, 
however, of the possibility that managers and other stakeholders might be involved in 
discursive attacks on stakeholder legitimacy and that this might actually result in the 
choice of more radical tactics to regain salience.  
I also contribute to the literature through my emphasis on the role also of other pro-
project stakeholders. The narrative and quotes show the important role of local police and 
pro-corporate community members or local business men in social movement repression. 
Local actors who stand to benefit from a contested corporate project might not own a 
powerful voice themselves to attack the legitimacy of protesters but do contribute to the 
discourse, and, more importantly, seem to draw on discursive templates provided by 
corporate and government elites to justify repressive and violent activities against 
movement actors.  
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The implication of this is simple: corporate social responsibility is not enough if 
corporate managers at the same time contribute to a discourse that has real and  harmful 
effects on grassroots movement members. Currently, it seems that Vedanta has decoupled 
their CSR from what I would call their 'discursive responsibility' - the responsibility to not 
contribute to violence by sponsoring powerful frames that delegitimize large parts of their 
local community stakeholders and provide legitimizing templates for violent local actors. It 
has been argued that corporations frame the environment for their employees (Kaplan, 
2008). I would argue that they also frame it for other project stakeholders like local 
business owners, community members hoping for employment and others that hope to 
benefit from the establishment of the mine. Given the emblematic nature of the Niyamgiri 
conflict and the high media attention, I argue that press releases and public statements by 
managers and politicians that frame the resistance movement as criminal and/or caused by 
outsiders will not only have implications for the conflict at hand but rather provide 
templates for future discourses for actors in similar conflicts through the process of 
discursive institutionalization. Frames matter for public opinion formation and influence 
the attitudes and behaviors of audiences, especially when they are communicated by 
corporate or governmental elites (Chong & Druckman, 2007) that engage in framing with 
the goal to influence how other actors think about an issue (Scheufele & Scheufele, 2013). 
If “(multinational) corporations - and other private actors - are not just players within the 
game, but also and increasingly are taking part in creating and enforcing the global rules of 
the game” (van Oosterhout 2010: 257), what does the present case tell us about the rules 
Vedanta is contributing to set for multinationals operating in contexts of violent conflict 
between the state and its citizens? The high expectations towards corporations as key 
players in the creation of peace and economic stability in conflict settings (Davis, 2013; 
Haufler, 2010; Kolk & Lenfant, 2012; Oetzel, Getz & Ladek, 2007) that are also reflected 
in the Indian government's anti-Maoist policy are questioned by my findings that connect 
corporate actors to frames that contribute to conflict at the local level. More research needs 
to be done on the connection between elite frames of protest and the emergence and 
activities of grassroots astroturf or counter-movement activities (see Shriver et al., 2012 for 
an overview). While corporate managers usually claim to be unrelated to local eruptions of 
violence in which anti-corporate activists are threatened and even killed, others have 
argued that such grassroots activities are just manifestations of elite ‘discursive 
obstruction’ (Shriver et al., 2012). Future research could try to link such findings to critical 
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discussions of the meaning and nature of corporate social responsibility (Banerjee, 2008). 
Before discussing further ideas for future research on this topic, I now examine the 
practical implications of my findings. 
5.8.5 Practical implications 
My goal was it not only to contribute to the theory on delegitimation through 
adversarial framing but also to point to the effects of such delegitimation for anti-corporate 
movements. The narrative connects the framing of the Niyamgiri movement as supported 
by outsiders and run with the involvement of criminals or terrorists to the legitimization of 
two forms of movement repression: overt violent action against 'outsiders' and the control 
of 'terrorists' by national level forces. Armed police forces created an atmosphere of fear 
among locals through search operations, surveillance, random arrests, and firing of bullets 
into the air and on people. According to activists, normal community life in Niyamgiri was 
severely hampered as a result which put an additional strain on the already distressed local 
population. Also international social movement activists and NGO members were affected 
by repression, albeit less strongly.  
While company officials claimed to wait impartially for a solution to the conflict, a 
closer examination of the empirical material lends itself to an alternative interpretation. 
Clear parallels emerge from our narrative: managers’ outsider and criminal framing and the 
publicly expressed wish for curbing the activities of outside instigators coincides with the 
actual repression of NGOs and attacks on local activists by local authorities and more 
radical local groups supportive of mining. I argue that managers' framing of the resistance 
provided legitimation and templates to violent pro-company grassroots groups and 
encouraged them to take action. The discourse and framing of managers and high ranking 
government officials is especially influential as it is more likely taken up by the mass 
media (Chong & Druckman, 2007) to publicly justify the overt control of protest and also 
provides framing templates and legitimation for violence by local pro mining groups. It 
moreover seems that direct logistic support was given by Vedanta to pro-corporate groups 
and the military that resulted in violence against movement members. This is consistent 
with other findings from comparable cases in India that connect mining companies to the 
activities of corporate-sponsored militia to clear land for mineral exploitation and even 
report the corporate sponsoring of Maoist rebels for the same effect (Miklian 2012). The 
extension of the anti-Maoist military operations to curb local movement activity in 
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Niyamgiri also created fears in other protest regions. After large sections of the Saranda 
forest had been leased to several mining companies against the will of the local population, 
an observer explained the “eerie silence” in the tribal villages: “To protest would be at the 
risk of being called a Maoist.” (Bera, 2012). 
In summary, even though managers denied involvement in violent activities, their 
framing of events can be related to grassroots movement repression by other supportive 
actors. My findings therefore contribute to claims that framing paves the way for violent 
repression of peaceful movements (Shriver et al., 2012). Especially in explosive contexts 
like Niyamgiri, where frustrations with past and current politics and the wish for 
emancipation from quasi-feudal landholding patterns in tribal regions clashes with the 
minerals-driven developmental dreams of governments and the hybris of multinational 
corporations to be able to deliver to these the terrorist frame is a powerful tool to move the 
control of social movements from the local to the national level, from the police to the 
military.  
An open question remains whether this clash contributes to movement radicalization. 
Attempts at explaining why people in the Red Corridor sympathize with the Maoists do 
cite atrocities committed during industrialization next to other economic and political 
reasons (Miklian, 2012). Our findings support the idea that being identified as a Maoist or 
sympathizer is a severe threat to individuals, families and entire villages in the states of the 
Red Corridor. Especially in the course of so-called ‘combing operations,’ villagers are 
beaten, arbitrarily arrested and detained, tortured and sometimes killed, women sexually 
abused, entire villages burnt down, and crops destroyed {Kashyap 2008}. Given such 
atrocities, many Maoist recruits are motivated by a desire for revenge or justice after 
experiencing violence by police or armed forces, often in the context of the takeover of 
land for the establishment of mining or other industrial ventures (Padel, 2014). It is the 
lack of de facto citizen rights and voice of affected communities to influence political 
decisions that affect their lives (Banerjee, 2011) that are a key motivator for sympathy with 
the Maoists who claim to revise caste, gender and quasi-feudal relationships that cause 
widespread exploitation of the rural population and seem to provide a way out of injustice, 
corruption and the growing socio-economic gap between urban elites and the rural 
population result in alienation from traditional politics (Guha, 2007; Shah & Pettigrew, 
2009). Additionally, a recent ideological shift among the former elite Maoist militia seems 
to have increased its grassroots and mass orientation through an emphasis on social justice 
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and the shared grievances of India’s poor as a uniting force (Harriss, 2011; Mahadevan, 
2012). Although criticized as a benign mask behind which the rebels continue to follow 
their ultimate goal of seizing state power through a people’s war (Pradhan, 2009), this re-
focussing on mass organization around a pro-poor participatory development frame 
together with the tangible security and development benefits for poor communities in 
Maoist ‘liberated zones’ (Roy, 2009) seems to result in a new closeness between Maoists 
and social movements against large-scale industrial projects that mobilize large sections of 
the rural Indian population whose livelihoods are threatened (Shah & Pettigrew, 2009). It 
is, however, also clear that Maoists resist mining ventures out of their own strategic 
motivations in order to strengthen their ranks (Padel, 2014: 7) and counteract infrastructure 
development that threatens their remote hideouts. It appears that the Maoists do not oppose 
mining per se as they have supported mineral exploitation in other places and depend on 
the mining industry for access to explosives and as a source of finance (Miklian, 2012; 
Padel, 2014).  
Confounding local resistance movements with Maoist rebels and applying the terrorism 
frame therefore seems counter-productive for several reasons. First, because of the direct 
negative effects of anti-Maoist militarization on the local population that is likely to result 
in increased sympathy for the Maoists and bears the potential of radicalization. While 
repression and the policing of protest have been shown to discourage the mainstream of 
peaceful protesters, a counter-effect can be observed for more radical and ideologically 
motivated segments of social movements (Della Porta, 1995). Repression might increase 
movement legitimacy and delivers templates for ‘injustice’ and ‘repressive state’ frames 
that strengthen the morale of already radical movement sections and are likely to result in 
“spirals of violent action-reaction” (Della Porta & Fillieule, 2004: 234; Jenkins, Jacobs & 
Agnone, 2003; Olzak & Olivier, 1998) rather than a solution of the conflict. Movement 
actors have realized the risk of the Maoist frame and actively counter it in their 
communication and discourse, however, as others have argued, unwanted support is hard to 
deflect and “An individual approved by communists is assumed to have sympathy with 
those who cheer.” (Fine, 2006: 414). 
Second, applying an anti-terrorism discourse on social movements turns the conflict 
between mine opponents and supporters into one of national security where collective 
survival can only be assured by countering terrorism with violent means. Similar to war 
rhetoric, the conflict becomes one about winning rather than about finding a solution 
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(Staun, 2010) and is thus highly unproductive. Persistent violent conflicts around separatist 
movements all over the world support the argument that the short term gains from framing 
such protest as terrorist, mainly public support, do not outweigh the long-term violence 
that is evoked (Pokalova, 2010). 
The findings suggest a strong belief on behalf of managers and government officials in 
minerals-based development as a cure for poverty and also for pro-Maoist sentiments that 
were assumed to be a direct result of the poor living conditions in remote rural regions. 
The Vedanta leadership expected that their venture to be able to achieve what decades of 
state- and NGO-driven development efforts had not been able to: eliminate poverty in 
Niyamgiri, one of the poorest regions within one of the poorest among all Indian states and 
over 1.3 Million inhabitants. It is unclear whether or how Vedanta’s mining venture would 
be different from other large-scale mining activities in Orissa and neighboring states that 
have so far not led to the promised economic development across all segments of society 
and whose benefits traditionally passed by especially tribal and other disadvantaged groups 
(Actionaid, 2008; Bhushan, 2008). Even a brief examination of Vedanta’s CSR activities – 
be it lunch for child care centers or settlement agreements with affected communities – 
delivers enough reasons for skepticism (see e.g. Amnesty International 2010 & 2012 for a 
more detailed review). The child care centers that Vedanta co-manages with the 
government are one of its most promoted CSR measures. Observers have expressed doubts 
about their benefits, arguing that “Vedanta’s contribution is only peanuts, literally and 
figuratively both.” after finding that children received only flattened rice with ground 
peanuts – both of questionable nutritious value (Mohanty, 2011). Vedanta's community 
settlements forbid signatory communities to criticize corporate activities now and in the 
future and demand cooperation in all aspects in exchange for CSR benefits and therefore 
seem to support paternalistic and quasi-feudal dependencies (Ramanathan, 2010) that 
motivate people to join the Maoists. Stakeholder engagement for Vedanta seems only 
possible with citizens that sign away their citizen rights.  
 It moreover seems unlikely that industrialization projects that are implemented by 
military means, even if they might generate economic gains for some, will contribute to 
more democratic and less radical sentiments among the population. Where the executive 
sides with corporations and appears unable - or unwilling - to distinguish members of local 
resistance movements from actual Maoists, little reduction of radical sentiments can be 
expected and accusations that the Indian government abuses its anti-Maoist offensive to 
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clear mineral rich land and forests from their inhabitants (Padel, 2014; Roy, 2009) will 
thrive. Other examples support such arguments and highlight that Niyamgiri is not a single 
case. 
In 2011, the government intensified anti-Maoist operations in the then Maoist 
controlled Saranda forest at the borders of Jharkhand, Orissa and Chhattisgarh. Similarly to 
the events described in my narrative, CRPF forces were stationed in the region and 
combing operations conducted in order to drive out and arrest alleged Maoist rebels and 
discourage their local support base. After the successful end of the anti-Maoist operation, a 
regional development plan was launched that, according to Rural Development Minister 
Jairam Ramesh, was supposed to benefit the mainly tribal population through 
infrastructure development. Until summer 2013 nothing much happened in this regard until 
the news broke that 19 new plots within the forest had been licensed to Jindal and other 
iron ore mining companies (Goswami, 2013; Kumar, 2013). While the Minister had 
initially demanded “a gap of 10 years” to allow the local population to recover and develop 
the qualifications to benefit from future mining (Yadav, 2013), it appears that this period 
will be cut short considerably.  
The last practical implication I want to discuss here is tensions within the movement 
itself that resulted from the adversarial framing of proponents of the Vedanta project. We 
have pointed to changing constellations and tensions within the anti-mining movement 
before (Kraemer et al., 2013) and it seems that these are amplified by the adversarial 
framing of the movement by its opponents. The outsider framing contributes to a 
widespread criticism of foreign NGOs as dominated by foreign interests that is also 
prevalent amongst some Indian activists. Added to this was the risk of being branded a 
Maoist supporter which posed an additional threat to NGOs that supported the Niyamgiri 
movement. My findings show that most likely due to fears of being shut down by the 
government, some NGO representatives felt that they had to distance themselves and their 
organization from the rest of the movement and painfully avoided any association with 
alleged Maoists. This is not surprising in a context where NGO legislation has been 
applied to repress critical civil society organizations (Kamat 2002). Mine proponents' 
adversarial framing thus potentially contributed to the deepening of pre-existing tensions 
and divisions within the movement. These findings also point to the need for a more 
nuanced perspective on the potential of transnational mobilization. It seems that the 
outsider adversarial frame is being applied in several countries around the world to deflect 
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resistance movements that are externally supported and that especially in countries with a 
colonial past it falls on fertile ground and has the potential to exacerbate conflicts within 
movements. This highlights once more the importance of existing national advocacy 
networks (Kraemer et al., 2013) and their role in developing a strong local base for 
resistance movements that cannot be dismissed as externally caused.  
5.8.6 Limitations and future research 
First of all, the main limitation of this study is its case-based nature that does not allow 
for generalizations beyond the Niyamgiri protest. I have argued above that there is reason 
to assume that the outsider and criminal master frame will be applied also in other contexts 
and the literature review above suggests the same. However, there is ample room for future 
studies to prove this assumption in different contexts and across a variety of contested 
corporate ventures and to theorize potential other master frames that I might have 
overlooked.   
One of the contributions of this study was that it examined the adversarial framing of a 
wider group of mine supporters instead of only looking at the framing contest between the 
corporation and opposing stakeholders. While this is a first step towards a more full 
examination of conflicts around corporate projects, one of the main limitations of my study 
is a lack of attention to dynamics within this group of project supporters. Future studies 
should delve more deeply into this topic and examine whether there are differences in the 
type of master frame that particular groups (e.g. politicians vs. managers) typically draw 
on, what the interactions and diffusion processes (Benford & Snow, 2000; Campbell, 2005) 
are and how they are turned into core action frames (Derry & Waikar, 2008). With respect 
to interactions Earl (2006) for example argues that distant actors like politicians shape the 
conditions in which those at the front lines (e.g. the police) operate in for example setting 
the overall tone that either allows or condemns violent repression of social movements. In 
terms of diffusion, it would be interesting to examine how adversarial framing moves 
across sites within India and transnationally and to unpack in detail “what this process 
looks like” (Campbell, 2005). It would further be interesting examine in more detail 
whether particularly those movements that receive transnational support are the target of 
the outsider frame or whether it is equally applied to national level activists that come to 
support local movements.  
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It is very well possible that frames fail and do not yield the desired outcomes (Benford 
& Snow, 2000). One limitation of this study therefore is that I did not systematically 
connect adversarial framing to outcome variables such as the publicly perceived legitimacy 
of the movement or movement repression. The narrative suggests that there were 
considerable negative effects from Maoist framing for local communities and tribal 
activists and that also the outsider frame had an impact on attacks on the freedom of 
movement of NGO staff and foreign activists. Moreover, the framing activities of project 
supporters apparently were serious enough for social movement actors to react with 
distancing - one of five reframing tactics that have been theorized in social movement 
literature (Benford & Hunt, 2003). Members of the local movement and the supporting 
national advocacy network went at great length to distance the movement against Vedanta 
from Maoist activities and reject this dangerous label. However, future studies could link 
framing activities more directly to outcomes like public perceptions of the movement and 
potential impacts of criminal/terrorist frame on the acceptance of social movement 
repression. With respect to the general public’s perception of and solidarity towards a 
movement, it is assumed that the outsider and criminal framing can erode a movement’s 
cognitive legitimacy base by reducing its comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness 
(Suchman, 1995). The existing social movement literature provides inspiration for how to 
study framing of anti-corporate protesters more broadly. For example, Cress & Snow’s 
(2000) qualitative comparative analysis of the impact that framing and other organizational 
and context factors have on outcome variables could be a great model for future studies of 
reactions to anti-corporate protest and their effects. 
More attention should also be paid to the reframing processes in response to outsider 
and criminal framing. Future studies could also examine how exhaustive the outsider and 
criminal master frames are in terms of describing the framing of corporate actors and their 
supporters and under what conditions or in which contexts around the globe they are 
applied during framing contests between corporations and their stakeholders. Findings 
from the anti-globalization movement suggest that anti-corporate protest around the world 
is at risk of being repressed as left radicals also in other, comparable, contexts where the 
symbol of left radicalism is culturally available (Williams, 2004). 
Of course, our findings could be dismissed as a single case, other reports from around 
Orissa and neighboring states, however, suggest differently. The POSCO plant as well as 
another bauxite mining project in the Gandhamardan mountains of Orissa also seem to face 
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a similar combination of criminalization and outsider framing (Miklian, 2012; Pradhan, 
2013).  our goal was it to present a more nuanced perspective on the situation of grassroots 
activists that are sandwiched between the promises of radical left groups, the violence 
associated with the government’s anti-Maoist fight and the threat of losing their lands and 
livelihoods to mining corporations. The fact that the villagers of Niyamgiri - against the 
call of Maoists to boycott these - recently attended the village meetings to decide about the 
future of Vedanta’s mine, speaks for their willingness and ability to make use of 
democratic means to defend their rights if given the chance. 
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
I will open this chapter with a summary of the papers presented in chapters three, four 
and five and then discuss them in more detail. Connecting the dots between the papers, I 
reason how the initial focus on CSR and international business, immanent in chapter three, 
shifted towards a more grassroots approach to studying resistance against corporations in 
chapters four and five. Then, I discuss the theoretical and practical conclusions of my work 
and suggest promising areas for future research.  
I conclude this dissertation with an epilogue in chapter seven to update the interested 
reader about the current situation in Niyamgiri. Posing the question 'Now what?', I discuss 
a potential avenue for supporting distressed communities beyond transnational and 
translocal advocacy.  
6.1 Summary 
6.1.1 A license to operate for the extractive industries? 
The first paper, A license to operate for the extractive industries? Operationalizing 
stakeholder thinking in international business, departs from a couple of emblematic 
examples of stakeholder protest and sabotage to highlight the power of stakeholders to 
influence the location decisions and economic success of extractive industry projects. Van 
Tulder and I argue that the traditional international business literature has largely ignored 
managers' practical need to obtain a license to operate (LtO) that is evident from 
managerial discourse especially in this contested industry.  
Our goal in the paper is twofold: First, we develop a more thorough theoretical concept 
based on practitioner notions of the LtO and a synthesis of the existing literature on the 
topic. Second, we discuss this multilevel LtO definition in the light of the existing 
international business literature and argue that traditional ideas about multinationals' need 
for local adaptation require updating, given the increased influence of local stakeholder 
protest.  
Based on practitioner definitions of the LtO and existing literature we conceptualize the 
LtO on three interconnected albeit distinct levels: social/local, legal/national and societal/
global and discuss these for the extractive industry. We distinguish the general level of 
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societal acceptance for EI operations that might be influenced by highly publicized 
disasters such as the Deepwater Horizon accident, from legal permissions for specific 
resource extraction projects granted by host country governments and the local acceptance 
of such operations by the affected communities. While these three levels would ideally all 
be positively aligned for a risk-free operating environment, in practice there often is a stark 
disconnect. This might mean that while there is strong governmental support for a mining 
project, the local communities might strongly resist it. Our multilevel conception of the 
LtO therefore helps to clarify the level at which a license has been granted or not.    
In international business, the concepts of local responsiveness and embeddedness are 
widely used to describe how multinationals respond to the pressures they face when 
operating across different contexts. The integration-responsiveness grid (Ghoshal & Noria, 
1989) maps firms and specific industries depending on their need for local responsiveness 
at subsidiary level on the one, and pressures for global integration and efficiency on the 
other axis. Drawing on the discussion around the LtO, we upgrade the local responsiveness 
axis to emphasize pressures for responsibility to local community demands. The pressure 
for local responsiveness has influenced strategic positioning and product development in 
industries like professional services and specific consumer goods that depend heavily on 
local context factors and regionally different tastes. While important, these considerations 
ignore other local pressures that emerge when corporations infringe on the land and 
resources of local communities with their operations. We show that, when mapped on such 
an integration - local responsibility grid, a different pattern emerges where the local license 
to operate is a central factor for some companies - especially those in the extractive 
business. The classic notion of the extractive industry as high in integration and low in 
responsiveness in the traditional I-R grid therefore belies the reality of local resistance and 
the need to respond to pressures that extractive firms face on the ground. When mapped on 
our integration - responsibility grid, a more nuanced consideration of highly invasive 
upstream extractive industry production (high need for local responsibility) on the one and 
downstream selling of e.g. petrol (low local responsibility) on the other hand emerges.  
The paper thus highlights how traditional international business theories largely ignore 
local stakeholder pressures that have the potential to considerably affect the success of 
multinationals' operations. It also shows how industry practitioners have reacted to this 
with a discourse about the need to obtain a 'license to operate' which drives CSR activities 
in the extractive industry today. What this paper leaves unanswered, however, is how local 
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protest might gain a threatening relevance for the corporation. What are the grassroots 
interactions that result in (trans)local protest strong enough to extract acts of 'local 
responsiveness' from the corporation? What is the nature of these corporate responses in 
such a contested environment? The two papers that follow try to shed some light on these 
questions.   
6.1.2 Conflict and astroturfing in Niyamgiri 
In the second paper, Conflict and astroturfing in Niyamgiri: The importance of national 
advocacy networks in anti-corporate movements, published together with Gail Whiteman 
and Bobby Banerjee, we develop a process theory of interactions between local, national 
and international actors in transnational advocacy networks (TANs). Based on a narrative 
about the rise and defection of a young tribal man - a temporarily central figure in the 
mobilization against Vedanta's mine - we highlight the often conflictual interactions among 
actors within TANs and point to the importance of national advocacy networks which we 
refer to as NANs.  
Our findings show the heterogeneity of national level conditions under which social 
movements might seek transnational support. Based on our findings for the Indian context, 
with its strong civil society and long history of social movements (Ray & Katzenstein, 
2005), we argue that under certain conditions transnational advocacy might be perceived as 
an additional avenue of support rather than the only option for social movements to 
influence power-holders. The traditional perception of TANs (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) does 
not account for such situations, which is why we suggest an extended model that captures 
the potential for a coexistence of national-level and transnational advocacy. This model 
also includes a larger diversity of actors than just domestic NGOs who are active in these 
NANs and involved in the establishment of TANs.  
NAN activists approach international advocacy organizations for support and connect 
them to local movement actors. They provide logistic support and are active 
communicators and 'information hubs' where news about local events flow together, are 
cross-checked and turned into material that can also be used by transnational campaigners. 
Most importantly, NAN activists also work to achieve national policy change, for example 
by embedding individual local movements into the national social movement landscape 
and supporting them in taking legal action at the national level.  
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Our narrative and longitudinal study of the Niyamgiri movement show that NAN actors 
are more than actors in the 'periphery' of the world system (Smith, 2004) who are in need 
of support, know-how and leverage provided by transnational NGOs from the 'core' 
countries. We challenge such traditional perspectives on transnational mobilization and 
point to the complex and often conflictual interactions among local, national and 
transnational movement actors. Our examination of the meso-level interactions between 
NAN activists and international advocacy organizations over time challenges the idea of 
anti-corporate movements as a unified front opposing the corporation. We uncover a much 
more nuanced and complex picture of power play, collaboration, and conflict and 
contribute to a more critical appraisal of the interactions in and benefits of TANs (Bob, 
2005; Holzscheiter, 2011; Jordan & van Tuijl, 2000; Rodrigues, 2011; Smith, 2004). We 
identify internationalization and localization as two central processes in transnational anti-
corporate movements that recursively interact under the influence of a third central 
process, counter-movement activities by pro-mining actors. Both, internationalization and 
localization are characterized by the mechanisms of scale shift, brokerage, recruitment and 
publicity. For counter-organizing we identify and explain strategic adaptation, lobbying, 
elite co-optation and CSR/publicity as central mechanisms.    
Mechanisms such as brokerage and elite co-optation/defection also by less organized 
individuals therefore can be seen as the microfoundation of transnational campaigns. The 
management and organization literature, however, almost exclusively focuses on broadly 
defined categories such as 'NGOs' or even more general 'stakeholders' when looking at the 
actors in and tactics of anti-corporate movements (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; den Hond 
& de Bakker, 2012; Doh & Teegen, 2003; Yaziji & Doh, 2010). Our findings draw 
attention to the important role of loosely organized and networked individual activists 
without or with several organizational memberships in constructing and maintaining 
transnational and national level resistance networks. In doing so, we shift attention from 
the study of organizations and their tactics to the process of organizing and the 
idiosyncratic decisions and circumstances that influence it. Examples for such decisions 
and influences are the personal network of a UK citizen who lived and worked in Orissa 
that came handy when a local movement tried to gain international support or the decision 
of a young tribal leader, under the influence of pro-corporate individuals, to put his own 
education first rather than continuing to fight for his community. Such characteristics and 
individual decisions represent crucial nodes in the organizing process and future studies 
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should pay more attention to the interactions and microdynamics that are crucial for the 
course and success of these movements.  
Finally, our findings also show that corporations are not passive targets of anti-
corporate mobilization. Counter-movement activities conducted by or in the name of the 
corporation can have a big influence on anti-corporate movements. Our narrative mainly 
illustrates corporate counter-mobilization through co-optation. Jika, a young tribal leader 
who, supported by national and local level activists, had played an important role in the 
Niyamgiri resistance movement as a community mobilizer, spokesperson and guide for 
national and foreign movement supporters was co-opted by Vedanta personnel and other 
movement supporters until he publicly announced his support for the mining venture in a 
youtube video. Other mechanisms like CSR/publicity, lobbying and strategic adaptation, as 
expressed for example in the increased use of youtube videos by Vedanta in response to 
activists' protest videos are only explored in passing and should be examined in more detail 
in future studies. 
This second paper emphasizes the role of more and less organized corporate and non-
corporate actors also in counter-mobilization. Much of the counter-organizing that 
happened in support of Vedanta's mine was not directly authorized or ordered by Vedanta 
managers but happened within a more broadly defined pro-Vedanta counter-movement 
space that comprised Vedanta managers, local business men, co-opted community 
members and former resistance activists, and even local politicians and potentially some 
journalists. The third and final paper examines the discursive processes that create the 
precondition and discursive environment for these coalitions to form and to justify their 
activities. 
6.1.3 Outside instigators and criminals 
The final solo-authored paper in this dissertation, Outside instigators and criminals: 
Legitimacy attacks on anti-corporate protesters through adversarial framing, examines 
how supporters of the Niyamgiri mining project framed their adversaries.  
I begin the paper by pointing to the diversity of public and private entities that might 
support a large scale industrial project such as the Niyamgiri mine and attached refinery 
(Aaltonen, 2013). While Aaltonen (2013) focused on how these entities try to establish the 
legitimacy of a project, Based on the literature on framing contests and adversarial framing 
(Benford & Snow, 2000; Guérard, Bode & Gustafsson, 2013; Kaplan, 2008), I highlight 
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the potential for using another strategy to push such a contested project ahead by 
weakening the resistance against it: legitimacy attacks on those who challenge the 
legitimacy of the project and argue that this is an understudied topic in the management 
and organization studies.  
Based on the literature, I outline two master frames that seem to find widespread 
application across a range of movements in different locations: the outsider and the 
criminal master frame. These frames seem to be widely used by those in power to defend 
their position when they are under attack and can also be identified in the empirical 
material of discourse around the contested Niyamgiri mine. Moreover, given the context of 
the Indian government's fight against Maoists in which the struggle about mining in 
Niyamgiri is set, it appears that the criminal master frame is extended to a terrorist frame 
that delegitimizes mining opponents by branding them as Maoists. This practice has 
serious implications for activists and communities in Niyamgiri as my narrative shows. 
The paper again highlights the importance of corporate non-market strategies at the 
grassroots level (Walker, 2009, 2012) that we have already pointed to in chapter four. It 
contributes to the literature that examines discursive processes between corporations and 
their societal environment (Calton & Payne, 2003; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003) in three 
ways. First by removing the corporate-centric perspective and developing a vocabulary for 
the way in which managers and other supporters of a corporate project frame their 
adversaries. Second, by broadening the view on a broader alliance of pro-corporate actors 
who discursively delegitimize anti-corporate protest. And, finally, by spelling out the 
effects that such adversarial framing has for its social movement targets. I also discuss 
whether such adversarial framing has the potential to contribute to the emergence of 
'dangerous stakeholders' who”lack legitimacy but possess power and urgency with 
negative consequences for community stakeholders and the corporation. 
6.2 Discussion 
Below, I jointly discuss the three papers of which the first one is a theoretical piece, 
written at a time when neither the emerging themes of the later two papers nor the 
methodological focus of the empirical part of this dissertation were clear. First (6.2.1), I 
apply the LtO concept to the case study of Vedanta in Niyamgiri and point to the transient 
nature of the concept that makes corporate claims to having (permanently) obtained the 
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LtO questionable. The multilevel concept of the LtO, however, is valuable in that it allows 
for a joint discussion of the interplay of local, national and global responsibilities that 
influence the local operations of multinational corporations. I then discuss three trends in 
section 6.2.2 that will only result in a higher need for extractive industry corporations to 
add local responsibilities to their internationalization plans. In the third section of the 
discussion (6.2.3), I take a more critical perspective and question the meaning of the LtO 
for the day-to-day decision making of managers in the extractive industry and highlight its 
theoretical limits. Sections four and five of this discussion return to chapters four and five, 
respectively, and draw a more detailed image of the grassroots processes underlying 
transnational advocacy as well as the organizing and counter-organizing between 
opponents and proponents of a contested corporate project. 
6.2.1 A license to operate for Vedanta?  
Vedanta's contested mine in Niyamgiri is a prime example for the kinds of conflicts that 
motivated the writing of chapter three on the license to operate. Practitioners in 
multinational enterprises and CSR professionals invented the LtO discourse as a reaction 
to the local pressures and transnational campaigns they were facing but the theoretical 
literature on international business strategy and influences on the location decisions of 
MNEs fell behind in terms of theorizing the stakeholder pressures that influence 
(re)location decisions, the financial viability of projects and the reputation of multinational 
operations.  
The Vedanta case clearly shows the relevance of our multi-level conceptualization of 
the LtO. Albeit the legal license for operating a mine in Niyamgiri had long been granted 
to the corporation, it was unable to establish this mine for the lack of a local license to 
operate. Moreover, an international campaign had formed that promoted the Niyamgiri 
case to attack the overall legitimacy of extractive industry operations on indigenous 
peoples' ancestral land. Figure 13 below shows the application of our multilevel model to 
the Vedanta case and highlights the interrelations between the three levels as well as the 
order in which the different licenses became relevant in this particular case because they 
were granted to the company or challenged.  
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Figure 13: Multilevel LtO, Vedanta in Niyamgiri
Our example points to the dynamic nature of the LtO and the importance of all three
levels for the implementation of a local operation. In the end, Vedanta was unable to 
achieve an LtO at all levels at any point in time. Following strong civil society opposition 
in India and later also in the UK, as well as a law suit in the Indian Supreme Court, 
Vedanta lost the legal license it had initially been granted by the Orissa government. It
appears that the perception of an LtO can only ever be a snapshot, a fragile state, easily 
interrupted at any point in time by challenges at the local, national or global level.          
The transient nature of the LtO questions its usefulness for practitioners. Claims to 
having 'obtained' an LtO are inadequate and fail to grant legitimacy to a project contrary to 
the apparent hopes among practitioners. However, our attempt to focus attention on the
local responsibilities and not only the local responsiveness of corporations is relevant and 
not only for the minerals and oil industry. Also other resource intensive or otherwise
locally invasive industries like agriculture and food & beverage production have to 
navigate the challenges of governmental approval coupled with grassroots resistance
against their invasive operations. The example of protests against Coca-Cola's plant in 
Kerala, India show how quickly a lack of local responsiveness can result in a threat to the
local license to operate, as well as high financial and reputational costs. I will therefore
discuss local responsibilities as a key challenge for extractive industry operations in more
detail below. 
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6.2.2 Local responsibilities as a key challenge for extractive industry operations 
Our second goal in chapter three was to expand the international business literature to 
pay attention to local factors other than culture and market preferences that influence 
localization decisions and the balance between global integration and local responsiveness. 
Traditionally, the extractive industry is seen as highly integrated with an emphasis on 
standard operations and products across the globe and little relevance of the local context 
in shaping operations (Ghoshal & Noria, 1989). We criticize this perspective, arguing that 
local responsibility should be added to the rather narrow consideration of the 
responsiveness to local markets.  
While it is true that vertically integrated upstream oil and mining majors have little 
need to be responsive to local market needs, many examples show that their extractive 
operations are prone to fail if corporations do not take responsibility for their impacts on 
affected communities. Given the high business risk emanating from local resistance, 
especially in the extractive industry, and the resulting relevance of the license to operate 
discourse among practitioners, we argue that it is high time to also introduce the idea of 
local responsibility to the international business strategy literature.  
Traditionally, extractive industry multinationals' localization decisions are based on the 
availability of natural resources and negotiations with host country governments (see 
Kraemer & van Tulder, 2007). We add the ability for exercising local responsibility to such 
considerations and draw on the LtO discourse to argue that managers have realized this 
need - at least rhetorically. We argue that embedding an extractive industry operation into 
the local context and safeguard operations by establishing good community relationships is 
a much needed capability that requires a higher level of local responsiveness than the 
traditional integration-responsiveness grid suggests.  
Three trends support this argument. First, extractive industry corporations increasingly 
need to move into remote frontier zones that are often inhabited by indigenous peoples to 
find exploitable reserves (Coumans, 2008). In the past two decades, awareness about the 
negative impact of resource extraction on indigenous peoples has been growing. Activists 
and policymakers around the world foster the right of indigenous peoples to determine 
what happens on their ancestral land. And while many laws, such as the right to Free Prior 
Informed Consent to resource extraction granted by the Philippines' Constitution, currently 
lack proper implementation (e.g. Minter et al. 2012), a host of organized advocates is 
active to support individual communities and push for implementation. Moreover, given 
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the globalization of information and the activities of internationally networked activists, 
the likelihood that individual cases of local community resistance receive global attention 
and support is likely to rise. 
Second, rising resource prices and new extraction techniques like fracking make it 
economically viable to exploit so far untapped reserves - also in the developed world. This 
has resulted in a new wave of local resistance movements against fracking but also against 
coal mining in countries like Germany, the US or the UK. These movements challenge the 
industry and the ruling parties mainly over environmental concerns and it is yet to be seen 
in how far they might connect to other local resistance movements worldwide to form a 
broad coalition against resource extraction that would further challenge the overall 
legitimacy (or global LtO) of this contested industry. What is clear, however, is that more 
broadly stakeholder sensitivity to environmental, social and ethical considerations has been 
growing (Du et al. 2011) and that, despite their claims to CSR, the extractive industry is at 
the receiving end of resistance emerging from this growing awareness locally and 
internationally.  
The final trend is what Scherer & Palazzo (2011) call the emergence of 'political CSR' 
where corporations contribute to the provision of public goods and influence global 
regulation of the role of business in society. Especially in an already contested industry like 
the extractive sector that is operating in locales where nation states have little influence, do 
not provide basic services to the population, and where a law enforcement is weak, 
corporations cannot rely on the national rules of the game as a source of legitimacy. Given 
the overall erosion of pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy, so the authors argue, Suchman's 
(1995) third form of legitimacy, moral legitimacy, becomes more important. Moral 
legitimacy, "moral judgments about the corporation's output, procedures, structures, and 
leaders" is discursively constructed between the corporation and its "relevant 
publics" (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011: 916 ).    
The above discussion suggests that multinational corporations in the mining and oil 
industry face many pressures for local responsibility and that the relevance of such 
responsibilities has been largely ignored in international business (but see Kolk & van 
Tulder, 2010). While national level influences on the CSR activities of multinational firms 
have been studied and compared extensively (see Fransen 2013 for an overview), we still 
know very little about how multinationals might negotiate tensions between the different 
contexts in which they operate (but see Pinkse, Kuss & Hoffmann, 2010) and whether and 
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how multinationals' standardized codes of conduct and claims to CSR are applied on the 
ground in an attempt to establish moral legitimacy that Scherer & Palazzo (2011) discuss 
as a key ingredient of the license to operate.  
Our multilevel conceptualization of the LtO is an attempt to start bringing together 
considerations about the legitimacy of contested industries like the extractive sector (global 
license), with the difficulty of complying with national level political economic structures 
and navigating negotiations with host country governments (national license), and finally 
the growing need for multinationals to establish the moral legitimacy of their operations 
among local community stakeholders and their international supporters (local license). 
Bringing together these three levels of engagement in one concept, we go beyond narrow 
managerial definitions of the LtO and present a starting point for a more fundamental 
discussion about the various responsibilities multinationals need to juggle when 
establishing local operations. However, this first paper can also be criticized as overly 
optimistic about the ability to establish a dialogue among equals between corporations and 
local stakeholders and too ignorant of the ideology shaping the knowledge and activities of 
corporations (Kuhn & Deetz, 2008) as I will discuss in more detail below.  
6.2.3 A critical appraisal of the value of the LtO concept 
Based on our multilevel LtO concept, one could argue that the ability to engage in 
community dialogue and achieve a certain level of local situatedness is a crucial strategic 
capability that can help 21st century extractive industry firms to obtain a competitive 
advantage (McWilliams & Siegel, 2011; Porter & Kramer, 2006). We depart from the 
corporate discourse about the need for a local license and, like other scholars before us 
(e.g. Calton & Payne, 2003; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011), take a willingness among corporate 
managers to engage in a 'dialogue among equals' with their stakeholders for granted. We do 
not explore alternative, less benign, ways of obtaining this competitive advantage outside 
of the LtO concept or the relevance actually attached to this LtO in day-to-day decision 
making and corporate practices on the ground.  
For example, Calton and Payne (2003) argue that managers cannot refuse dialogue 
anymore when it comes to global concerns about human or labor rights and the 
environment. This might be true for some highly exposed Western multinationals like 
Unilever, who due to its massive impact, exposure, claims to responsibility and the public 
pressure it receives, cannot but participate in the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil. Next 
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to the fact that the relevance and impact of such high-level initiatives is debatable (Fransen 
& Kolk, 2007; Utting, 2002), as soon as we leave the level of global multi-stakeholder 
initiatives that involve the top 50 MNEs from the Western world, the prospects become 
even more bleak.  
Extractive industry companies have repeatedly shown that local values, worldviews, 
needs and expectations are rather irrelevant for their daily practice. Where ExxonMobil 
imposes a narrow definition of CSR and shows no sign of attempting to come to a shared 
definition with community stakeholders (Conley & Williams, 2005), mining companies 
impose their definition of who belongs to the local community and perceptions of what 
community stakeholders are owed (Cragg & Greenbaum, 2002). Community expectations 
to procedural justice and the different worldviews of indigenous stakeholders are largely 
ignored (see e.g. Whiteman 2009, Mander & Tauli-Corpuz, 2006). The daily reality of 
extractive industry operations is miles apart from a theoretically discussed level playing 
field or the 'reflective managerial practice' that would grant moral legitimacy to community 
stakeholders (Calton & Payne, 2003; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011).  
Moreover, the theoretical debate on these topics is skewed towards the Western 
multinational corporation. Also our conceptualization of the license to operate only makes 
sense in this context. Other corporations with large scale operations and similar challenges 
in terms of community relations, such as the many multinationals with their origins in 
emerging or developing economies that are often (partly) state-owned (such as China's big 
three: CNPC, SINOPEC, and CNOOC, Petronas from Malaysia, or Petrobras from Brazil) 
are less susceptible to reputation threats and attacks in the Western media and are 
supported by their governments in their negotiation with host countries. Our LtO model is 
therefore only applicable to a specific kind of multinational: the Western publicly traded 
multinational corporation and excludes other firms that have risen to global importance 
without finding the level of theoretical attention that their relevance would imply.  
By disseminating the CSR discourse of Western multinationals about their need to 
obtain a LtO, we are also running the risk of contributing to the 'imperialism of a Western 
CSR discourse' that lets these multinationals appear superior versus their counterparts from 
developing/transition economies (Khan & Lund-Thomsen, 2011). However, studies on the 
local impact of CSR, however, show little difference between what Western multinationals 
achieve versus for example Chinese multinationals (Hilson, 2012; Pegg, 2012). Until now 
it seems that, independent of their country of origin, multinationals have not been able to 
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tackle the real governance and human rights challenges that many resource rich countries 
face (Banerjee, 2007; Pegg, 2012; Utting 2005). Elaborating theoretical concepts like the 
LtO within a traditional and largely uncritical CSR framework does therefore little to 
challenge the ideologies, interpretitive schemata and 'imperatives' underlying actual 
corporate practice (Kuhn & Deetz, 2008).  
This is exactly the critique I faced when I first arrived in the field and discussed my 
early theoretical work with Indian activists. They kept challenging me with two questions: 
'Why take the pains of developing theory around something that does not create real 
positive impact for anyone on the ground?' and 'Where are the voices of your so-called 
stakeholders in all this theory?' These two simple questions challenged my initial 
conception of the research project and helped me to pay more attention to the doubts I 
experienced every time I was reading traditional academic work on CSR that for example 
examined the content of CSR reports.  
As a result, the two empirical papers have a strong grassroots orientation and pay 
attention to the processes of organizing and framing and their effects for actors on the 
ground,  rather than studying CSR codes of conduct, websites or reports in which natural 
resource companies speak about their alleged responsibilities vis-a-vis (imagined) 
communities. Departing from high-level theoretical discussions about an inherently 
managerial concept like the LtO, this dissertation project evolved into a study of the messy 
reality of organizing processes around a contested natural resource extraction project 
where the 'community' turned out to be a constantly changing translocal network. Focusing 
on the the perceptions and discourse of actors on both sides of the conflict, I was able to 
study the emergence, internationalization and re-localization of an anti-corporate resistance 
movement and the discourse and counter-organizing of project proponents. In doing so, I 
hope to provide a deeper insight into the challenges multinationals face on the ground, the 
complex nature of anti-corporate mobilization, and also shed some light on the discursive 
roots of social movement repression. In the following sections I discuss the two empirical 
papers (chapters four and five) in more detail. 
6.2.4 Expanding our understanding of transnational anti-corporate advocacy 
In chapter four, Kraemer, Whiteman & Banerjee highlight the agency and importance 
of a variety of more or less organized NAN actors in creating the networks and providing 
the local information and connections that are the precondition for transnational advocacy. 
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In doing so, we draw a picture of complex and often conflictual interactions in 
transnational advocacy networks that so far received little attention in the management and 
organization studies. 
It appears that transnational networks often fail to deliver their "promises of 
empowerment" and often have unwanted consequences for local activists (Rodrigues, 
2011: 3). Supporting such earlier work, the findings presented in this dissertation show the 
often complicated and changing relationships between local, national and international 
activists over time and point to the struggle between internationalization and localization 
of the movement in Niyamgiri. In the process of internationalization, the interests of 
domestic activists might be neglected or overshadowed by the needs of the fast-paced 
'international advocacy apparatus'. Transnational advocacy directed at corporations 
depends on creating media awareness in their Western countries of origin where corporate 
shareholders and customers reside. Campaigns are thus tailored to fit the understanding 
and perceptions of this target audience which often means simplification of complex local 
political and social challenges and, sometimes, their outright misrepresentation 
(Mendelson & Glenn, 2002; Rodrigues, 2011). The random presentation of 'local 
spokespeople' to the Western media in London and the neglect of other similar struggles in 
various locations across the country are only two examples of this in the present case. 
Many NAN actors were therefore torn between the hope for increased awareness and 
support from Western stakeholders on the one and the fear of misrepresentation and 
negative impacts of the transnational campaign on the cohesion and goals of the local 
movement on the other hand. As a result, domestic activists worked hard to (re-)localize 
the movement in several ways. First and foremost, they connected the struggle in 
Niyamgiri to a network of other past and present movements and Indian social movement 
organizations, transferred learnings, and created an exchange between key movement 
figures from different locations and linked the Niyamgiri struggle discursively to the fight 
of disadvantaged communities for land rights and participation in decision-making about 
natural resource and other large scale industrial projects on their land. This was an attempt 
to counteract the narrow representation of the Niyamgiri movement as the struggle of a 
'noble savage-like' indigenous tribe for their livelihood that was prevalent in the Western 
media. Second, they tried to support the formation of a strong local movement leadership 
that could assure a reliable long-term mobilization of the Niyamgiri communities. Finally, 
activists supported the communities to take legal action against Vedanta at the local and 
172
national level which ultimately resulted in the Supreme Court decision for local voting 
about the project that ended in its unanimous rejection. 
Previous management and organization studies on anti-corporate mobilization fail to 
capture the tension between the internationalization and localization of anti-corporate 
movements and tend to present a too benign image of transnational mobilization that 
neither takes into account the complexity of actors and their interactions, nor the potential 
negative effects of transnational mobilization observed by authors from other fields (e.g. 
Mendelson & Glenn, 2002; Rodrigues, 2011). The work presented here expands our 
knowledge and thinking about transnational anti-corporate activism in several ways.  
First, it expands the notion of the 'boomerang model' of transnational advocacy (Keck 
& Sikkink, 1998) as it has been applied to the context of anti-corporate mobilization 
(McAteer & Pulver, 2009; den Hond & de Bakker, 2012; Joutsenvirta, 2011). McAteer & 
Pulver (2009: 3) describe the 'corporate boomerang' as follows: "corporate-focused TANs 
emerge when local communities, living at points of production or extraction, are blocked 
in their efforts to influence the operating practices of a corporate subsidiary. Appeals to 
local corporate managers may fail because they are protected by local governments loath to 
challenge corporate practices and jeopardize the economic base of the locality." Den Hond 
& de Bakker (2012) extend these ideas further and distinguish three different types of 
TANs: the 'classic' case of mobilization against an individual corporation, the possible 
expansion of protest and tactics to other corporations in the same sector, and third, 
transnational protest against individual corporations with the ultimate goal of changing 
government behavior.  
Based on our findings, I suggest a possible extension to these ideas about anti-corporate 
mobilization that emphasizes attention to a potentially existing and effective national level 
advocacy network as I encountered it in the case studied here. First of all, not all local 
channels to influence a subsidiary were blocked. Unlike workers in sweatshops (den Hond, 
de Bakker & de Haan, 2010), the local communities threatened by the Niyamgiri mine 
were able to apply local tactics with a material impact on the firm such as local mass 
protests and road blockades. These were complemented by national level activities like 
litigation and protests in Delhi and, finally, by transnational advocacy that targeted the 
corporate headquarters in London. Many cases of anti-corporate mobilization will happen 
in local and national contexts that are similar to the one studied here, where a strong NAN 
can provide support to local activists. Management and organization studies of anti-
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corporate mobilization therefore need to pay more attention to existing mobilization 
structures and the ways in which transnational advocacy efforts can complement national-
level activism if we want to better understand the diversity of anti-corporate movements 
and the dynamics within them (see 6.2.5).  
Second, this conception of TANs as a potentially complementary support mechanism 
that 'docks on' to an existing NAN for a specific campaign has implications for notions of 
agency and power relations within TANs that have so far largely been ignored by 
management and organization studies. The idea of the traditional boomerang model that 
portrays national level activists as recipients of resources and support from their Western 
counterparts (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) has been unquestioningly taken over by management 
and organization scholars who applied this model to anti-corporate movements. My 
findings challenge this view and draw a different image where increased attention is paid 
to the agency and importance of NAN activists who are not only able to create leverage for 
local movements but also attempt to orchestrate and regulate transnational advocacy efforts 
by challenging and counteracting the representations and activities of TAN activists.  
Third and finally, my findings point to the establishment of a translocal resistance 
network (Banerjee, 2011) by NAN activists. Translocal resistance is different from the 
transnational advocacy model in that it proclaims the rootedness of individual movements 
in their local context while at the same time emphasizing the establishment of lateral 
connections between such locally rooted movements across the globe. Where the 
traditional boomerang model stands for transnational advocacy, the extension for including 
NANs suggested above is exemplary for translocal movements. Based on my findings, I 
argue that these translocal movements are based on personal eye-level relationships 
between individual activists, who might be independent or part of an international NGO. In 
that they go beyond the transactional relationships that are typical for TANs, where local 
activists 'trade' grassroots information and logistic support for the international awareness 
and support created by international NGOs. These traditional relationships surfaced in the 
present case for example when NGO staff from London traveled to Niyamgiri or sent film 
teams there without consulting with local activists and often resulted in confusion, 
disappointment or anger among Indian activists. NAN activists, however, were happier to 
interact with NGO members and other activists who were looking to strengthen the broader 
translocal coalition against minerals-based development that was building connections 
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between the movement in Niyamgiri and other local movements against Vedanta in Zambia 
and South Africa.  
It has been argued that some conflicts between corporations and local stakeholders 
cannot be analyzed as dyadic conflicts because they really are extensions of already 
existing conflicts (den Hond, de Bakker & de Haan, 2010). My findings support such ideas 
and point to the processes by which such extensions are being actively created by activists 
that operate at the national and translocal level.  
6.2.5 Adversarial framing as potentially harmful corporate communicative 
practice 
Social movements like the one studied here try to influence the discourse and values in 
a society and are part of a network of discourses that multinational corporations are 
embedded in (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). They compete with a host of private and public 
actors that are supportive of a certain corporate activity (Aaltonen, 2013) in a framing 
contest (Benford & Hunt, 2003) that mainly is about explaining what is at stake and 
thereby mobilizing people to action. The construction of frames that provide interpretive 
templates and meaning to actions is an essential component of organizing around contested 
corporate projects. And while we know a lot about how movements frame issues (e.g. 
Carroll & Ratner, 1996; Snow, 2004) the “resistance of those under fire has been mainly 
overlooked” (Guérard, Bode & Gustafsson, 2013: 782), especially in management and 
organization studies.  
Chapter five exposes the interpretive schemata applied by those in power to make sense 
of resistance and delegitimize the threatening alternative vision of reality propagated by 
protesters. It also examines the implications are for protesters and the communities that 
happen to be caught in the conflict. I show how the outsider and criminal master frames are 
adapted to the specific context studied here. Given that framing represents collective 
interpretations at the micro level (Goffman, 1974) and frames are used as tools for 
mobilization (Snow, 2004), frames and framing are the building blocks for macro-level 
institutionalized conventions (Gray, Purdy & Ansari, 2015). How adversaries are framed 
can therefore have far-reaching implications for their public perception and the perception 
of challenges to the corporate-driven and rapid industrialization-based development model 
that many governments are supporting. A normalization of repression of protest against this 
model might be the result.  
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Now what is the role of the corporation in all this? The expanding responsibilities of 
corporations bear the risk that companies "are criticized for what others have 
done" (Scherer & Palazzo. 2011: 913). On the one hand, a focus on process and organizing 
around contested corporate projects requires a more differentiated perspective than simply 
blaming 'the corporation' for the negative impact of adversarial framing. On the other hand, 
corporate and governmental elites can amplify and strategically deploy frames (Gray, 
Purdy & Ansari, 2015; Chong & Druckman, 2007; Scheufele & Scheufele, 2013) which 
means that the statements of corporate managers or high government officials might be 
intentional. In any case, they have the potential to permeate and can create far-reaching 
consequences if they are taken up by other pro-corporate actors who apply these frames to 
justify attacks and criminal activities as when anti-mining protestors are beaten up by pro-
mining youths with cricket bats sponsored by the corporation (Kraemer, Whiteman & 
Banerjee, 2013). The corporation might have no control over such activities but does that 
mean it cannot be held responsible?     
Below, I will first point to directions for future research that follow from this discussion 
before I focus on the practical implications of this work. 
6.3 Directions for Future Research
6.3.1 Process studies of organizing and action nets 
The idea of TANs and NANs is only an incomplete representation of the organizing 
processes underlying their formation. With our narrative and analysis in chapter four, we 
already point to the fluid nature of organizing around the contested Niyamgiri mine. This 
notion of organizing is being been taken one step further by Hernes (2008) and 
Czarniawska (2008).  
A focus on the organizing processes around contested corporate projects challenges 
much of the existing literature on contested corporate activity in two ways. First, it 
highlights that corporations do not confront some static 'opposition' that can easily be 
captured with the tools of stakeholder identification and salience (e.g. Mitchell, Agle & 
Wood 1997). The findings presented here show the complex and constantly evolving 
conglomerate of actors at the local, national and international level that create the 
perception of opposition among corporate managers. Actors such as NANs and TANs that 
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target corporate activities in a specific location result over time from the 'relating' that they 
do, the "continuous work of connecting and disconnecting in a fluctuating reality" (Hernes, 
2008: xv, citing Cooper 1981). These actors might have a different constituency and 
relationship with each other at any point in time and cannot be sufficiently described with 
traditional stakeholder labels.  
The entities observed in chapter four - NAN, TAN, and 'the corporation' - are tangled 
(Hernes, 2008) which means that they emerge and co-evolve in interaction and, through 
their relating, form an action net (Czarniawska, 2008). The label of who is organizing and 
who is counter-organizing seems arbitrary in this context where all entities engage in 
activities like recruiting, mobilizing, financing, educating, popularizing, and attacking. 
What is important in this perspective, however, are the interpretive templates chosen by 
individuals and groups as they engage in these actions (Czarniawska, 2008).  
Future work in the field of stakeholder management should pay more attention to this 
transience of alliances and identities and focus on the study of the unifying interpretitive 
templates that constitute 'actors' through activities rather than fixed identities. Traditional 
descriptive stakeholder labels such as 'the community' thus become worthless if they do 
not qualify what the community stands for and what its demands are at a certain point in 
time and how these demands might change in interaction with other (groups of) actors such 
as corporations and their supporters or international NGOs and their local representatives. 
Also Aaltonen (2013) has pointed to the conglomerate of public and private entities and 
individuals that might support large-scale industry projects although they might not share 
many characteristics  otherwise.  
Future studies should examine in more detail the activities within such action nets as 
they emerge around contested corporate projects rather than trying to categorize corporate 
stakeholders. Haug (2013) for example focuses on meetings as a central element of the 
process of social movement organizing and mobilizing. Other aspects, however, such as 
recruitment, education or the establishment of linkages between different movements that I 
have touched upon in chapter four are so far understudied.  
The formation of translocal movements is an interesting case in point when it comes to 
examining organizing processes. How are these translocal connections forged and how do 
corporations defend themselves against more and more interconnected localized yet 
internationally networked movements? Indian and UK activists in the present case were 
working hard to build a broad alliance against Vedanta by connecting the struggle in 
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Niyamgiri to local movements in Zambia, Trinidad and Tobago and South Africa where the 
corporation also had operations. Examining these translocal connections around the 
different operative sites of an individual corporation would add a meso-level perspective to 
existing studies looking either at movements against individual corporations (e.g. McAteer 
& Pulver, 2009; Joutsenvirta, 2011) or industry-level mobilization (den Hond, de Bakker & 
de Haan, 2010).  
6.3.2 Managerial discourse 
The social connection model of responsibility (Young, 2008) highlights the role of 
corporations in creating and/or maintaining the structural conditions that benefit them. 
Next to deliberate acts like negotiations with host governments or the membership in CSR 
initiatives to prevent attention to the underlying structural disparities that cause global 
inequality, managerial discourse is an important, yet so far understudied, tool by which 
corporations influence the conditions in which they operate. 
Kuhn and Deetz (2008) also point to the need to pay more attention to communication 
processes and practices within corporations if we want to take the critique of CSR beyond 
ideology critique. To this I would add the need to look for communication processes and 
practices around contested corporate projects to include also other entities that might 
support a corporate project at a given point in time. The authors call for an "enriched 
theory of communication" (Kuhn & Deetz, 2008: 190) that "focuses on understanding the 
cultural politics of experience and processes of domination in interaction, has a strong 
conception of 'other' and 'otherness', and is grounded in conflict theories". The case studied 
in this dissertation highlights the abysmal distance between progressive academic ideas 
and the grassroots reality of corporate practice and communication where project 
opponents are perceived as 'troublemakers' 'mischief mongers' or 'terrorists'. Future studies 
should work to close this gap between academic discourse and grassroots practice.   
6.3.3 The effects of 'protest as terrorism' and the role of corporations in movement 
repression 
Given recent arguments about the potential of frames to get amplified and reified into 
institutionalized conventions (Gray, Purdy & Ansari, 2015), future studies could also take 
interest in the framing of activists as terrorists and whether this frame is in the process of 
becoming a generalized perception of protest as an illegal disruption of the 'normal' order.  
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It appears that since the US 'War on terror' in the early 2000s an amplification of the 
terrorist frame is happening in terms of scope and regularity/frequency (Gray, Purdy & 
Ansari, 2015). Starting with the heavy policing of the anti-globalization protests in the last 
years, the treatment of anti-corporate protest has become rougher, also in the so-called 
developed world. Although there are no killings of activists involved, the repression of 
anti-corporate and protest against the extractive industry in Germany and the framing of 
the resistance is comparable to that described in chapter five. With a new wave of anti-
fracking protests around the world emerging, the study of corporate framing of protest is a 
promising area for future research as is the role of corporations in policing such protest. 
Moreover, framing has an impact on social movements by considerably shaping their 
'cultural opportunity structure' (Benford & Snow, 2000). A hostile public opinion reduces 
movements' room for maneuver in that it impedes their ability to recruit new members and 
find public support (Williams, 2004). We know too little about the impact of movement 
criminalization on future mobilization and the connection to a potential radicalization of 
movements as a reaction to narrowing opportunity structures and increasing repression (but 
see Della Porta & Fillieule, 2004). 
6.3.4 The mining industry as an 'extreme case' to examine stakeholder tactics 
More studies of mobilization against the mining industry would be needed to uncover 
differences in such resistance as compared to protest targeted at big customer brands from 
the apparel, electronics and oil industry (e.g. Khan, Munir & Wilmott 2007; den Hond & 
de Bakker, 2012; Zyglidopoulos, 2002). Much of the mining industry (with a few 
exceptions like De Beers) and also many oil companies are less receptive to the protest of 
individual customers through so-called 'buycotts' and attacks on their brand image. Some 
of the mechanisms of the corporate boomerang model do not take effect for these 
industries as they also do not for state-owned corporations or those from developing or 
transition countries. We know far too little about whether and how the activities of such 
companies can be controlled and what can be done to advance their social and 
environmental practices on the ground.  
The mining industry, however, depends on Institutional investors for finance and we 
should examine in more detail the power and influence of institutions such as the ethics 
committee of the Norwegian Pension Fund, whose decisions also influence other 
institutional shareholders and can therefore be crucial in reigning powerful corporations.  
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Another interesting avenue for further research is the effectiveness of local 
mobilization in creating a material impact on the firm. Such tactics are often ignored in 
studies of transnational and translocal resistance that largely focus on elite and mass 
participation tactics with a symbolic or material impact on corporations (e.g. den Hond, de 
Bakker & de Haan, 2010). However, such local impacts can be highly effective in an 
industry such as the mining industry that is highly dependent on particular locations where 
natural resources are found and where the most relevant local stakeholders are not 
employees like in the apparel industry but surrounding communities who are freer to 
organize protests and blockades that have the potential to bring entire operations to a 
standstill with high financial losses for affected corporations (Franks, 2014). Some 
attention has been paid in other fields to the impact that the costs of protest have for 
movement targets' willingness to change (Luders, 2006) but we know too little about how 
relevant these locally imposed costs are versus for example the reputational damage that is 
often the goal of transnational mobilization against mining corporations.  
Finally, future research in management and organization might want to examine 
mineral rich locations as sites of continued protest and mobilization that become fixed 
actors in a global action net against mining. The fact that "the mineral will always be in the 
ground" as one informant put it, represents a constant temptation for its exploitation and 
might result in continuous mobilization. In the social movement literature some attention 
has been paid to de-mobilization and re-mobilization of movements. What can we learn 
from these that will help us understand the potential reification of action nets and the 
potential emergence of new action nets in a context of long-term or repeated mobilization 
against mining? Given such important practical questions, I will now turn to the practical 
implications of this study.  
6.4 Practical Implications
What to make of the findings presented above in terms of practical recommendations? 
How not to fall into the trap of suggesting yet another managerial approach to corporate-
community relations? There are three areas where I feel, the findings presented above 
could have an impact: the interactions within transnational movements, notions of what 
constitutes a practical approach to CSR in the mining industry, and the education of 
(future) managers. 
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6.4.1 International NGOs in transnational campaigns and the emergence of self-
organized translocal movements as an alternative 
My findings highlight the importance of paying attention to internal organizing 
processes in TANs and have implications for the practice of individuals and groups 
engaged in transnational advocacy. Actors in international NGOs in many cases might need 
to re-think their engagement with local and national level activists and the role that 
international organizations can and should play in transnational advocacy efforts. Our 
findings show that although they were (at least sometimes) aware of the criticism by Indian 
activists, international NGO staff pushed ahead with their strategies for the transnational 
campaign and carried out the local activities that were required for it (e.g. local video 
shoots, sending of journalists to Niyamgiri). The effectiveness of TANs largely depends on 
their ability to deal with the "differences in interests, identities and ideologies" represented 
within them (den Hond & de Bakker, 2012: 292). We still know too little about the 
complex interactions within movements, a promising field for future studies.  
Recent organization studies literature points to meetings as important spaces for 
mobilizing and organizing activities in movements (Haug, 2013) and it would be 
worthwhile to pay attention to how international actors can best dock onto existing 
mobilization structures and how this could be facilitated by a structure of (online or 
offline) meetings with relevant NAN actors. Also, exploring how online communities and 
other online platforms and asynchronous communication tools could be made more useful 
for creating meaningful exchange and engagement among actors in TANs. The question 
here would be how we can facilitate the establishment of stronger and trusted connections 
between the various actors involved in TANs, facilitate information sharing and joint 
decision-making.   
6.4.2 CSR in the extractive industry 
In terms of what constitutes CSR in the extractive industry, I want to suggest in line 
with others (Banerjee, 2011; Whiteman, 2009) that it is first and foremost the ability to 
influence decisions about what happens on their land that will be able to change corporate-
community relations in the extractive industry. As long as communities are not involved at 
eye level, from the beginning of negotiations with host governments, and in a way where 
they really have a say about whether or not extraction is going to happen rather than just 
being participants in staged public deliberation processes (Lee & Romano, 2013), other 
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CSR measures will always remain only a payback for negative social and environmental 
impacts that leaves behind a bad aftertaste. The tactic of Vedanta, and many other mining 
and oil multinationals still seems to be to 'test the waters' and attempt to catch communities 
off guard by quickly pushing through extractive projects with self-interested local 
governments and then produce facts - such as by constructing a refinery at the foot of a 
mountain for which an extraction permit has not yet been obtained. The Vedanta case is 
maybe one of the few where this tactic has not worked out.  
Given such experiences, it does not surprise that communities are extremely weary of 
negotiations with mining or oil companies and reject their offers of stakeholder 
engagement. Another implication of my findings is that even if communities have no 
previous negative experiences with extractive industry firms themselves, the extensive 
efforts of NAN activists to embed them within a wider context of anti-corporate/anti-
mining mobilization, makes it impossible for firms to engage with them on a 'clean slate'. 
The way in which community engagement and CSR strategies are currently developed still 
suggests such a 'clean slate' approach that is very unlikely to be successful. The idea of 
embeddedness of anti-corporate mobilization in a web of past and current struggles and the 
relevance of the particular context should influence the planning of stakeholder 
engagement and CSR activities. 
6.4.3 A coalition against the policing of protest as terrorism 
As I argue in chapter five, anti-corporate movements are at threat of being framed as 
criminals and terrorists. Above (6.3.3) I give more examples of terrorist framing. These 
examples show that the findings presented above have a far wider reach than the Niyamgiri 
mountains. Just recently Intercontinental Cry, a non-profit working in the field of 
indigenous peoples' rights, published an article in its online magazine titled "Peru, an 'anti-
mining terrorist' in the making". In the article, the organization describes how members of 
the national Peruvian police were caught on video as they attempted to portray an anti-
mining protestor as a dangerous individual by placing a weapon into his hand and then 
taking a photo of him. The staged image later appeared in the national media, together with 
an article describing the protesting man as a danger to the public. It was retracted only after 
the intervention of Intercontinental Cry. Next to reporting this police practice, the 
organization argues further that the protests against the Tia Maria mine had been 
accompanied by several similar media headlines that framed the protest as 'terrorism'. It 
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further quotes a spokesperson of Southern Copper who apparently argued that the 
company's decision to cancel the mining project in March 2015 had been due to the 
ongoing "anti-mining terrorism" in the region.  
Social movements are essential for shaping societal values (Rochon, 1998). As 
societies around the world are trying to negotiate the value attached to the environmental 
and social costs of economic development 'imperatives', the framing of protest as terrorism 
is a dangerous tendency that warrants its own concerted countermovement complete with 
large-scale awareness raising and legal support for those affected. Organizations fighting 
for the right to free spee”h and human rights around the world try to tackle these 
challenges but do not draw on a shared narrative yet when it comes to opposing movement 
criminalization. This seems very much needed if we do not want to lose the diversity of 
worldviews represented especially by indigenous movements (Mander & Tauli-Corpuz, 
2006) and our ability to create economic and social innovation as a counterweight to the 
mainstream.  
6.4.4 Management education 
My findings also have implications for management education. A first step to overcome 
the "dominant conflict frame" among managers when it comes to stakeholder relationships 
(Kuhn, 2008: 1246), is the acknowledgement of the "constitutive force" (Kuhn, 2008: 
1227) of communication in organizations. This needs to be followed by attempts to 
deliberately change the way managers communicate with and about stakeholders and 
implies what could be labeled 'ideology work' in manager and management education. 
What is a better place to start with this than management schools? It is there where 
management and organization scholars have the chance to shape the interpretive schemata 
of future managers and develop their ability to perceive and include a broader set of values 
into their daily decision making practice. A change in how we educate managers of the 
future and current managers, beyond the Principles for Responsible Management 
Education (see e.g. Alcaraz & Thiruvattal, 2010) has the potential to change the high-level 
narrative of CSR that is often unrelated to the day-to-day communication and practice in 
corporations. 
The case presented here could easily be turned into a role play that would allow 
students to take over the roles of corporate managers facing the pressure to create support 
for their project by means of CSR, communication, and negotiation with the government. 
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Other students would take over the role of international NGO staff in need for a 'big scoop' 
and driven by the desire to generate the highest possible support among Western 
stakeholders in order to put pressure on the corporation. Finally, others would act as 
national and local level community stakeholders, faced with a double challenge of mining 
and external mobilization. Such role plays or the work with interactive case studies and the 
analysis of real-world cases go a long way in building empathy and the ability to change 
perspectives that is essential in today's world where corporate staff needs to be responsive 
to multiple pressures and where we should inspire a new generation of entrepreneurs. 
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7. EPILOGUE
Victory! What now? 
You, might ask yourself that question, now that you made it to the end of this 
dissertation (Consider yourself a member of an eclectic group!). I have asked it multiple 
times in the past months and thinking about an answer has been challenging. It made me 
question the practical meaning of my academic work and the value of a victory that might 
only be a temporary one as I have discussed above. I will try my best to first quench your 
hunger for some news from Niyamgiri and will then outline a couple of thoughts about 
how I might be able to follow my passion for "supporting the underdogs" rather than 
getting rid of it, as was once suggested to me by a member of my department after a 
presentation of my work.    
7.1 Updates from Niyamgiri
It is hard to find out about what is currently happening in Niyamgiri from Europe. The 
transnational advocacy caravan has moved on and online news coverage of the area has 
become much scarcer since the final community vote and subsequent victory over Vedanta 
in August 2013. The words 'Niyamgiri' or 'Vedanta' combined with the names of the three 
most relevant international NGOs that had driven much of the transnational campaign do 
not deliver much in terms of recent articles or updates since the Dongria Kondh's public 
vote against Vedanta in August 2013.  
The imperatives of their trade require these organizations to move on and focus their 
attention on more pressing topics that demand public attention. There is a lack of attention 
to the consequences of mobilization beyond the immediate 'win' over the target which is 
not only typical for advocacy organizations but also for much of the research on social 
movements (Giugni, 1998, 2004). One of the few exceptions, Khan, Munir and Willmott 
(2007) show the potential for transnational advocacy to create negative outcomes for those 
they are intended to protect. In their case, Bangladeshi soccer ball producers and their 
families were much worse off after the 'successful' transnational campaign against child 
labor in the industry. Also the anti-sweatshop movement only had small impacts on 
workers' actual labor conditions (Armbruster-Sandoval, 2004). Given such examples, it is 
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valid to ask, where has their victory left the Dongria Kondh? And what are their prospects 
for the future? 
One has to dig a bit deeper and look for translocal movement actors such as the makers 
of the Foil Vedanta blog who are more actively working to expose the shortcomings of the 
company and continue to connect activists translocally while attacking Vedanta at its 
headquarters in London. Also the Indi”n media still do pay some attention to the 
emblematic case that had high symbolic value for the question of how the country is 
balancing its hunger for economic growth with a responsibility to assure the welfare of the 
millions of people who still depend on their land and surrounding natural resources for 
survival. In January 2015 under the title 'Revisiting the legend of Niyamgiri', one of the big 
Indian dailies takes its readers back to Niyamgiri. The article lists a couple of the current 
challenges that people in Niyamgiri still face despite their victory: lack of appropriate 
education in their native language, survival in a market economy where intermediaries 
almost always get the better of them, and the incursion of the military and police forces 
into their lands due to alleged Maoist activities. Finally, the article also highlights the 
potential for local organizations that were formed during the resistance to also achieve 
improvements on other pressing issues the communities face. Whether or not these 
mobilizing structures persist will be shown but it might very well be one of the positive 
outcomes of movement activity together with the increased connection and feeling of unity 
among communities that a shared victory brings.  
For NAN activists, the victory against Vedanta is a positive sign for a successful 
application of the Forest Rights Act (2006) that allows forest dwelling communities to 
decide about the use of their traditional land. In that sense, the Niyamgiri victory has the 
chance to influence future tactics and political opportunities as it has the potential to turn 
around every mining MoU signed in the past years.  
At the same time, however, the Niyamgiri conflict also stands for a growing 
criminalization of participants in anti-corporate movements. The government has 
continued anti-Maoist operations in the Niyamgiri hills and the news report small 
'successes' such as the discovery of an empty Maoist camp in the area. The Dongria 
Kondh, however, took a clear stance against the Maoists when they attended the public 
votes about the mine in great numbers after Maoists had tried to deter this democratic 
process. NAN activists also continued to highlight the difference between the Niyamgiri 
resistance and Maoists. Nevertheless, in October 2014, another activist was arrested under 
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charges of being a Maoist. Haribandhu Kadraka, according to other activists, had 
repeatedly protested the police atrocities and combing operations in Niyamgiri. He also is 
an important figure in the communist party that had been a strong force behind the local 
movement against the mine and refinery. In November 2015, Drika Kadraka, another 
Dongria Kondh activist, committed suicide after being arrested by the anti-Maoist CRPF 
forces in Niyamgiri .  6
Next to this cost of the Niyamgiri success, more positive personal impact of 
mobilization (Giugni, 2004) can be observed as well. Jika, again, is an interesting case 
here. His Facebook profile picture, that shows him in full Dongria Kondh traditional 
adornment together with national politician Rahul Gandhi during his visit to Niyamgiri in 
2008, indicates that Jika still connects to his time as a central figure in the resistance 
movement despite his defection in 2009, the Vedanta-sponsored education and the 
production of a music CD with Dongria Kondh music - also financed and promoted by 
Vedanta. More recent pictures on his Facebook profile strongly speak to his wish to benefit 
his community and show that he has not turned his back on his heritage. They show a 
much different, more corpulent and modernly dressed Jika in blue jeans and white shirt, 
with short hair and without the Dongria hairpins. He shares images of himself as a 
translator at a tribal fair and the organizer of a cricket tournament for Dongria boys. 
Another picture shows him together with a group of traditionally dressed Dongria Kondh 
as he supports them in filling in application forms for some unknown benefit. 
For Jika, the conflict about the mine definitely had profound and in many ways positive 
biographical and economic consequences. For the majority of the Dongria Kondh, 
individual economic or career benefits have not accrued although may be that mobilization 
resulted in a stronger sense of community and collective identity (Hunt & Benford, 2004) a 
revival of traditions and indigenous identity as it has happened elsewhere (Murray Li, 
2000). What is clear though, is that the risk of mining in Niyamgiri is present despite the 
Dongria Kondh's temporary victory over one company. The chance that another mining 
company might apply for a lease to mine one of the bauxite rich mountains in the region is 
looming over the Niyamgiri communities like the sword of Damocles.  
Repeated mobilization might be necessary to protect the mountain in the long run and 
might demand a high toll in terms of arrests, criminalization and conflict within the 
 http://www.countercurrents.org/cc281115.htm (accessed Dec. 6th, 2015)6
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communities created by individuals 'selling out' to the company. There is an often 
neglected 'toll' that communities pay for mobilizing when they lose time and resources that 
otherwise would have gone into generating a livelihood. Especially for subsistence farmers 
and the very poor this might become an issue that can hamper movement participation or 
creates even greater poverty than before. As a result, resistance can erode and communities 
might become more susceptible to accepting CSR and offers for compensation and 
ultimately give way to the mine they never wanted. 
The final section below introduces some early stage ideas about the chance that exists 
for communities in a strong negotiation position based on economic alternatives to mining. 
I will draw on a brief comparison of the Niyamgiri and POSCO cases to make my point 
that next to translocal campaigning it might be translocal trade relationships that could 
create an alternative future for economically weak communities around the world that are 
threatened by land-loss through industry.  
7.2 A translocal network of economic alternatives to mining
When one compares the movement in Niyamgiri with the anti-POSCO movement at 
Orissa's coast (Park, 2011), it appears that Dhinkia and the surrounding communities can 
rely on a solid income from the production and sales of betel leaves that is not available in 
Niyamgiri and leaves the Dongria Kondh in a weak negotiation position on purely 
economic grounds. The villages in the proposed POSCO project area are able to reject 
corporate offers for compensation as insufficient by calculating the long-term value of their 
land over generations based on the annual income that can be earned from selling betel 
leaves. This is a rare example of a strong economic argument against mining in the poorest 
of all Indian states.  Having realized this difference and having heard stories from activists 
about walking over a 'carpet of rotting mangoes' in Niyamgiri during mango season, made 
me think. What if there was a way for the Niyamgiri communities to form a cooperative 
and earn a fair income with their agricultural produce rather than being cheated by 
middlemen or not being able to visit the local market at all due to anti-Maoist combing 
operations? What if they would produce value added products from the abundance of wild 
and forest cultivated plants like mangoes and pineapples? What if they would be able to 
sell these products to conscious customers in India and beyond? Customers, who want to 
188
learn more about their cause and are willing to support the protection of their mountain 
range with their wallets rather than with their feet?  
This is just the beginning of an idea to create translocal connections between past and 
present anti-mining and similar struggles about the right to land by subsistence and 
farming communities and sympathetic supporters all around the world through a network 
of local producers who sell their products under one brand. Not only would this social 
business provide fair payment for these products. It would also re-invest into these 
communities by supporting the formation of co-operatives, providing training and support 
in new product development, and provide an online platform for communities to share 
their struggles with the world and connect to other communities worldwide to form 
translocal networks. Customers would benefit from delicious value added ethically 
produced agricultural products with a story that are not only guilt-free but help 
communities develop at their own pace and gain the traction they need to make decisions 
about their future.  
Up until now this is just a dream. One that shows that with the end of this dissertation 
the journey has not ended. There's much to learn still and I feel that finishing 'the book' has 
little to do with having accomplished closure. To the contrary, I feel more than ever 
motivated to go out and learn and explore new fields such as the world of social business 
into which I have set foot in the past years next to finishing this dissertation. Setting up 
such a business starting from the broad outlines I shared above has much appeal in a 
hands-on way that allows faster iterations and more direct feedback loops than they are 
possible in the academic world.  
On the other hand I feel that much remains to be done in the academic world which 
motivates me to keep one foot rooted there while dipping the other into more unknown 
waters. This is grounded in the conviction that innovative approaches to management 
education as I called for above need people with experience in both worlds who are willing 
to inspire the next generation of corporate managers to rethink the way in which business 
needs to be done. 
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APPENDIX 
Short description / pseudonym Location Date Duration 
(mins)
Lawyer focusing on human rights law, 
regularly supports jailed activists from 
various movements across India
Delhi 25.11.2008 10 with & 
50 without 
recording
NGO Project Coordinator working with an 
international NGO on social and economic 
justice topics in Orissa and other states
Delhi 27.11.2008 37
Sanjay & Medha Delhi 27.11.2008 80
Delhi 24.2.2008 120
Medha Delhi 8.3.2010 72
Spokesperson of the anti-POSCO 
movement, member of the communist party
Bhubaneswar 1.12.2008 56
Journalist and activist working on grassroots 
media production 
Bhubaneswar 1.12.2008 45, no 
recording
Human rights lawyer working with several 
Orissa movements, group discussion 
together with Delhi activists
Bhubaneswar 2.12.2008 83
Jika - tribal activist and temporary central 
figure in the anti-Vedanta movement
Bissam Cuttack 3.12.2008 19
Bissam Cuttack 7.12.2008 12
Bissam Cuttack 5.2.2009 25
Bhubaneswar 19.3.2010 95
Niyamgiri leader of a tribal (land) rights 
organization active across India
A village in 
Niyamgiri
6.12.2008 about 60, 
no 
recording
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Seasoned female activist who was a central 
figure in the Kashipur movement of the 
1980s
Paikmal 11.12.2008 25
Interview with the former and the current 
leader of a successful anti-industry 
movement, members of the conservative 
BJP
Paikmal 11.12.2008 10
Senior human rights activist involved in 
several struggles across Orissa, member of 
the communist party
Paikmal 12.12.2008 25
Another seasoned female activist of the 
Kashipur movement
Paikmal 12.12.2008 30
Staff of an international NGO involved from 
early on in the mobilization against 
Vedanta's refinery and mine in Niyamgiri
Bhubaneswar 19.12.2008 63
Senior human rights activist involved from 
very early on in the anti-Vedanta movement
Bhubaneswar 9.1.2009 about 75, 
no 
recording
Head of a local NGO working with 
communities affected by 'natural and man-
made disasters'
Bhubaneswar 15.1.2009 49
Staff of a development NGO that mainly 
works with tribal villages across Orissa, also 
in Niyamgiri
Bhubaneswar 21.1.2009 45, no 
recording
Focus group with six participants occupying 
one or several of the following roles: NGO 
staff/consultant, lawyer, activist and 
researcher
Bhubaneswar 23.1.2009 85
Local Manager of an international NGO 
involved from early on in the mobilization 
against Vedanta's refinery and mine in 
Niyamgiri
Bhubaneswar 11.2.2008 53
Bhubaneswar 20.3.2010 30
Founder of an organization whose goal it is 
to form a national alliance of grassroots 
organizations, communities, and support 
organizations who struggle against mining
Delhi 27.2.2009 118
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Head of the South Asia team at an 
international human rights NGO also 
working on the case of Vedanta in 
Niyamgiri
London, UK 28.7.2009 49
Staff of an international indigenous peoples 
NGO also working on the case of Vedanta in 
Niyamgiri
London, UK 28.7.2009 64
Activist working extensively with several 
anti-mining struggles in India and 
internationally
Utrecht, The 
Netherlands
3./4.8.2009 2-3 hours, 
no 
recording
A member of staff of an international 
indigenous peoples NGO also working on 
the case of Vedanta in Niyamgiri
Phone 
interview
1.10.2009 65
UK photographer and activist who has been 
supporting the anti-Vedanta struggle from 
early on
Phone 
interview
11.12.2009 48
Coordinator of a Delhi-based networked 
support organization for people's 
movements across India
Delhi 13.3.2010 111
Campaigns Manager of an international 
NGO involved from early on in the 
mobilization against Vedanta's refinery and 
mine in Niyamgiri
Delhi 15.3.2010 60
Senior Fellow and Executive Director of an 
important Indian NGO working on natural 
resources and energy security
Delhi 16.3.2010 30
Charles Delhi 17.3.2010 30
Staff member of a Orissa NGO working 
with tribal communities mainly on 
community forest rights
Bhubaneswar 22.3.2010 105, no 
recording
International NGO staff working with the 
POSCO movement. Same NGO that had 
been working in Niyamgiri from early on
Bhubaneswar 24.3.2010 83
Senior activist and socialist who has been a 
central figure in several farmer's movements 
against industrialization in Western Orissa
Bhubaneswar 25.03.2010 73
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Appendix 1: Interviews with social movement actors and supporters 
Appendix 2: Interviews with corporate managers, consultants & government officials 
Spokesperson of the local chapter of CPI-
ML which heavily supported the tribal 
organization spearheading the anti-Vedanta 
movement in Niyamgiri
Bhubaneswar 27.3.2010 65
Leader of the anti-POSCO movement Dhinkia 2.4.2010 42
Six women from the anti-POSCO 
movement
Dhinkia 2.4.2010 15
Reporter of an Orissa TV channel that 
regularly reports about people's movements
Bhawanipatna 8.4.2010 47
Lawyer who was strongly involved in legal 
actions against Vedanta
Delhi 22.4.2010 65
47 interviewees in 42 interviews ~176 h
Short description Location Date Duration 
(mins)
Plant Manager, Vedanta Keonjhar 13.1.2009 85
CSR Manager, Vedanta Keonjhar 14.1.2009 40
Interview and walk through the colony with 
intermittent conversations with inhabitants
Jharsuguda 16.1.2009 140
PR Manager, POSCO Bhubaneswar 19.&20.1.2
009
180 total, 
125 mins 
recorded
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Bhubaneswar 23.1.2009 99
Bhubaneswar 15.4.2010 124
CEO Lanjigarh Refinery, Vice President 
Mines, Vedanta
Bhubaneswar 23.1.2009 45, no 
recording
Professor at a private management school 
who is consulting mining companies on 
resettlement policies and plans
Bhubaneswar 27.1./11.2.2
009
about 120, 
no 
recording
Head CSR & PR, Vedanta Lanjigarh Refinery Lanjigarh 5.2.2009 35
Assistant Manager PR, Vedanta Lanjigarh 
Refinery
Lanjigarh 5.2.2009 39 mins 
with, 15 
without 
recording
Associate GM Corporate Affairs, Vedanta Bhubaneswar 14.2.2009 2
Interview with three consultants working for 
Vedanta and other clients on mitigating 
environmental and social risks
Delhi 9.03.2010 120
Head of the Scheduled Cast Research & 
Training Institute who supported mining in 
Niyamgiri as a way to develop tribal regions
Bhubaneswar 23.3.2010 20, no 
recording
Bhubaneswar 12.4.2010 25, no 
recording
New PR Manager,  POSCO Bhubaneswar 30.3.2010 84
Another interview with one of the consultants 
to Vedanta interviewed in March 2010
Delhi 21.4.2010 72
17 interviews with 16 interviewees ~ 18 hrs 
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What does it mean when a corporation claims to have a ‘license to operate’ in a local community? 
How does a member of an indigenous tribe make it to London to protest against a multinational mining 
company? How do managers perceive and speak about protest against their company and how does 
this discourse matter for social movement repression? 
First, I argue, based on a literature review, that responsiveness to local community needs has become an 
important factor inﬂ uencing the ability of multinational enterprises to successfully internationalize their 
operations. Then, I explore the practitioner concept of the license to operate and develop this into a  
theoretical framework. Based on a case study of an anti-mining movement, that grew from the initial local 
community resistance in a remote Indian mountain range into a translocal movement, I try to answer the 
remaining questions empirically. To shed light on the organizing processes in anti-corporate movements, 
my co-authors and I trace the journey of a young man who for a short time became one of the leading 
ﬁ gures in the anti-mining movement but later changed sides to support the company. We also highlight 
the importance of national advocacy networks for successful movement building across borders. Finally, 
I analyze the managerial discourse about the anti-mining resistance and link it to the repression of social 
movement actors by the police and other stakeholders. Overall, this dissertation builds on and advances 
the growing literature on anti-corporate social movements.
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